




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THE
H I S T O R Y
OF THE
PROGRESS AND TERMINATION
OF THE
ROMAN REPUBLIC.

By ADAM FERGUSON, LL. D.

PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.

A NEW EDITION.

VOL. IV.

BASIL:

Printed and sold by J. J. TOURNEISEN.

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THE provincial appointments of Pompey and Crassus, with that which was at the same time prolonged to Cæsar, seemed to dismember the empire, if not to expose the republic itself to great danger.

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Of these three adventurers, Pompey and Cæsar, apart from the evil particularly apprehended in any of their measures, were in themselves subjects of a very dangerous character: neither possessed that dignity of mind which fits the citizen for the equality of persons in a republican State; neither could acquiesce in the same measures of consideration or power which other Senators had enjoyed before him; neither could be at ease where he did not command as master, or appear at least as the principal object in every scene in which he was employed.

This paltry ambition, some ages before, might have been held in contempt by the meanest of the People, or must have shrunk before that noble elevation of mind by which the statesman conceived no eminence besides that of high personal qualities employed in public services, or before that austere virtue which confined the public esteem to acts of public utility, supported by unblemished reputation in private life. But in the present age, there was a fashion which set such antiquated notions at defiance, controuled the authority of the State itself, and bestowed on private adventurers the attachment which belonged to the commonwealth, and the deference which was due to its legal head.

In the progress of this republic the character of parties had already repeatedly changed, and the danger to be apprehended from them accordingly varied.

In the first periods of its history, citizens were

divided on the supposed distinctions of birth; and, in the capacities of Patrician or Plebeian, strove for prerogative or privilege with much emulation, as separate orders of men in the commonwealth, but with little jealousy of personal interests.

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In a subsequent period, when the invidious part of the former distinction was removed, citizens having no longer the same subject of animosity, as being born to different pretensions, they entered more fully on the competition of individuals, and the formation of separate factions. They strove for the ascendant of aristocratical or democratical government, according to the interest they had formed to themselves in the prevalence of either. They were ready to sacrifice the peace and honor of the Public to their own passions, and entered into disputes accordingly, which were in the highest degree dangerous to the commonwealth. They thought personal provocations were sufficient to justify public disorders; or, actuated by vehement animosities, they signalized their victories with the blood of their antagonists. But, though sanguinary and cruel in their immediate executions, they formed no deliberate plans of usurpation to enslave their country, nor formed a system of evils to continue beyond the outrage into which they themselves were led by their supposed personal wrongs or factious resentments.

We are now again once more to change the scene, and to have under our consideration the

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conduct of men who were in reality as indifferent to any interest of party as they were to that of the republic, or to any object of State; who had no resentments to gratify; or who easily sacrificed those which they felt to the purposes of a cool and deliberate design on the sovereignty of their country. Though rivals, they could occasionally enter into combinations for mutual support; frequently changed their partisans, and had no permanent quarrel but with those who uniformly wished to preserve the republic. They were surrounded by persons who admired the advantages of wealth or of power which were gained at the expense of their country, and who indeed were ready to extol the virtues of any adventurer who led a numerous list of retainers to share in the spoils of the commonwealth.

Peace had now, for some years, except in that part where Cæsar commanded, been established throughout the empire. Instead of military operations, the State was occupied in directing the farms of the revenue, in hearing complaints of oppression from the provinces, and in appointing the succession of military governors. Besides the disputes which have been mentioned relating to the provincial appointments of Crassus and Cæsar, there arose a question on the subject of provinces to be assigned to their immediate predecessors in the Consulate, Marcellinus and Philippus. It was strongly urged that Piso, Gabinius, and even Cæsar, should be recalled to make way for officers who were entitled

to similar command in their turns. This measure was supported in part by Cicero, who vehemently contended, that Piso and Gabinius should be superseded; but urged the continuance of Cæsar in his station, a circumstance for which this able adventurer had taken sufficient precaution not to leave it in hazard from the issue of this debate.

Piso, the near relation of Cæsar, in the event of these deliberations, was actually recalled, and, upon his return to the city, complained to the Senate, in terms of great asperity, of the injury done to his character. Cicero had ever treated Piso and Gabinius, though in reality but the instruments of Pompey and Cæsar, as the principal authors of his late calamities; and, upon the present occasion, had pronounced against Piso that violent invective which still remains among his works and which the subsequent conduct of the person against whom it was directed in a great measure disproved.

Gabinius had for some years enjoyed the government of Syria, and during this time had ventured to employ the force of his province in a manner, which, together with some other offences, drew upon him, at his return to Rome, the animadversion of the Senate.

It has been mentioned that Ptolomy Auletes, king of Egypt, in exile from his kingdom, had applied to the Romans for aid in recovering his crown; that his suit had been granted, but rendered ineffectual by the regard which was paid

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to a supposed oracle, which forbade his being reinstated with a military force; that he had withdrawn to Ephesus, and taken sanctuary in the temple, where he waited for some change of fortune in his favor. Lentulus, the governor of Cilicia, to whom the business of restoring him, though without military force, had been committed by the Senate, deliberated whether he should not venture to disregard the restriction imposed upon him; march with an army to restore the king of Egypt; possess himself of the wealth which was to be found in effecting such a revolution, and trust to the influence of his friends at Rome in procuring his pardon from the Senate, and even their approbation of what he should have done.

Upon this question Cicero advised Lentulus, if he had a force sufficient to undertake the enterprise, not to lose an opportunity of performing a service which, though not authorized, could be afterwards vindicated. But the business still remained in suspense, when Gabinius arrived in Syria, and probably, by an advice from Pompey to the same purpose with that of Cicero to Lentulus, undertook, in opposition to a decree of the Senate and of the Augurs, the restoration of this exile to his throne. Having received or bargained for a great sum of money in return for this service, he advanced with a fleet and an army towards Egypt, passed through Palestine, and on his way raised a contribution in that country.

Berenicé, the daughter of Ptolomy, now in possession of the crown, had married Archelaus; and, in order to strengthen her hands against her father, had assumed her husband as a partner in the throne. But the forces of these associated sovereigns were defeated by Gabinius, and Ptolomy was restored to his kingdom. Gabinius, with the treasure amassed on this occasion, hoped to be secure against the attacks which, at his return to Rome, were likely to be made upon him, for his contempt of the Senate, and of the oracle, and for the extortion of which he was accused at the same time in Palestine, a part of his own province.

In this busy time of Cæsar's faction at Rome, he himself, upon an alarm of an invasion from Germany, had been called to defend the northern extremity of Gaul. Two separate hordes, the *Tenchteri* and *Usupetes*, pretending to be driven by superior force from the usual tract of their migrations, had united together, and presented themselves on the banks of the Rhine. The native inhabitants of the right of that river instantly abandoned their habitations, and collecting all the boats that could be found on it to the opposite side, made a disposition to stop the passage of these invaders.

The Germans, observing the precautions which were taking against them, affected to lay aside the design of passing the Rhine; and, by changing their course, made a feint to divert the

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attention of their antagonists. In execution of this purpose, they continued for three days to retire from the river. At the end of this time, supposing that their opponents would be off their guard, and returned to their ordinary way of life, they suddenly turned their whole cavalry, and in one night repassed the ground over which they had marched on the three preceding days, surprised a sufficient number of boats with which to accomplish their passage, dislodged the natives of the country on the left of the river before them, and from thence continued their migrations betwixt the Rhine and the Meuse, over what is now called the dutchies of Juliers, of Limburgh and Luxemburgh.

These invaders amounted, by Cæsar's account, to upwards of four hundred thousand souls¹; a number which exceeds that of the inhabitants of any city in Europe, besides London and Paris, and which may perhaps raise some suspicion of error in copying the text, or of exaggeration in the commentary, which was itself intended to raise the character of Cæsar at Rome. On the question relating to the probability of so great a number, it may be observed, that those migrating nations, certainly unacquainted with many of the arts which are practised to supply and accommodate popular cities, were likewise exempt from the want of such supplies, and acquiesced

¹ Cæsar de Bell. Gal. lib. iv. c. 15.

in what was necessary to mere subsistence. Such nations have less skill and industry than the manufacturer and the trader in a settled and well regulated city; but they have less waste and less misapplication of labor to superfluous and unprofitable purposes than take place in great cities.

The German nations of this age, although they had opportunities to observe among their neighbours the advantages of land-property, and of agriculture supported by skill and industry, yet frequently preferred the state of migration, and from policy declined making any permanent settlement, lest the care of property, and the study of unnecessary accommodation, should corrupt or enervate their people. Their favorite occupation was hunting, which they considered as a preparation for war. They traversed the woods and pasture lands, with numerous herds, and subsisted chiefly by milk, flesh, and game. They likewise knew the use of corn, of which they sometimes took a crop from favorable lands; but without remaining any longer than one season to cultivate any particular portion of ground.

They moved in great and numerous bodies, that must to a great extent have covered the face of the country over which they passed; but the body thus moving together were distinguished into separate clans and fraternities, led by their headmen or chiefs, who kept order in their several divisions. They allowed private parties to make war beyond the limits of their own coun-

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BOOK try, and to chuse their leaders for this purpose.
IV. In peace, the separate clans had no band of connexion. If they had at any time a general government which comprehended the whole of their tribes, it was but a temporary expedient, to which they had recourse in war, and on other pressing occasions.

Under such equality of conditions, every individual, who was of a proper age, was obliged to labor for himself; and to subsist by what he procured; and he employed his labor only in procuring what was necessary. In these circumstances, it was not likely that commodities should accumulate; but the numbers of the people, if we may rely on the testimony of Cæsar in this place, or on the evidence of ancient history in general, was certainly great².

The Suevi, before whom the present invaders of Gaul had retired, were said to consist of a hundred cantons, each furnishing annually a thousand men for war, and a like number for the care of their herds and domestic concerns. Such clouds gathering on the frontier of Cæsar's province, required his presence. He accordingly assembled his army, and advanced between the Rhine and the Meuse.

The Germans, in general, were accustomed to despise the Gauls, and the present invaders expected no formidable opposition on this side of the Rhine; they had ventured to divide their forces,

² Cæsar de Bell. Gall. lib. iv. c. 15.

and had sent the great body of their horse upon an excursion beyond the Meuse to scour the lower parts of the country, and upon Cæsar's approach, they offered to treat with him. "They neither fought (they said) nor would they decline a war with the Romans. It was their way to repel injuries with the sword, not to elude them by negociation. But in the present case, they should nevertheless condescend so far as to assure the Roman general, that they had passed the Rhine from necessity, and not with any intention to invade his province. That if he were pleased to receive them as friends, they were in condition to merit this title, should be content with the ground they had gained, or accept of any other which he might chuse to assign them." Cæsar replied, "That while they remained in Gaul, he could not consider them as friends. That if they repassed the Rhine, he had allies in Germany, with whom he should endeavour to join them in a league of defence against the common enemy, by whom they had been thus forced to relinquish their usual bounds."

Having received this answer, the German deputies, to make their report, and to receive the command of their nations, desired a cessation of arms for three days. But Cæsar, suspecting that they only meant to amuse him, and to gain time for the junction of all their forces, refused to comply with this request, and continued his march. Being arrived within twelve miles of

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IV. with fresh entreaties that he would advance no farther, or at least, that he would give to the cavalry, who made the vanguard of his army, orders to abstain from hostilities for three days: that in this time, they might have an answer from the German nations mentioned in their last conference, and know whether such a league could be formed, as was then proposed, to give them some prospect of safety in returning to their usual haunts.

Cæsar, upon this occasion, seems to have granted a cessation of arms; though on account of what afterwards happened, he is willing to diminish the extent of his own engagement, and to impute the breach of faith which followed to his enemies. He agreed to advance no farther than four miles for the convenience of water, and sent an order to his vanguard to abstain from hostilities. This order, however, had no effect. His advanced guard, consisting of five thousand horse, had an encounter with eight hundred of the enemy.

When this encounter happened, the Germans were not yet joined by the great body of their horse. They had earnestly sued for a cessation of hostilities; it was not likely that they would have begun the attack. Yet Cæsar accused them of a design, with this small party, to surprise the whole of his cavalry.

On the day which followed this skirmish of the cavalry, the leaders and principal men of the

Germans leaving their own camp, unfurnished with officers, in perfect security, came in great numbers to that of Cæsar to exculpate themselves, to convince him of their pacific dispositions, and to prevent the farther progress of his army. This he thought a favorable opportunity to cut off, by a complete surprise, this enemy entirely, and to finish the war. Having accordingly secured the persons of their leaders, who had thus put themselves in his hands, he advanced with his whole army directly to their camp, easily overcame the few that took arms to oppose him, and without distinction of sex or age, put the whole to the sword. The country, over all the ways by which they endeavoured to escape from the camp, at which the slaughter began, to the confluence of the Rhine and the Meuse, was strowed with the slain³.

The Roman people, though seldom sparing of the blood of their enemies, were shocked at the recital of this extraordinary massacre; and when Cæsar, on account of this victory, applied for a thanksgiving, and for the usual honorary decrees of the Senate, he was charged with having wantonly invaded the nations of Gaul, and of having dishonored, by an act of treachery, the arms of the Republic. It was proposed to deliver up his person to those injured nations, that he might expiate, by his own sufferings, so many acts of

³ That branch of the Rhine which falls into the Meuse, changes its name for that of Wall.

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injustice and impiety, which the Gods might otherwise avenge on his country.

The German horse, that by their absence had escaped this calamity which befel their countrymen, appear soon after to have repassed the Rhine, and to have taken refuge with some of the Hordes who lived near the sources of the Roer and the Lippe. Thither Cæsar, to spread the terror of his arms, soon afterwards pursued them; and passed the river, not in boats and by surprise, as the Germans were accustomed to do, but in a manner which he seems to have chosen, as better suited to the dignity of the Roman state; he projected a bridge, which was executed in ten days, with much ingenuity, and some ostentation of his power and skill. This work being finished, he placed proper guards at both its extremities, and advanced with the main body of his army into the contiguous part of Germany, where, on account of the reception given in that quarter to the cavalry who had escaped the late massacre on the Meuse, he laid the country under military execution.

Cæsar, from the place at which he had passed the Rhine, appears to have gone up the eastern side of the river, where he visited the Ubii, a nation inhabiting over against what are now the cities of Bonne and Cologne. Here he had intelligence, that the Suevi, a nation consisting, as has been observed, of a hundred cantons, and mustering two hundred thousand warriors, who were divided into two squadrons that took the

field, and conducted the domestic affairs of the nation by turns, were preparing to oppose him; that they had actually sent their wives, children, and superannuated men into places of safety, and had assembled their warriors to meet him. This nation having an ascendant over all the cantons of Germany, considered it as a proof of their valor, that no nation could pretend to settle on the tract of their migrations, or within reach of their excursions; and that the country, to a great distance around them, was accordingly waste. In their own movements, they never halted above a year to raise a single crop from fields, which, to keep up the martial spirit of their nation, and to preclude the desire of property, with the other passions that accompany settlement, they successively abandoned.

Cæsar, not being prepared to enter on a war with such an enemy, and being sensible that a defeat might expose his army to ruin, while even a victory could procure him no adequate advantage, having remained eighteen days on that side of the Rhine, and employed no more than twenty-eight days in the whole service, chose, while he still had the reputation of victory unimpaired, to repass that river, and to break down his bridge.

This singular man, whose abilities were equal to any task, and who had no occasion to court the public admiration by measures concerted on purpose to obtain it, was, nevertheless, not above ostentation, and gave way to it not only where

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BOOK it might contribute to impose on an enemy, but
IV. even where it would do no more than gratify his own vanity, or increase the fame of his actions at Rome. To this motive we may venture to impute the design, which, at an advanced season of the year, and at the end of the same summer in which he had, between the Meuse and the Rhine, vanquished the numerous army of the Tenchteri and Usepetes, in which he had passed the Rhine, and insulted the warlike nations of Germany, even on their own ground, he now projected the invasion of Britain, though surrounded by the ocean, and untouched by the arms of any foreign invader. To carry this design into immediate execution, as soon as he had repassed the Rhine, he continued his march through the low countries, and collected his forces in the neighbourhood of the Portus Icius and Gesoriacum *. While we perceive the features of vanity in the leader, we must admire the hardiness and vigor of the troops who could accomplish these services.

The extent of this island, the numbers and character of its people, were then unknown on the continent. Cæsar having in vain endeavoured to procure information in these particulars, sent a galley with orders to explore the coast, and to observe the countenance of the natives. He ordered all his shipping, and even those vessels which he had employed the preceding year

* Calais and Boulogne.

against

against the Veneti¹, to sail round the Cape of
Britanny into the British channel, and repair to
the straits which separate this island from the
continent.

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I.

On the report of these preparations, which evidently pointed at Britain, some of the natives, willing to avert, by negociation, the storm which threatened them, sent to the Roman Proconsul a submissive message, and offered to come under his protection.

Cæsar, founding a claim to the possession of the island on these advances which were made to him, proceeded with more boldness to the execution of his enterprize. That the natives of the country he was leaving might not create any trouble in his absence, he obliged them to give hostages, and made a proper disposition of his army to keep them in awe. He had assembled at the most convenient haven on the Gaulish side, now supposed to be the Wissan, between Calais and Boulogne², eighty transports or ships of burden, with a number of galleys to accommodate the officers of rank, and their equipage. The remainder of his shipping was yet detained by contrary winds, in a creek at some miles distance, supposed to be Boulogne; thither he sent his cavalry, with orders to embark on board the ships where they lay. He himself went on board, with the infantry of two legions, at the former

¹ In the Bay of Biscay, about Vannes.

² See Danville's Geography of ancient Gaul.

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haven, and having found a favorable wind and moderate weather, weighed about ten at night, and reached the coast of Britain, on the following day, at ten in the morning. The cliffs, where he first came near to the shore, were high and steep, and the hills were covered with numerous bodies of foot, of men on horseback, and even in wheel-carriages, from which the natives of this country were accustomed to make war. It being impossible to land under such difficulties; and in the face of this opposition he bore away, as is probable, to the northward about eight miles, with a favorable wind to some part of the flat shore⁷ which surrounds the Downs; and here, in the manner of ancient debarkations, for which the shipping of those times was built, ran his transports aground, and prepared to land.

In the mean time the Britons, who in their march on the hills had kept pace with the Roman galleys, came down to the strand, and advanced even some way into the water to oppose the descent. As the surf on that shore usually runs high, and the Romans, from where their vessels struck, had some way to wade in water that was too deep to allow them the free use of their weapons, they remained on board, and durst not meet the enemy under such disadvantages. Cæsar seeing his men unusually backward, did not

⁷ Planum & apertum littus. See Cæsar's Commentaries.

think proper, in these circumstances, to urge them farther; but ordered some of the lightest vessels, which were mounted with missile engines, or manned with archers and slingers, to row as near to the shore as they could on the right and the left of the landing place, and from thence to gall the enemy. This disposition succeeded so well, that the beach close to the water was presently cleared, and the Romans were left to descend from their ships, and to wade undisturbed to the land.

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The Britons, seeing their enemy in possession of the shore, offered to surrender, and were about to deliver their hostages, when an accident happened, which encouraged them again to take arms. On the fourth day after the Roman infantry had landed, a second division of ships, with the cavalry, appeared in sight; but before they could reach the land, were dispersed by a violent storm; part was driven back on the coast of Gaul, part carried down the British channel, and cast in distress on the contiguous shores. Even the shipping, from which the legions had disembarked, lying aground in the surf, or at anchor in a high sea and spring-tide, with which, the Italians were unacquainted, were set adrift, or filled with water, many of them beat to pieces or greatly shattered, and rendered unserviceable.

By these misfortunes, Cæsar, although he had made no provision to subsist for the winter in Britain, was in danger of being obliged to remain in it for want of shipping. The natives

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retracted their late submission, began to drive away the cattle, and to lay waste the country within reach of the Roman camp. They flattered themselves that the enemy would be obliged to depart, or must perish for want of provisions; and that they would, by the example of so vain and calamitous an attempt, deter every stranger for the future from invading their island.

Cæsar, in the mean time, while he employed all his workmen with the greatest diligence in repairing his ships, endeavoured to collect some provisions, and to form a magazine. The natives assembled in great bodies to intercept his foragers, and obliged him to cover them with the whole force of his army. The legions were at first greatly disconcerted by the unusual effect of the British chariots, and by the want of their own cavalry; but as they prevailed in every close fight, the Britons were soon obliged to renew their former submission, and became bound to deliver double the number of hostages they had formerly stipulated. But Cæsar not thinking it proper, with shattered vessels, at the mercy of autumnal winds and stormy seas, to await the performance of this article, ordered the hostages to be sent after him into Gaul, reembarked with his army, and with the first favorable wind repassed to the continent. At his arrival, he found that the Gauls upon the report of his late misfortunes, had revolted; that one of his transports, with three hundred men on board, having parted

with the fleet, and landing at a separate place, were attacked; and that it was necessary to send the remains of his cavalry to their relief. The Morini, inhabiting what are now the districts of Calais and Dunkirk, with other nations of the low countries, had taken arms against the officers he had stationed to keep them in awe. The campaign therefore concluded with the operations, which were necessary to quell this revolt. Labienus subdued the Morini. Quintus, Titurius, Sabinus, and Lucius Cotta having laid waste great part of the low countries, fell back to the coast.

The Roman army was soon after put into winter quarters; and Cæsar, as if sensible that he had made his attempt on Britain with too small a force, and whatever representation he might give of particulars, had incurred the imputation of a miscarriage, gave orders to refit his fleet, and to add, during the winter, as many more ships as possible, built upon a construction more fit for that service, broader, and more capacious in the hull, for the reception of men and horses, and lower in the gunwale, for the convenience of landing. The timber was probably taken from the neighbouring forests; but the materials of his rigging, it is said, were brought from Spain. Having taken these measures to enable him at a more convenient season to renew his expedition into Britain, he set out as usual for Italy, and for the neighbourhood of Rome.

Here he found Pompey and Crassus employed,

BOOK IV. as has been already related, in obtaining for themselves, and for him, the objects which they had severally in view. Crassus had fixed his thoughts on the treasures of the East, and projected the sale of kingdoms, of which he hoped to have the disposal in that part of the world. Pompey too was gratified in his wishes, had got the command of an army, and the patronage of a great province, while he continued at Rome to enjoy his consideration, and was vested with a species of monarchy, in wielding the united powers of the party. Cæsar had provided, what he knew in the end was to decide every controversy, a great army, inured to service, and in a station which gave an easy access to Italy, and the command of Rome. As if secure of their interests, they permitted the election of Consuls to proceed without disturbance; and suffered Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, a professed partisan of the senate, together with Appius Claudius, to be elected Consuls; Marcus Cato, and Milo, to be placed in the list of Prætors; and several citizens, well affected to the Senate, to be admitted into the college of Tribunes.

U. C. 699.
L. Dom.
Ahenobar-
bus, App.
Claud. Pul-
cher.

The winter and spring, however, were inactive on the part of the aristocracy. Cato, probably did not see any public object in which to engage with advantage beyond the duties of his office, in which he endeavoured to restrain by his authority, and by his example, the extravagance and luxury of the age. The dangerous powers which had been recently granted to persons, from

whose ambition the republic had much to fear, CHAP.
no doubt greatly alarmed the senate; but this I.
body, though led by Domitius, one of the Consuls, by Cato and Milo, two of the Prætors, and supported by many of the Tribunes, did not think themselves entitled to dispute the validity of those grants, nor to attempt the revocation of what had been so recently confirmed by the people.

Pompey, now master of Spain and part of Africa, with an adequate army, still under the pretence, as has been mentioned, of his commission to furnish the public granaries with corn, remained in Italy, and passed the greater part of his time among his country-villas, executing the duties of general purveyor with the assistance of his lieutenants, and managing his intrigues in the city by means of his agents and friends. He was attended by numbers of every rank and condition, who resorted to him with the assiduity of real courtiers, and with a servility, which, in a republic, implied the utmost corruption of manners. He even maintained the appearances of royalty in the state which he assumed, as well as in the influence he acquired. While he himself affected reserve and moderation, in order to appear worthy of his rank, his retainers ever treated him as a great prince, and with his connivance fomented disorders tending to shake the government of the Senate; to the end that the republic might be forced to rely on him for support, while he himself affected to decline the burden.

In the management of these intrigues, and in the

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IV.

full hopes of their success, Pompey was now left by Crassus, as well as by Cæsar. The first, in his impatience to take possession of his government, had broken through all the impediments that were placed to hinder his departure from Rome, made haste to Brundisium with his army, embarked, notwithstanding the unfavorableness of the season, and, with considerable loss, both of men and shipping in a storm, made his passage into Macedonia. The prohibition of the Prætor still sounded in his ears. He dreaded a vote of the Senate or People to recall his commission. It appears, that soon after his departure, a motion had been actually made for this purpose; and that Cicero, though formerly on ill terms with Crassus, being taught by his late sufferings to court the favor of those who could either hurt or protect him, appeared on this question in his favor, and claimed a share in the merit of obtaining the decision that was given to confirm his commission^{*}.

But without attending to the state of these deliberations at Rome, Crassus continued his march by Macedonia and the Hellespont into Asia. In passing through Galatia, finding Dejotarus, sovereign of that principality, then of an advanced age, occupied in a work that is becoming at every age, building a new city, and making a settlement for more people; he is said to have observed to the prince, that it was somewhat too

^{*} Cicero ad Famil. lib. v. ep. 8. ad Crassum.

late, at his age, to form projects of new settlements; "nor are you very early," replied the other, "in your undertaking the conquest of Parthia."

C H A P.

I.

Crassus was turned of sixty, and having ever considered riches as the surest means of arriving at eminence and power, now joined, to the rapacity of a youthful ambition, the avarice of age. Upon his arrival in Syria, he pillaged the temple of the Jews, and laid hold of treasure wherever else he could find it. He made a pretence of the military levies to be made in the provinces for extorting money; and afterwards, reserving the money he had raised for his own use, neglected the levies. He required of the different districts of his province, and of the neighbouring allies, large quotas of men and military stores, merely that they might buy exemptions with proportional sums of money⁹. In the same spirit of avarice and rapacity, he invaded the Parthians without any authority from the State, and even without the pretence of a quarrel.

The Parthians, like other dynasties which before or since have arisen in that part of the world, or in the neighbourhood of the Euphrates and the Tigris, were of Scythian extraction. On the decline of the Macedonian power, about two hundred years before the present date, a swarm from the north had migrated to the lower banks of the Tigris, over-ran the country round Ctesiphon,

⁹ Plut. in Crasso, 11. Dio Cass. lib. iv. c. 13.

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BOOK continued to harass the neighbourhood by their
IV. depredations; and, at last, being commanded by Arfaces, the founder of this new kingdom, took possession of an extensive country, and though under a new name, in fact restored the monarchy of Persia¹⁰.

The Parthian, or new Persian monarchy, being yet in its vigor, was the most formidable power that now any where appeared within reach of the Roman arms. Its forces consisted almost entirely of horse. Part intended for regular charges, cased in heavy armour, and using the lance; part mounted in a lighter manner for expedition and swiftness, and using the bow. While in the field they were attended by herds of spare horses, which they pastured, or drove in the rear of their armies. With this supply, upon any occasional loss, they new-mounted their cavalry, or, having reliefs of fresh horses, performed amazing marches, and frequently presented themselves to their enemies, where it was not expected they could appear. They had different notions of victory and defeat from other nations; they always counted it a victory, when, by their flights, they drew an enemy into straits by hasty and unguarded pursuits¹¹, and often enjoyed the greatest advantage when they seemed to be routed and to fly.

When Crassus advanced to the Euphrates,

¹⁰ Justin. lib. lxi. Dio Cass. lib. xl. xli.

¹¹ Ibid. Dio, lib. xl. c. 15.

Orodes king of Parthia, then engaged in a war with Artabazes, on the side of Armenia, sent a deputation to expostulate with the Roman general on the cause of his hostile approach, Crassus made answer, That he would give the reasons of his coming when he arrived at Seleucia, "Here," said one of the Parthian messengers (showing the palm of his hand) "hair will grow before you shall arrive at Seleucia." Crassus proceeded in his march, passed the Euphrates, and ravaged Mesopotamia without any resistance. Having continued his operations until the end of the season, he returned for the winter into Syria¹². Upon his arrival in this province, he was joined by his son Publius, who had served some years in a considerable rank in the army in Gaul, and was now detached by Cæsar with a thousand horse, and many marks of honor, to act under his father in Syria.

This invasion of Mesopotamia, after the season had become far spent, served only to alarm and provoke the enemy, without procuring any advantage to the arms of the Romans; and hostilities were likely to proceed in the spring with great animosity, when Crassus was to prosecute the war which he had thus commenced on such dangerous ground.

Cæsar, in the mean time, found continual occupation for his troops in Gaul, or in the neighbourhood of that province. He himself, with

¹² Dio Cass. lib. xl. Plut. in Crasso.

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his usual activity, having been in Italy in the beginning of winter, and having conferred with the persons with whom he intrusted the management of his affairs at Rome, proceeded to Illyricum, upon a report, that this part of his province was infested by the incursions of the Pyrustæ, a warlike tribe on the frontier. Upon his arrival, the invaders withdrew, and were disowned by their nation. The State denied, that they had ever given a commission to make war on the Roman province, became bound for the future to restrain the depredations of private adventurers, and gave hostages for the observance of this article.

Early in the spring, Cæsar returned from this expedition to the quarters of his army in the Low Countries, and found, that in consequence of the orders he had given at the end of the preceding campaign, no less than six hundred transport-vessels, and twenty-eight galleys, were actually built in different harbours from Ostend to Boulogne, and in a few days might be ready for sea. He accordingly ordered them to be launched, and directed the whole to assemble at the same port from which he sailed on the preceding year, in order to receive the army on their intended invasion of Britain. But, before his departure, being informed that certain nations on the Moselle were meditating a revolt, and were soliciting the Germans to come over the Rhine to their assistance, to the end that he might not leave any enemy on foot in his rear, and that he

might secure the peace of Gaul in his absence, he marched to the Moselle with four legions and eight hundred horse. Upon his arrival he had the good fortune to find the people divided between two leaders, who, being jealous of each other, made their submissions separately, and gave the necessary hostages as a pledge for their future behaviour.

With these securities, Cæsar returned to the coast, found all his armed galleys and five hundred and sixty of his transports actually assembled; the other forty transports had been put back by contrary winds, and were still retained at the port at which they had been built. The force intended for this expedition to Britain consisted of five legions, amounting possibly, on the probable supposition that they were not complete, to about twenty thousand men¹³, together with a body of Gauls, including many of their chiefs, whom Cæsar chose to retain with his army, rather as hostages for the fidelity of their countrymen, than as auxiliaries in the war. The fleet consisted of five hundred and sixty transport-vessels, twenty-eight armed gallies, with many tenders and small craft, provided by officers for their own conveniency, and for the reception of their equipages; in all eight hundred sail.

The wind being northerly for five-and-twenty

¹³ The legions, at the end of this campaign, were reduced to 3,500.

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BOOK IV.

days ¹⁴, after the fleet was assembled, the troops still remained on shore. At the expiration of this time the wind changed, and the troops began to embark, but were suddenly interrupted by the desertion of a Gaulish chief, who, being averse to the service, thought this a favorable opportunity to disengage himself with his followers. Cæsar considered this desertion as a declaration of war, and being sensible of the danger he might incur in case of any disaster by having such enemies in his rear, suspended the embarkation, and sent a party of horse in pursuit of the fugitive, who, being overtaken, was killed in attempting to defend himself. His followers were brought back and obliged to embark for Britain.

On the return of the party employed in this service the embarkation proceeded, and being completed at sunset of the same day, the wind being still fair, the fleet weighed, and got into the Channel; but the wind soon after having failed, or shifted more to the west, and the tide being set to the northward, they were carried a considerable way in that direction past the port for which they had steered. At day-break, they saw the land of Britain on their left, and seemed to leave some conspicuous part of the island, probably the South Foreland, astern: but with the turn of the tide, and the help of their oars, they arrived at noon at a convenient part of the coast

¹⁴ See Cæsar's Commentaries.

not far distant from the landing-place of the former year, but less exposed to the sea. This place we may suppose to have been *Pigwell Bay*, beyond the mouth of the *Stour*, or the entry to *Sandwich-Haven* ¹⁵.

C H A P.

I.

The Britons had assembled as formerly to oppose the descent of the Romans; but, on the appearance of so great a fleet, were intimidated, and withdrew from the coast.

Cæsar, flattering himself that he had found a safer road for his ships than that at which he had stationed them in the preceding year, left his fleet at anchor, and guarded against any attempts of the natives by a body of ten cohorts and three hundred horse, that were properly intrenched on the shore. Being informed that the Britons had their forces assembled on a small river (probably the *Stour*), at the distance of ten or twelve miles

¹⁵ Mr. d'Anville, on a supposition that Cæsar must have passed into Britain by the shortest possible line, fixes upon Hith, about eight miles west of Dover, as the place of his landing in his first invasion of Britain; and, consequently, on some other contiguous part as the place of his landing in the second invasion: but this does not agree, either with the description of the coast, being *planum & apertum littus*, or with the sequel of the story, which places such a river as the *Stour* to be passed in his march, about twelve miles from the shore. The coast at Hith, though not altogether inaccessible, is steep and hilly, and would have exposed Cæsar to difficulties in his first operations on shore, which he could not possibly have omitted to mention.

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from his landing-place, he put his army in motion in the night, and at break of day came up with them, dislodged them from their post, and obliged them to withdraw to a place of retreat in that neighbourhood, which, on occasion of their own wars, had been fortified in their manner with a mote, and ramparts of wood. To reduce them in this strong hold, he erected some works, and made regular approaches; but as he had not invested the place, the only effect of his attack was, to force the enemy to abandon it, and to continue their retreat. He had taken his resolution to pursue them on the following day, and had begun his march in three divisions, when it appeared, that the element which is the safeguard of Britain, though not always sufficient to keep its enemies at a distance, yet is subject to accidents which render the attempt of invaders very difficult, and their condition, even when on shore, sufficiently hazardous. To this purpose a messenger overtook Cæsar on his march with tidings, that all his ships, in a storm which arose in the preceding night, had been driven from their anchors, had run foul of each other, that many of them were stranded, and wrecked, and all of them greatly damaged.

Cæsar, on this report, suspended his march, and, having fixed the main body of his army in a well-fortified camp; he himself, with a proper escort, returned to the coast. At his arrival, he found that forty of his ships were irrecoverably lost;

lost; but that the remainder, though greatly damaged, might be refitted. For this purpose he gave orders in the army, that all who had been instructed in the trade of a carpenter, should repair to the sea port to be employed in refitting the fleet; he called many workmen likewise from Gaul, and gave directions for building a number of new vessels on different parts of that coast; and to guard, for the future, against such accidents as had lately befallen his ships, he ordered that they should be drawn on shore. In this work the army was incessantly employed for ten days, and without intermission even in the night. The fleet, at length, being in this manner secured from the dangers of the sea, and covered by an intrenchment on the side of the land, he returned to his camp, and resumed the operations of his army.

C H A P.

I.

It appears that the natives of Britain, being divided into many small cantons or separate principalities, and, as usual in such cases, frequently at war among themselves, had been actually at variance when Cæsar arrived; but during the short respite which the disaster that had befallen his fleet had given them, they had agreed to suspend their own quarrels, and were assembled in greater numbers than formerly, under Cassivelaunus, a chieftain of Middlesex, or, as Cæsar describes him, a prince residing on the northern banks of the Thames, and at about seventy or eighty miles from the sea.

This chieftain brought into the field a numerous

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B O O K army of infantry, of horsemen, and armed chariots.
IV. His knowledge of the woods enabled him to harass the Romans on their march, and, following the tracts that were clear of underwood, not only to gall them with missiles from the thickets, but to charge them likewise with his horsemen and chariots even in places where the ground seemed least fitted to the movements of such bodies. Encouraged with his success in this species of warfare, he ventured to attack the whole cavalry of the Roman army, which, being on a foraging party, were supported by an entire legion. But the Britons being, in this attempt, defeated with great slaughter, their chief lost courage, or was deserted by his followers, and never more attempted to face the Romans.

Cæsar, finding this enemy remit his ardor, advanced with a quicker pace. From his silence on the subject of any difficulty in passing the Medway, we must suppose him to have followed the vale of the Stour to Ashford, and from thence to have kept on the plains to Maidstone, near to which place the river Medway is every where naturally fordable; and from the length of his march, being about eighty miles from the sea, when he came upon the banks of the Thames, we may suppose him to have arrived on that river at the reach which runs from the south to north, somewhere between Kingstone and Brentford. There he observes, that the only ford in the river was fenced and guarded; that a row of sharp stakes was driven under water; that the

opposite bank was lined with a palisade, and CHAP.
manned by a numerous body of the natives. He I.
nevertheless proceeded to force his way, and by the impetuosity of his attack, drove the enemy from their post, and without any loss, effected his passage, although his men were obliged to wade up to the chin.

Cassivelaunus had, for some time, made no attempt to resist the Roman army; he had, contented himself with observing their motions, and with endeavouring to strip the country before them of every particular by which they could profit on their march. Cæsar, on his part, advanced with the precautions necessary against such an enemy, and, as they had destroyed what could be of immediate use to his army, he destroyed what was left, in order to force the natives to submission. In this state of the war, having leisure and opportunity to observe the condition of the country and the manners of the people, he gives the following account of both:

“ That on the coast there were colonies, from
“ the neighbouring continent, still distinguished
“ by the names of the countries from whence
“ they had come; that these colonies, being
“ possessed of agriculture, and well stocked
“ with cattle, were extremely populous; that
“ they had money made of iron or brass; the
“ first of which metals, with great quantities of
“ tin, were found in their own island; the other
“ metal was imported from abroad; that the winter
“ was milder here than in Gaul; that the woods

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“ of Britain furnished the same timber with those
“ of Gaul, except the fir and the beech; and the
“ houses were built in the same manner in both
“ countries.” From this account of the coast he
proceeds to observe, “ That the inland parts were
“ occupied by the original natives, who, with
“ little corn, subsisted chiefly by milk and the
“ other produce of their herbs; that, by a parti-
“ cular superstition, although possessed of hares,
“ of geese, and other fowls, they were forbid to
“ eat of these animals; that they were curious in
“ the ornaments of the person, affected to have
“ bushy whiskers, and long hair; that they stained
“ or painted their bodies of a blue color, and had
“ no clothes besides the skins of beasts; that they
“ associated in small clubs or fraternities of ten or a
“ dozen in number.” And adds a circumstance,
in which, if he were not deceived as is common
enough to foreigners, by some appearances which
were not sufficiently explained to him, he gives a
striking example of the diversity which takes place
among mankind in settling the canon of external
actions. The brothers, the father, and the son,
though separately married, and reputed the parents
of children, brought forth by their respective wives,
yet, without jealousy or imputation of evil, lived
with those wives in common¹⁶.

Cæsar, being on the left of the Thames, made
an alliance with the Trinobantes, supposed to
have been inhabitants of Essex and Suffolk. The

¹⁶ See Cæsar's Commentaries on his last expedition to Britain.

sovereign of this canton having, in some quarrel with his own people, been expelled from his kingdom, had taken refuge with Cæsar in Gaul, and was now, by force of the Roman arms, restored to his kingdom. Five other principalities made their submission at the same time. Cassivelaunus retired to his principal fortress, which, consisting of a palisade and a ditch, situated in the least accessible part of the woods, was by the natives, as Cæsar is pleased to express himself, called a town, and was in reality, in case of alarm, a place of retreat for themselves and their cattle. On the approach and attack of Cæsar on one side, Cassivelaunus retired by an outlet on the other, leaving some herds of cattle, and many of his men, to fall into the enemy's hand.

After this defeat, the British prince endeavoured, as a last resource, to give Cæsar some trouble in his rear; and for this purpose sent an order to the four princes of Kent, to assemble their people, and endeavour to force the Roman station, and destroy the Roman shipping, where they lay on the coast. They accordingly attacked the intrenchment, but were repulsed, and Cassivelaunus himself, reduced to despair by the defection of so many of his countrymen, and by his repeated defeats, determined to make his submission. The season of the year being far advanced, and Cæsar, desirous to retire with honor from a country in which he was not prepared to make any settlements, accepted this on easy terms.

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A certain tribute was imposed on the nations inhabiting the banks of the Thames, hostages taken for the payment of it, and the invaders, with a numerous assemblage of prisoners, then the only or principal spoils of this island, retired to their ships, which, not being sufficient to receive them at one embarkation, were obliged to return for a second; and in this way successively, without any material accident, transported the whole of the Roman army into Gaul.

C H A P. II.

Death of Julia, the Daughter of Cæsar, and the Wife of Pompey. — Trial of Gabinius. — Detection of an infamous Transaction of Memmius and Ahenobarbus. — Revolt of the Low Countries. — Military Execution against the Inhabitants of the Country between the Rhine and the Meuse. — Operations of Crassus in Mesopotamia. — His Death. — Competition for the Consulate. — Death of Clodius. — Riot in the City. Pompey sole Consul. — Trial of Milo.

WHILE the Roman army was in Britain, there happened, by the death of Julia, the daughter of Cæsar and the wife of Pompey, a great change in the discontinuance of the relation which subsisted between them, and the separation of their supposed political interests. The connexion which then came to be dissolved, had been devised as a bond of confederacy between parties whose interfering objects of ambition must have otherwise, on many occasions, excited their mutual jealousy. Neither the father-in-law, nor the son was likely to sacrifice his ambition to mere affection, but each may have expected, that the other should be, in some

C H A P.
II.

B O O K degree, the dupe of his relation, and should abate
 IV. a little of the jealousy to which he was, by his situation and his object, so naturally inclined. This passion, however, we may believe was far from having been extinguished in the mind of either. The choice which Pompey made of Spain for his province, with a military command for a term of five years, probably proceeded from a desire to retain his superiority over Cæsar, and to have in his power, in case of a breach between them, a province, though less contiguous to Italy than that which was held by Cæsar, not less fitted to furnish formidable armies and the resources of war.

Notwithstanding these effects of jealousy, while the familiar relation of father-in-law and son subsisted between Cæsar and Pompey, and while Crassus continued to hold a species of balance in their councils, they seemed to acquiesce in a participation of consequence and power. But the death of Julia, and that likewise of the child of which she had been delivered only a few days before her death, put an end, not only to any real cordiality in this connexion, but even to any semblance of friendship, and rendered them, from this time forward, mutually jealous of the advantages they severally gained, whether in respect to force in the provinces, or to state and popularity at Rome.

It is observed, that, from this date, Cæsar became more than formerly attentive to reports from the city, and more careful of his intelligence

from thence ¹; and that he endeavoured to gain every person who might be of consequence in deciding the contest which he perceived must arise. Among these he paid his court in particular to Cicero, who was likely, about this time, to devote himself to Pompey, and whom he wished, at least, to keep in suspense between them: for this purpose, as appears from their correspondence, he applied, as usual, to his vanity, and, while he was piercing the woods of Britain in pursuit of Cassivelaunus and his painted followers ², affected to read and to admire verses which were sent to him by a person much more esteemed for his prose than his poetry.

The Roman army had been tempted into Britain by the hopes of finding mines of silver, but were disappointed; for, besides slaves, they found no booty in that island. Such probably likewise were the principal spoils of Gaul; yet we find their general, in consequence of his conquests in that country, enabled to expend great sums in supporting his influence at Rome. While Pompey procured his own appointment to the command of an army, in order to keep pace with Cæsar in the provinces, Cæsar, in his turn, projected public works at Rome to vie with the magnificence of Pompey, and with that of other citizens, who made such works a part of their

¹ Cicero ad Quint. frat. lib. ii. ep. 15. & lib. iii. ep. 1.

² Ibid. ep. ult. Ad Atticum. lib. iv. ep. 16.

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BOOK policy to gain the People. For this purpose
IV. Cæsar proposed to build a Basilica³, and to enlarge the Forum, at an expense of six millions Roman money, or about fifty thousand pounds; to rail in the field of Mars with marble balusters, and to surround the whole with a colonnade or portico extending a thousand paces, or about a mile.

In these several works Cæsar affected to consult or to employ Cicero in a manner which flattered his vanity, and renewed his hopes of being able also to direct his councils⁴ in what related to matters of State.

In the mean time, parties in the city, though engaged on the side of different competitors for office at the approaching elections, were likewise intent on the cause of Gabinius. This officer, while yet in his province, had been impeached for disobeying the orders of the Senate, and for contempt of religion in his expedition to Egypt. But having, by the influence of Pompey and of Cæsar, eluded this first attack, he set out for Rome in great confidence, and, on his journey, gave out, that he was to demand a triumph. But, upon his approach to the city, hearing in what manner the Senate and People were affected towards him, he thought proper to make his

³ What the Romans called a Basilica or palace, was a kind of exchange, containing porticoes for merchants, and other public accommodations.

⁴ Cicer. ad Atticum, lib. iv. ep. 16.

entry in the night; and being arrived, on the eighteenth of September, did not even venture to appear in the Senate for ten days. No less than three prosecutions were preparing against him: for treason, for extortion in his province, and for other crimes. The first day on which he presented himself in the Senate, the Consuls, when he would have withdrawn, commanded him to stay. And, having called the farmers of the revenue from Syria, who attended with a complaint from the province, bid them state their charge.

An altercation ensued, in which Cicero, mindful of the injuries he had received from Gabinius, took a principal part against him, and pronounced an invective, which the other returned with the abusive appellation of *fugitive*, in allusion to his late exile¹. Yet, soon after, when this criminal was brought to trial for extortion in his province, Cicero, as will afterwards be mentioned, undertook, at the solicitation of Pompey, to appear in his defence.

Before this trial for extortion took place, C. Memmius, one of the Tribunes, on the ninth of October delivered to the People, with great force, a charge of treason against Gabinius². The judgment of the Tribes being called, and sentence of condemnation likely to pass, while

¹ Cicer. ad Quint. frat. lib. iii.

² Ibid.

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IV.

the Lictors were preparing to seize their prisoner, his son, a young man, with much filial piety, a virtue highly esteemed by the Romans, threw himself at the feet of the Tribune, and, being rudely spurned on the ground, happened to drop his ring, the badge of Roman nobility; the spectators were moved; Lælius Balbus, another of the Tribunes, interposed, and, with the general approbation of the People, commanded the process to stop⁷.

The other prosecutions nevertheless were continued against Gabinius. One before the Prætor Alfius, in which, though the majority of the judges voted to acquit, there were twenty-two, out of seventy, who voted guilty⁸. Another before Cato, on a charge of depredation in his province, to the amount of quater millies, four hundred millions Roman money, or about three millions sterling; in this last he was condemned, and forced into exile. At this trial, Pompey and Cæsar continued to employ their influence in his favor. And Cicero, although he had hitherto treated Gabinius as the author of his own exile, being reconciled to Pompey and Cæsar, no longer continued at variance with a person, who had been no more than their tool or instrument in procuring his misfortunes, and

⁷ Val. Max. lib. viii. c. i.

⁸ Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 16.

condescended, on this occasion, though ineffectually, to plead his cause'. CHAP. II.

The approaching elections gave rise to competitions and intrigues more connected with the state of the republic, and more an indication of the manners which then prevailed. The poorer citizens came to depend for their subsistence on the distributions of corn and other gratuities, which were made or procured by those who courted popularity, or who aspired to the offices of State. Corruption became every day more flagrant and less disguised; and the laws against bribery were losing their force for want of persons to prosecute a crime, of which so many either wished to reap the benefit, or which many were so strongly tempted to commit. To supply this defect, Cato moved in the Senate, That every one elected into office should be subjected to an inquest, even if no one should prosecute¹⁰; and actually obtained an edict, requiring the ordinary judges, that were named for trials within the year, to take cognizance of the means by which candidates succeeded to office; and to set those aside who were found to have incurred the penalties of corruption¹¹. The Tribunes interposed their negative, or suspended the effect of this resolution, until an act of the People

⁹ Dio, lib. xxxix. c. 63. Cicero ad Quint. frat. lib. iii. ep. 1 & 3.

¹⁰ Plutarch, Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 16.

¹¹ Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 16.

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should be obtained to confirm it. The proposal gave great offence to the parties concerned ; and Cato being attacked by the populace, narrowly escaped with his life. He afterwards, in a full assembly of the more respectable citizens, was favorably heard on this subject. But Terentius, one of the Tribunes still persisting in his negative, this attempt to restrain the corrupt practices of those who canvassed for office had no effect.

The candidates themselves, in the mean time, if each could have trusted the laws for restraining others, as well as himself, from the practice of giving money ; or if any number of them could have relied upon an agreement to be entered into among themselves to refrain from it, would, it is probable, have been glad to be relieved from an abuse which rendered their pretensions so expensive and so precarious. Moved by these considerations, candidates for the office of Tribune entered into an agreement not to bribe, and deposited each a sum of money¹² in the hands of Cato, to be forfeited by any person who should be found acting in contravention to their treaty¹³. One of them, however, was detected in giving money, and accordingly forfeited his pledge.

In the competition for the Consulate, corruption

¹² Quingena, 500,000 Roman money about 4000 l.

¹³ Plutarch, Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 15. ad Quint. frat. l. ii. c. 12.

was carried to the greatest excess. An office was opened, at which the candidates dealt out money to the People, who came in the order of their Tribes to receive it ¹⁴. A gratuity of ten millions of sesterces ¹⁵, was offered to any person who should secure the vote of the first Century, or, as it was called, the *Prærogativa*. The demand for money to be employed in this species of traffic became so great, that by the first of July interest rose from four to eight per cent ¹⁶. All the four candidates, Memmius, M. Scaurus, Cn. Domitius, and M. Messala, mutually raised prosecutions for bribery against each other; and in the course of these transactions, it appeared that Caius Memmius, once a vehement partisan of the Senate, had made his peace with Cæsar, and was now supported by his party at Rome.

Memmius, it may be remembered, having been Prætor at the expiration of Cæsar's Consulship, brought a charge of high misdemeanour in office against him. And Cæsar appeared for some time to resent this attack; but was in reality as little to be diverted from his purpose by resentment, as he was by affection, and knew how to choose his friends from among those who had the resolution to provoke, as well as from among those who inclined to serve him. Cæsar

¹⁴ Ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 17.

¹⁵ About 80,000 l.

¹⁶ Ad Quint. frat. lib. ii. ep. 15. Idibus Quint. fœnus fuit bestibus ex triente.

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accordingly made use of this opportunity to separate Memmius from the rest of his enemies, and by his means brought to light a scene of corruption, in which Memmius himself, with other professed supporters of the Senate, had been concerned, and which furnished Cæsar, and the supposed popular party, with a great triumph against these pretenders to purity and public virtue.

It appeared that, among other irregularities at Rome in the administration of government, even laws, and supposed acts of the Senate or People, could be forged or surreptitiously obtained. The present Consuls, Cn. Domitius, Ahenobarbus, and Ap. Claud. Pulcher, entered into a compact with two of those who were candidates to succeed them, Caius Memmius and C. Domitius Calvinus: the two first, to secure their own nomination to lucrative provinces at the expiration of their Consulship; the two others now standing for this office, to secure their elections. The parties agreed to forge an edict of the Senate and of the People, fixing the consular provinces. And a sum of money was deposited by the candidates in the hands of the Consuls, to be forfeited, if they did not support this forgery, with the evidence of three Augurs, who should vouch for the passing of the law in the assembly of the People, and two Senators of consular dignity, who should swear they were present when this allotment of provinces was confirmed by the Senate,

Senate, although it was notorious that no meeting of the Senate had been held for this purpose. C H A P.
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Memmius being gained by the parties of Cæsar and Pompey, was persuaded to sacrifice his own reputation, in order to ruin that of Domitius Ahenobarbus. He laid this strange agreement, which had been drawn up in writing, together with the bonds which had been granted upon it, before the Senate. Appius Claudius braved the detection; but Ahenobarbus, professing himself to be of a party which contended for purity and reformation of manners, incurred much disgrace and reproach.

From this transaction it should appear, not only that the assemblies of the People were extremely irregular and tumultuary, and might be made up of such persons as were by any party purposely brought to the Comitium; but that even the meetings of the Senate might be packed; that their proceedings were carelessly recorded, and might be easily forged. The numbers required to form a Comitium or assembly of the People not being fixed, any convention of persons brought from any part of Italy, occupying the usual place of assembly, might take upon them the designation and powers of the Roman People; and as the fluctuating sovereignty of the People by this means passed from one party to another, its orders were often surreptitious and contradictory, and every law might be considered as the mandate of a party or faction, not as

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the will of the community ¹⁷. Great as these disorders were, there were at all times numerous parties who had an interest in the continuance of them; and the age, though suffering under the most grievous abuses, was still more averse to the necessary reformatations.

The infamy of this recent transaction produced a delay of the elections, until the term of the present Consuls in office was expired. An interregnum accordingly ensued. The partisans of Pompey hinted the necessity of naming a Dictator. He himself affected great reserve, in expectation that when the present troubles came to their height, the powers necessary to suppress them would, by general consent, be pressed into his hands.

In the mean time Cæsar, whose councils had so great a share in determining these events, was detained in the northern parts of Gaul, and was obliged, contrary to his usual practice, to pass the whole winter on this side of the Alps. On his return from Britain, finding that the harvest in Gaul had been unfavorable, he was tempted, in order to facilitate the subsistence of his army, to extend his quarters much farther than had been his ordinary practice. Labienus, with one division, was sent to the Moselle; Titurius Sabinus, with another, to the neighbourhood of the Meuse, near to what are now the districts of Liege and Maestricht. Quintus Cicero was posted

¹⁷ Dio Cassius lib. xxxix. c. 65.

on some of the branches of the Scheld or the Sambre, in the county of Hainault. And the whole army, by this disposition, extended from the Seine to the Meuse about Maestricht, and from the sea to the neighbourhood of Treves. The distance at which the posts were placed from each other being observed by the natives, who still bore with impatience the intrusion and usurpation of these strangers, tempted them to form a design against each of the quarters apart, and by cutting them off, to rid their country for ever of these imperious and insatiable guests, who acted as proprietors in every territory on which they were received, and branded every act of resistance to their unjust usurpation with the name of defection and rebellion.

In execution of this design, Ambiorix, leader of the nations which were situated in the angle, above the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine, and round the quarters of Sabinus, which are supposed to have been at a place which is now called Tongres, suddenly presented himself with a numerous body before the Roman station, and endeavoured to force the intrenchment; but being repulsed, had recourse to an artifice in which he succeeded. Affecting a great regard for the Romans, he desired that he might have an opportunity to communicate to their general a matter of the most serious importance. An officer being sent to him upon this request, he pretended to disclose, with the utmost regret, a secret design formed by the Gauls to cut off the

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Roman army; gave notice that a great body of Germans had already passed the Rhine to join in the execution of this design; that he himself had been very much averse to the project; but had been obliged to give way to the popular impetuosity of his countrymen, which he could not resist; that all he could do was to warn the Romans of their danger, to the end that they might, in the most effectual manner, consult their own safety. If they chose, while it was in their power, to withdraw, and to gain the nearest station of their own people, he had influence enough to hinder their being molested on the march: but if they should hesitate for any time, or wait till the Germans arrived, it would no longer be in his power to avert the storm with which they were threatened.

This admonition, even from an enemy, after a long debate in the council of war, determined Sabinus to quit his present situation. He accordingly began a march of fifty miles towards the quarters of Quintus Cicero. And falling into a snare, which the treacherous chieftain had laid for him, perished, with an entire legion and five cohorts, of whom the greater part were put to the sword. Some got back to the station they had left, but finding no security in that place, killed themselves in despair. A very few escaped, by the woods, to Labienus on the Moselle.

The natives, thus encouraged by the success of their first operation, pushed on to the quarters of Quintus Cicero, armed and assembled the

country as they passed, and arrived with such expedition, that they intercepted all the parties which were abroad in search of wood, provisions, or forage, and made so unexpected an attack on the Roman station, as left Cicero scarcely time sufficient to man his intrenchments. They renewed the artifice which they had practised with so much success against Sabinus. But Cicero, though unacquainted with the manner in which that officer had been betrayed, determined to remain in his camp, and as soon as possible to give intimation of his danger to Cæsar. For this purpose he strengthened his post with additional works, and published a reward to the first person who should succeed in carrying intelligence to the nearest quarter of the Roman army.

The enemy being about sixty thousand men, formed a circle, facing to the centre, quite round the Roman intrenchment; and the more effectually to cut off all communication of supplies or intelligence from without, effected a line of circumvallation, consisting of a ditch fifteen feet wide, and a breastwork eleven feet high, extending over a circumference of fifteen miles¹⁸. In this work, being unprovided with intrenching tools, they were obliged to cut the turf with their swords. But having begun it by a sufficient number of hands in all its parts at once, they,

¹⁸ Cæsar de Bell. Gallico, lib. v. c. 42.

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B O O K according to Cæsar's account, completed the whole
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From this line, which they formed by the direction of some Italian deserters, they made regular approaches to the Roman intrenchments; and having pushed their turrets quite up to the ditch, threw, by means of their slings, red hot bullets and burning darts into the thatch with which the huts of the camp were covered; set them on fire; and, in the midst of the confusion which arose from this circumstance, endeavoured to scale the palisade and the parapet.

While Cicero continued, with great ability and courage, to withstand these attacks, the persons who endeavoured to carry the tidings of his situation to Cæsar were repeatedly intercepted, and cruelly tortured, to deter others from renewing the same attempt. The intelligence, however, by means of a native Gaul, who, availing himself of the dress, manners, and language of his country, passed unobserved through the lines of the enemy, was at last carried to the head-quarters of the Roman army.

Cæsar, as usual, trusting more to dispatch and rapid execution than to the numbers of his men, left a legion at Samarobriva ¹⁰ to guard his stores, magazines, and baggage, and with two other legions, not exceeding seven thousand men, being all that, without hazarding an improper delay, he could assemble, hastened his march to

¹⁰ Amiens.

the quarters of Cicero. He dispatched two messengers, one to Labienus, with orders, if possible, to put the troops under his command in motion towards the Meuse, and another to Quintus Cicero himself, with hopes or assurances of immediate relief. The first messenger found Labienus beset with a numerous army of Gauls, and therefore unable to move; the other, having come to the foot of Cicero's intrenchment, cast the billet which contained the intelligence, wound up on the shaft of a dart, against one of the towers, where it stuck, and hung for some days unobserved; but being found at last, it was carried to Cicero, and gave notice of Cæsar's approach. At the same time the fire and the smoke of his camp began to appear on the plain, and gave both parties equal intimation of his coming.

The Gauls, without delay, got in motion with all their force, and having abandoned their lines of circumvallation, advanced to meet Cæsar. Cicero sent him intelligence of this movement of the enemy. The armies arrived nearly at the same time on the opposite sides of a brook running in a hollow tract between steep banks, which neither party in the presence of the other could venture to pass.

Cæsar, supposing that the great inequality of his numbers might inspire the Gauls with contempt, endeavoured, by exceeding his usual caution, to feed their presumption. He affected to choose a ground that was fit to secure his camp; and contracting its limits, crowded both his

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legions within the dimensions which were usually occupied by one. In this posture he meant to await the effects of the enemy's temerity, or, if they declined passing the brook, to avail himself of the security they were likely to feel, and to attack them in their own camp by surprise.

The event justified Cæsar in his first expectation. The Gauls, trusting to the superiority of their numbers, thought they had nothing to dread but the escape of their enemy; and they accordingly passed the rivulet, with intention to force his lines. Instead of defending his camp, he poured forth his army at once from all its avenues, and, with the advantage of a surprise upon those who came to attack him, and by the great superiority of the Romans, when mixed sword in hand with an enemy, routed, dispersed, or forced to lay down their arms, the greater part of this multitude which came to attack him with so much ferocity and confidence.

By this victory Cæsar not only relieved Quintus Cicero, whom he joined the same evening, but likewise dispelled the cloud which hung over the other quarters of his army, of which many had been at the same time invested by the natives. These insurrections, however, which kept all the inhabitants of the low countries in motion, even in the most unfavorable season, gave him the prospect of an early and a busy campaign, and so much disconcerted the plan which he had formed for the winter, that he was hindered from making his usual journey across the Alps.

During this necessary stay in Gaul, it does not appear that the interests which Cæsar commonly studied were suffering in any considerable degree at Rome. The civil government in the city was hastening fast to its ruin, and the longest sword was soon likely to decide the sovereignty of the empire. The office of Consul was unoccupied, and continued to be so from the beginning of January to the middle of July. In all this time there was no administration of justice²⁰, nor any exercise of magistracy, besides that of the Interrex, who, during the five days of his appointment, was supposed to have no other object besides the elections of Consuls. This object was vainly attempted by every successive Interrex. The popular tumults were fomented by the Tribunes who were in the interest of Pompey; and some prodigy, or unfortunate presage, was continually alledged, to prevent the elections. The Senate striving to put an end to these disorders, even ventured to commit to prison Q. Pompeius Rufus, a Tribune, who seemed to be most active in disturbing the public peace. The occasion seemed ripe for the execution of Pompey's design; and accordingly another Tribune, Lucceius Hirrus, known to be in the secret of Pompey's intrigues, moved that he should be named dictator²¹. He himself, as

²⁰ Plutarch, in Pompeio, p. 483.

²¹ Ibid. Cicero epist. at Quint. frat. lib. iii. ep. 9.

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usual on such occasions, absented himself from the assembly, and still kept it in his power to avow or disown the measures of his creatures.

This motion was strongly opposed by Cato, and appeared to be extremely disagreeable to all the principal members of the Senate²². Pompey therefore thought proper to disclaim it, denied his having encouraged the Tribune to make it, and even refused to accept of the Dictatorship; adding, That he had been called to the exercise of great powers earlier than he himself had expected; and that he had always resigned his powers earlier than had been expected by any one else²³. In this was expressed the great object of Pompey's ambition; he preferred this point of estimation to the possession of power. The odium of the proposed measure fell upon Luceius Hirrus, the Tribune who moved it, and had nearly brought upon him a deposition or degradation from his office. Cato, willing to gain Pompey, or to confirm him in the virtue he assumed, pronounced an encomium on this act of moderation, recommended the republic to his care, and encouraged him in the resolution he had taken, to prefer the esteem of his fellow-citizens even to the power of disposing of their lives and fortunes at his pleasure. Pompey from thenceforward joined with the Senate in bringing

U. C. 700.
Cn. Dom.
Calvinus,
M. Val.
Messala,
Coss.

²² Plutarch, in Pompeio. Cicero epist. ad Quint. frat. lib. iii. ep. 9.

²³ Plutarch, in Vit. Pompeii.

on the elections ; and accordingly , after seven months interval of confusion and anxiety , Cn. Domitius Calvinus and M. Valerius Messala were chosen and entered on office in the month of July.

While Pompey was endeavouring , by his intrigues in the city , to make a species of monarchy in his own person appear to be necessary , Cæsar , was in fact providing himself with the only means which , in so distracted a state , can either acquire or preserve such a power. He was joining three additional legions to the establishment of his province ; and , under pretence of his late loss on the Meuse , or of his fears of a general defection in Gaul , he had the address to bring into his own service a legion which had been recently formed in Italy under the commission of Pompey. These he now borrowed , and either actually debauched , or rendered of doubtful fidelity , if ever it should be proposed to recal or employ them against himself.

While he took these measures for the augmentation of his forces , and before the end of winter , having intelligence that the Nervii , or the inhabitants of the county of Hainault , held frequent consultations together , and were about to take arms , he determined to prevent them ; and for this purpose , with four legions drawn from the nearest quarters , he marched into their country , and , without meeting with any opposition , destroyed their habitations , moved away their cattle , and made many prisoners. He continued

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Having, in the course of this winter, called the nations of Gaul to a general convention at an island in the Seine ²⁴, he began the operations of the following summer by punishing some of the cantons ²⁵, who had absented themselves from that assembly, and who, by this act of disrespect, had incurred his resentment, or given him suspicion of hostile intentions. The principal object of the campaign, however, was the punishment of Ambiorix and his countrymen, by whom, as has been related, Sabinus, with a legion and five cohorts, had been circumvented and cut off in the beginning of the preceding winter.

As the Romans scarcely appear to have conceived that any people had a right to withstand their invasions, and treated as rebellion every attempt a nation once vanquished made to recover its liberties, Cæsar states it as necessary for the credit of the Roman army, for the security of their quarters, and for preventing such acts of supposed perfidy for the future, that the subjects of Ambiorix should suffer an exemplary punishment. To secure this effect, he projected two expeditions; one to the right and the other to the left of this enemy's country, with intention

²⁴ Now Paris.

²⁵ The Senones and Carnutes.

to preclude them from any retreat or assistance on either side. He penetrated into the woods and marshes of Brabant, or on the left of the Meuse, and obliged the inhabitants to come under engagements not to assist or harbour his enemies.

From thence, still avoiding to give any alarm to the nation which was the principal object of these operations, and having formerly sent his baggage under an escort of two legions to the Moselle, he now followed in the same direction with the whole army; and finding that Labienus had, by a recent victory, vanquished all his enemies in that quarter, he continued his march to the Rhine, constructed a bridge on that river a little way higher up than the place at which he had formerly passed it, and once more set foot upon German ground.

The Suevi, and other great migrating nations of that continent, having moved to the eastward, leaving nothing behind them but deserts, on which no army could subsist, he contented himself with exacting hostages from the Ubii and other contiguous nations, to secure their neutrality, or rather to make sure of their concurrence in the future operations of the war. And with these pledges he repassed the Rhine, broke down part of his bridge, and left a guard of twelve cohorts properly intrenched to secure the remainder.

From thence he sent forward his cavalry, with orders to make quick and silent marches into the

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countries between the Rhine and the Meuse, and himself followed with the infantry. Hitherto Ambiorix and his countrymen, who were the principal objects of all these operations, had taken no alarm, and had enjoyed such perfect security, that the leader himself, upon the arrival of Cæsar's horse, narrowly escaped, and had no more than time, by a general intimation, to warn his people to consult their own safety. They accordingly separated, part hid themselves in the contiguous marshes, others endeavoured to find refuge with some neighbouring nations, or fled to the islands that were formed at the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine.

Cæsar, as if he had been forming a party of hunters, separated his army into three divisions; sent Labienus with one division to pursue those who fled to the confluence of the two rivers: Trebonius with the second up the course of the Meuse; and he himself, in pursuit of Ambiorix, directed his march to the Scheld. His orders were, that each division should put all they met to the sword, and calculate their time so as to return to the place of general rendezvous in seven days.

To render this execution the more complete, all the neighbouring nations were invited to partake in the spoils of a country that was doomed to destruction. Among the parties who were allured by this invitation, two thousand German horse had passed the Rhine, and continued to ravage all before them in a body. Cæsar, in

making a disposition for his present march, had lodged the whole baggage of his army at the station (supposed to be Tongres), which in the preceding winter had been fortified for the quarters of Sabinus. Here the works being still entire, he left a guard with his baggage under the command of Quintus Tullius Cicero.

The Germans, in the present instance, knowing no distinction of friend or enemy, ceased to plunder the natives of the country, and turned all their thoughts on seizing the baggage of the Roman army. Their coming was so little expected, that the traders and sutlers who had erected their stalls and displayed their merchandise, as usual, without the intrenchment, had no time to save their effects. Numbers of Cicero's baggage-guard were abroad in search of forage. The remainder with difficulty manned the avenues of their post, and must have been forced, if the foragers, upon hearing the noise with which the German's began the attack, had not returned to their relief, and forced their way through the enemy, who, mistaking them for the vanguard of Cæsar's army, thought proper to consult their own safety by an immediate flight.

Cæsar, upon his return to the post at which he had left his baggage, censured the officer commanding the guard for having divided his party, and for having omitted, on the supposition of any degree of security whatever, any part of the precautions usual upon such a duty. He proceeded to complete the revenge he had projected

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against the unhappy followers of Ambiorix, with sending parties in every direction to burn every house, and lay waste every field that had been formerly spared or overlooked; and this being done on the approach of winter, made the destruction complete, as the few who escaped the sword were certain to perish by famine, or by the asperity of the season.

Cæsar having in this manner made an example, which he supposed was to overawe all the nations of that neighbourhood, he withdrew with his army from a country in which he had made it impossible for any numbers of men to subsist; and having stationed two of his legions on the Moselle, and the remainder on the Marne, on the Seine, and the Loire, he himself hastened into Italy, where all his views and preparations ultimately centred. The scene of political intrigue, in which Crassus had hitherto borne a part with Pompey and himself, was now, in consequence of recent events on the other extremity of the empire, about to undergo a great change, that was likely to affect the conduct of all the parties concerned.

In the spring, Crassus had taken the field on the frontier of Syria, with seven legions, four thousand horse, and an equal number of light or irregular troops. With this force he passed the Euphrates, was joined by an Arabian chieftain, who is mentioned by historians under different names, of Acbarus²⁶ or Ariamnes, in

²⁶ Plutarch, & Dio Cass.

whom

whom, on account of his supposed knowledge of the country, the Roman general had placed great confidence. Here he expected likewise to have been joined by Artabazes, King of Armenia; but Orodes, now on the throne of the Parthians, prevented this junction, by invading the kingdom of Armenia in person, while he left Surena, a young warrior of great reputation, in Mesopotamia, to oppose the Romans.

Crassus intended to have followed the course of the Euphrates, to where it approaches nearest to Seleucia and Ctesiphon, the capital of the Parthian kingdom; but was dissuaded by Ariamnes, who prevailed on him to direct his march eastward on the plains to meet Surena, as not in a condition to oppose him. Some parties too, that were advanced to examine the country, reported that they had been on the tract of departing cavalry, but that no enemy was any where to be seen. Thus Crassus was induced to quit the Euphrates, and, agreeably to the directions of his guide, took the route of Carræ eastward. This place he fortified in his way, and occupied with a garrison. From thence, in a few marches, he arrived in sandy and barren plains, without trees, herbage or water. While the army, though discouraged by these appearances, still continued its march, a few horsemen belonging to the advanced guard returned to the main body with signs of terror, and brought an account that their division had been surrounded by numerous bodies of horse, and to a few cut off.

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The Roman army being thus compacted, the Parthians appeared on every side, came within reach of an arrow-shot, and galled them without intermission. The weapons of the Romans, in this situation, availed them nothing; even the shield could not cover them from arrows, that showered from every quarter, and in many different directions. They stood however in their place with some degree of courage, in hopes that the quivers of the Parthians must soon be exhausted, and that this enemy would be obliged either to join them in close fight, or to retire. But they found themselves deceived in this expectation, observing that the enemy had a herd of cows in their rear, loaded with arrows, and that the quivers of those in the front were continually replenished from thence. At the same time Ariamnes, the Arabian, deserted, and was perceived to go over to the enemy. The desertion of this traitor, by discovering that his pretended attachment, and his council, which had been unhappily followed, was only a piece of barbarous treachery to draw the

army into its present situation, completed the general discouragement which the Romans had already begun to feel. They crowded together in despair, and oppressed with heat and thirst, or stifled with dust, they continued for a while, like beasts caught in a snare, to present an easy prey to their enemies.

In this extremity, Crassus determined to make an effort with his cavalry to drive the enemy so far off, as not to be able to reach his infantry with their arrows. His son Publius accordingly formed the Roman horse into one body, and made a general charge. The Parthians gave way in seeming disorder. The young man advanced with great impetuosity as against a flying enemy, and in hopes of completing his victory: but the Parthians, under cover of the dust which every where arose, instead of flying before him, as he supposed, were actually turning on his flanks, and even falling behind him to encompass his rear. The legions at the same time happy to be relieved from the attack of the enemy, quitted their ground, and for a little resumed their march, which enabled the Parthians the more effectually to surround the horse; but the father, recollecting the danger to which he exposed his son, again prevailed on them to halt. In this situation, a few of the horse arrived, with accounts that they had been surrounded, that Crassus, the son, was slain, and the whole cavalry cut off, except a few who escaped to the father with these melancholy tidings.

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Night, however, was fast approaching, and the Parthians, on a sudden, withdrew, sensible that their way of fighting would expose them to many disadvantages in the dark. It was always their practice to retire at night to a considerable distance from the enemy whom they had harassed by day, and upon these occasions they generally fled like an army defeated, until they had removed so far, as to make it safe for them to pasture their horses, and to store up their arms. Crassus apprized of this practice, took the benefit of the night to continue his retreat, and abandoning the sick and wounded of his army, made a considerable march before it was day. But the advance he had gained, was not sufficient to hinder his being overtaken by the same enemy, and again involved in the same distress. Having his defeats and his flights renewed on every succeeding day, he arrived at last at the post which he had fortified at Carræ, and there found some respite from the attacks of the enemy. At this place, however, it was not possible to make any considerable stay, as the whole provisions of the army were lost or consumed, and such supplies as the country around might have furnished, were entirely in the power of the enemy. Nor was it convenient to depart immediately. The moon was then at the full, and night was almost as favorable to the Parthians as day. In these circumstances, it was determined to wait for the wain of the moon, and then, if possible, to elude the enemy again by marches in the night.

In this interval, the army mutinied against Crassus, and offered the command to Caius Cassius; but he, although desired even by Crassus himself, declined to accept of it²⁷. The troops of consequence no longer obeyed any command, and separated into two bodies. The first went off by the plains on the nearest way into Syria: the other took the route of the mountains; and if they could reach them before the enemy, hoped to escape into Cappadocia or Armenia. The first division was accompanied or commanded by Cassius, who, though with considerable loss, led them back into Syria. The other, with Crassus himself, was pursued by Surena, and harassed on every ground where the Parthian horse could ply on their flank or their rear. Being exposed to frequent losses, they suffered a continual diminution of their numbers, and were not likely to be long in condition to avoid the enemy, or make any resistance.

Surena, apprehending that these remains of the Roman army might gain the mountains before he could force them to surrender, sent a deputation to Crassus, proposing at some intermediate place, between the two armies, a conference, to which each should bring a stipulated number of attendants. While this message was delivering, Surena himself appeared at a little distance on an eminence, waved with his hand, and in token of peace, unbent his bow. Crassus distrusting the

²⁷ Dio, lib. iv. c. 28.

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faith of this barbarous enemy, who was supposed to hold perfidy lawful, as a stratagem of war, declined the conference; but his troops, weary of continual fatigue and danger, and flattering themselves that by an accommodation an end might be speedily put to their sufferings, expressed such a desire for the conference, as their general, in this situation, could not safely withstand. He put himself therefore, with a few friends, under the direction of Surena's messengers, and submitted to be led to their general; but on the way, finding himself treated as a prisoner, he refused to proceed, and having made some resistance, was slain. The army separated into sundry divisions, a few escaped into Armenia or Syria, the greater part fell into the enemy's hands ²⁸.

Thus died Crassus, commonly reputed a rare instance of ambition, joined with avarice, and a mean capacity. It is not to be doubted, that in point of ambition he even rivaled Pompey and Cæsar; and it is probable, therefore, that his avarice was merely subservient to this passion. It is quoted, as a saying of his, that no man who aspired to a principal place in the republic should be reputed rich, unless he could maintain an army at his own expense ²⁹. Such was the use of wealth, which, in place of equipages, horses, and dogs, occurred to a rich man of that

²⁸ Dio Cass. lib. xl. Plutarch, in Crass.

²⁹ Cicero de officiis, lib. i. c. 8.

age at Rome. Of his capacity we cannot form a high opinion, either from the judgment of his contemporaries or from his own conduct³⁰. It appears, indeed, that he owed his consequence more to his wealth, than to his genius or personal qualities of any kind. On account of his wealth, probably, he was considered by Cæsar and Pompey as a person, who, if neglected by them, might throw a weight into the scale of their enemies; and he was admitted into their councils, as a person fit to witness their transactions, and on occasion to hold the balance in suspense between them. These circumstances placed him among the competitors for the principal influence at Rome, and makes his death an æra in the history of those factions which were hastening to overwhelm the republic. By this event, his associates Cæsar and Pompey, already disjoined by the dissolution of their family-connexion, were left to contend for the superiority, without any third person to hold this species of balance between them.

The calm which had succeeded the late election of Consuls was but of short duration. The time of electing their successors was fast approaching, and the candidates, Scipio, Milo, and Hypsæus, were already declared. Clodius, at the same time, stood for the office of

³⁰ Is igitur mediocriter a doctrina instructus; angustius etiam a natura, &c. Cicero de claris oratoribus. c. 66. Ad Atticum, lib. iv. ep. 13.

BOOK IV. Prætor. Scipio was by birth the son of Metellus Pius, adopted into the Cornelian family by Scipio Nafica. His daughter, in consequence of this adoption, bearing the name of Cornelia, the widow of young Crassus, was recently married to Pompey, who, upon this connexion, supported Scipio, his father-in-law, in his pretensions to the Consulate. Milo had a powerful support from the Senate, in whose cause he had retorted the arts and violences of the seditious demagogues against themselves. Clodius had great interest with the populace, and from inveterate animosity to Milo and to his party, joined all his interest with Scipio and Hypsæus against him.

It is in the nature of human things to advance, in accumulating the good or evil to which they tend. These competitors, in contending for the streets and the usual places of canvassing the people, joined to the former arts of distributing money, and of exciting popular tumults, the use of an armed force, and a species of military operations in the city. Three parties in arms every day paraded in different quarters of the town, and wherever they encountered, violence and bloodshed generally followed. The opposite parties of Hypsæus and Milo had fought a battle in the *Via Sacra*; many of both sides were killed, and the Consul Calvinus was wounded in attempting to quell the riot.

These disorders so long obstructed the elections, that the term of the present Consuls in

office expired, before the nomination of any successors; and every legal power in the commonwealth being suspended, the former state of anarchy, with accumulating distractions, again ensued. The Senate, and the other friends of Milo, would gladly have hastened the elections, but were hindered by the partisans of the other candidates. The populace too, enjoying this season of gratuities, of entertainments, and of public shows, in which the competitors continued to waste their fortunes, were glad to have the canvass prolonged ³¹.

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When the Senate proposed to have recourse to the remedy usual in such disorders of the state, by naming an Interrex, the only title under which any person could preside in restoring the magistracy by an election of Consuls, they were forbid by the Tribune Munatius Plancus, who was supposed to co-operate with Pompey in some design, to be favored by deferring every measure that was proposed for the restoration of order.

In the midst of this scene, which kept the minds of men in fear of some general calamity, an accident happened, which brought the disorder to a height, and forced every party to accept of a remedy. On the 13th of the kalends of February, or the 20th of January, Milo going to Lanuvium, a town about fifteen miles from Rome, of which he was chief magistrate, about three o'clock in the afternoon, met with Clodius

³¹ Pædianus in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

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BOOK returning from his country-seat at Aricia. Milo
IV. was in a carriage with his wife Fausta, the daughter of Sylla, and a friend Fufius. He had a numerous escort, amounting to some hundreds of servants in arms, and, in particular, was attended by two noted gladiators, Eudamus and Birria. Clodius was on horseback, with a retinue of thirty servants likewise in arms. It is likely that this encounter was altogether accidental; for the companies continued on their way without any disturbance, till Birria, the gladiator, unwilling to pass without giving some specimen of his calling, as he straggled a little behind his party, quarrelled with some of the followers of Clodius. A fray ensued: Clodius himself returned to quell it, or to punish the authors of it; but meeting with little respect among the gladiators, received a wound in the shoulder, and was carried to be dressed in the inn at Bovillæ, near to which place the disturbance began. Milo being told of what had passed, likewise returned to the place; and thinking it safer to end their quarrels there, than await the revenge of an enemy thus provoked, who would not fail, at the head of his faction in the city, to rouse the fury of the populace against him, encouraged his people to pursue their advantage: they accordingly forced their way into the inn, dragged Clodius from thence, and having killed him, and dispersed all his followers, left him dead of many wounds in the highway.

Sextus Tediùs, a Senator, happening to pass,

put the body into his own carriage, and sent his servants with it to Rome. They arrived before six at night, and proceeding directly to the house of the deceased, which stood on the Palatine hill over the Forum, laid the corpse in the vestibule.

The servants of the family, and multitudes from the streets immediately crowded to see this spectacle. Fulvia, the wife of Clodius, stood over the body, and with loud lamentations uncovered and pointed out the wounds of her deceased husband. The crowd continued to increase all night, and until break of day, when Q. Munatius Plancus, and Q. Pompeius Rufus, Tribunes of the People, likewise repaired to the same place, and gave orders to carry the dead body naked to the market-place, and there to leave it exposed to public view on the Rostra; and at the same time accompanied this spectacle with inflammatory harangues to the people.

Sextus Claudius, kinsman of the deceased soon after removed the body from the market-place to the Senate house, meaning to reproach the order of Senators as accessory to the murder. The populace, who still followed in great numbers, burst into the place, tore up the benches, and brought into a heap the materials, with the tables and desks of the clerks, the journals and records of the Senate, and having set the whole on fire, consumed the corpse on this extraordinary pile. The fire soon reached the roofs, and spread to the contiguous buildings. The Tribunes,

BOOK IV. Plancus and Rufus, who were all this while exhorting the people to vengeance, were driven from the Rostra by the flames which burst from the buildings around them. The Senate-house, the Porcia Basilica, and other edifices were reduced to ashes.

The same persons, by whom this fire had been kindled, repaired to the house of M. Lepidus, who, upon the first alarm of an insurrection, had been named Interrex, forced into the hall, broke down the images of the family ancestors, tore from the looms the webs, in weaving of which the industry of Roman matrons was still employed, and destroyed what else they could reach. From thence, they proceeded to attack the house of Milo, but there met with a more proper reception. This house, during the riots, in which the master of it had borne so great a part, was become a kind of fortress, and, among the other provisions made for its defence, was manned with archers, who plied those who attacked it with arrows from the windows and terrace, in such manner as soon obliged them to withdraw.

The rioters being repulsed from the house of Milo, crowded to the Temple in which the Consular Fasces, during the Interregnum, were kept, seized them by force, and carried them to the houses of Scipio and Hypsæus, the present popular candidates for the Consulate; these, without any other form of election, they pressed to assume the ensigns of Consular power. But not having prevailed in this proposal, they proceeded

to the house of Pompey, saluting him, with mixed shouts of Consul or Dictator, according as they wished him to assume the one or the other of these titles or dignities.

From this time, for some days, an armed populace, mixed with slaves, continued, under pretence of searching for Milo and his adherents, to pillage every place they could enter³². And the partisans of the candidates, Hypsæus and Scipio, thinking they had Milo at a disadvantage, beset the house of the Interrex; and, though it was not customary for the first in this nomination to proceed to the elections, they clamored for an immediate assembly of the people for this purpose. The party of Milo, though professing likewise to join the same clamor for an immediate election, came to blows with their opponents, and protected the house and the person of the Interrex from farther violence.

Milo himself, who was at first supposed to have fled or gone into exile, hearing of the excesses committed by the opposite party, and of the general inclination of the more sober part of the citizens to check and disappoint their violence, ventured again to appear in the city, and at the head of his friends, renewed his canvass. A succession of officers, with the title of Interrex, continued to be named at the expiration of every usual term of five days; but such was the confusion and distraction of the scene, that no election

³² Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.

BOOK IV. could be made. The Senate, under the greatest alarm, gave to the Interrex, and to the Tribunes of the People, to whom they joined Pompey, who by virtue of his proconsular commission as Purveyor of Corn for the People, held a public character in the State, the usual charge given to the Consuls, to watch over the safety of the republic. They even recommended to Pompey to make the necessary levies throughout Italy, and to provide a military force to act for the commonwealth, in repressing the disorders which were committed by the candidates for office.

Under the protection of such temporary expedients, to restrain the violence with which all parties endeavoured to do themselves justice, some applied for redress, in the way of prosecution and civil suit. The two Claudii, nephews of the deceased Publius Clodius, demanded that the slaves of Milo, or those of his wife Fausta, should be put to the torture, in order to force a discovery of the manner in which their uncle was killed. The two Valerii, Nepos and Leo, with Lucius Herennius Balbus, joined in the same demand. On the opposite party, a like demand against the slaves of the deceased Publius Clodius was made by Cœlius, one of the Tribunes; and a prosecution for violence and corruption was entered by Manilius Caninianus against Hypsæus and Scipio, the competitors of Milo, for the office of Consul.

Milo, in answer to the demand that was made

to have his slaves put to the torture, pleaded that the persons, now demanded as slaves, were actually freemen, he having manumitted them as a reward for their faithful services in defending his person against a late attempt made by Clodius on his life. It was alledged, on the other hand that they were manumitted to evade the law, to preserve them from the torture, and to screen himself from the evidence which they might in that manner be obliged to give. M. Cœlius and Manilius Caninianus being Tribunes, and disposed to favor Milo, had ventured to vindicate him to the People, and to load Clodius as the aggressor, and the intended assassin in the fray which cost him his life. Cicero too, with great zeal and courage, while the friends of Milo were yet unsafe in the streets, maintained the same argument in the Senate, and before the people³³. Milo, however, would have been glad to make a composition; and as Pompey had all along, in the competition for the Consulship, favored not only Scipio but likewise Hypsæus against him, he offered to drop his pretension in favor of those candidates, if Pompey would agree to suppress the prosecutions that were commencing against him. To these proposals Pompey refused to listen. He probably thought the election secure for his friends, and by affecting a zeal for justice, hoped to increase his authority with the people.

³³ Ascon. Pædian. in Argument. Orat. pro Milone,

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The partisans of Pompey, in the midst of this wild and disorderly state of affairs, were busy in renewing the cry which they had raised in the former interregnum, that he should be named Dictator, for the re-establishment of order, and the restoration of the public peace. Such an extraordinary power had never been at any time more wanted in the republic; but the times, in which it might be safely applied, were no more. The name of Dictator recalled the memory of Sylla's executions, and it appeared to be uncertain against whom they might now be directed. To avoid the title more than the power of Dictator, Bibulus moved in the Senate, that all the present candidates for the Consulate should be set aside, and that the Interrex should assemble the people for the election of Pompey sole Consul. Cato, to the surprise of every body, seconded this motion. He observed, that any magistracy was preferable to none, and that if the republic must be governed by a single person, none was so fit for the charge as the person now proposed. Pompey being present, thanked Cato for this declaration of his esteem, and said he would accept of the charge, in hopes of being aided by his counsel. Cato made answer, in terms, meant to be literally interpreted, but which, in other instances of the same kind, under an aspect of fullness, have been intended to flatter, That he meant no favor to Pompey, and deserved no thanks from him: that his intention was to serve the republic.

It

It was resolved, in terms of this motion, that Pompey should be presented to the people as sole candidate for the office of Consul, and after two months were elapsed, he might propose any other candidate to be joined in this office ³⁴ with himself. The election was accordingly brought on by the Interrex Servius Sulpitius, on the twenty-fourth of February, and Pompey declared sole Consul ³⁵, with a commission from the Senate to arm, if necessary, the inhabitants of Italy, for the better establishment of order in the city.

Pompey
sole Consul.

The first object of Pompey, in the high and unprecedented dignity which was now conferred upon him, appears to have been the framing of some laws to restrain for the future such disorders as had lately prevailed, and to bring criminals to justice. For this purpose, he obtained an act to enforce the laws which already subsisted against violence and corruption; and to regulate the form of proceeding in trials on such criminal accusations.

By the regulations now suggested by Pompey, every trial was to end in four days. The examination of evidence might occupy the three first; the hearing of parties, and the judgment, the fourth. The prosecutor was allowed two hours to support his charge, and the defendant three hours to make his defence. The number of

³⁴ Plutarch, in Vit. Pomp. & Catonis. Dio lib. xl.

³⁵ Afcon. Pædian. in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

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IV. datory characters prohibited ³⁶. The Quesitor, or Judge Criminal, was to be chosen from among those who had held the office of Consul, and eighty judges or jurors were to be impannelled, and obliged to attend the trial. After the evidence and pleadings were heard, the parties were then allowed each to challenge or reject fifteen of the jury or judges, or five from each of the orders of which they were composed; and the court being thus reduced to fifty-one, they were to be inclosed and to give judgment ³⁷.

Corruption was become so frequent, and so much a necessary art in conducting elections, that it was difficult to find any one willing to prosecute this crime. To remedy this defect, a clause was enacted in the law of Pompey, by which any person formerly convicted of bribery, might obtain a remission of the penalties he had incurred by convicting any one other person of a crime equal, or by convicting two persons, though of a crime less heinous than his own. By these means, it was proposed that one conviction should produce still more in succession. That conviction, in every instance, should be attended with infamy; but that the pains of law should ultimately rest only on such person as could not find another on whom to shift the burden from himself ³⁸.

³⁶ Dio Cass. lib. xl. c. 53.

³⁷ Ascon. Pæd. ibid.

³⁸ Dio Cass. lib. xl. c. 52.

These regulations were made with a particular view to the trial of Milo, now arraigned on the statutes both of corruption, and of violence or assassination. The passing of these laws was opposed on this account by the friends of the accused, who alledged, that they were not acts of legislation, but acts of attainder, having a retrospect to the case of a party concerned in a past transaction, Cœlius the Tribune, and Cicero, maintained this argument. Pompey replied with impatience, That if he were hindered to proceed in a legal way, he should employ force¹⁹. He appeared to entertain some animosity against Milo, such at least as they who love to govern have to others who appear not to be easily governed. He either had, or affected to have, apprehensions of danger to his own person, confessed or affected this apprehension in the Senate, and retired, as for safety, to his own house in the suburbs: there he retained, for the guard of his person, a party of armed men; and there too, under the same affectation of withdrawing from violence, he caused the assemblies of the Senate to be held.

The Aristocratical or Senatorian party was much interested in the preservation of Milo: they had been frequently assailed by the popular rioters, who set the laws at defiance; and as the laws had not always been of sufficient force to protect their persons, it was their interest to protect those who, on occasion, had set aside

¹⁹ Ascon. Pædian. in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

BOOK IV. the laws in their defence. The argument, in equity, indeed was strong on the side of Milo. During the late suspension of government, the factious were rather separate parties at war, than subjects enjoying the protection, and amenable to the jurisdiction of any civil power whatever. They who procured or prolonged this state of anarchy, were alone chargeable with the consequences. In this contest, which could not be maintained without force or violent measures, the friends of the republic and of the Senate were badly circumstanced. They contended for laws, and a constitution which might be turned against the very irregularities which had been necessary to their own preservation, while the opposite faction, if defeated, might claim the protection of forms, which they had endeavoured to subvert.

It would have been just, perhaps, to have closed the late scene of confusion with a general indemnity, and to have taken precautions for the regular, uninterrupted exercise of government in future. This, however, would not have calmed the resentments of those who were aggrieved, and Pompey determined to signalize his government by a more specious appearance of justice. Domitius Ahenobarbus was chosen commissioner for the trial of Milo, on the charge of murder; and the other judges, taken from among the most respectable of each order in the commonwealth, were impanelled in terms of the late statute. The criminal was cited to answer this charge on the fourth of April; and on the same day, to answer a charge

of corruption brought against him in the ordinary court of the Prætor Manlius. Marcellus appeared for him at the bar of the Prætor, and procured a delay until the other trial should be ended.

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The court, it appears, was assembled in the Forum or open market - place. There was a tribunal or bench railed in for the judges. The whole space was crowded with multitudes of people. The prosecutors began with examining Cassinius Schola, who had been in company with Clodius when he was killed. This witness gave direct evidence to the fact, and exaggerated the atrocity of the crime. Marcellus would have cross - questioned him; but the populace, and many others who assembled in the crowd who favored the prosecution, raised a menacing cry, which alarmed the accused and his counsel so much, that they claimed the protection of the court. They were accordingly received within the rails, and the judge applied to the Consul, who had taken his station near to the place of assembly, in order to restrain, by his presence, any disorders that might arise at the trial. Pompey, who was then attended only by his lictors, was himself likewise alarmed by that disorderly shout, and said, that, for the future, a proper force should be provided to keep the peace. He accordingly, on the following day, filled every avenue; which led to the Forum, with men under arms; and, upon some tumult among the populace, gave an order that the place should be cleared. In the execution of this order numbers were killed.

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Under the impresson made by this vigorous exertion of power, the witnesses continued to be examined for two days without any disturbance. Among these the inhabitants of Bovillæ, the family and relations of Clodius, and his wife Fulvia, were examined on the several circumstances that fell within their knowledge, and left no doubt remaining with respect to the fact. The minds of men every day became more intent on the issue: so that, on the fourth day, when the parties were to plead, all other business was suspended in the city; the shops and offices were shut.

There appeared for the prosecutors Appius Claudius, M. Antonius, and Valerius Nepos. They began at eight, and spoke till ten. For the defender appeared Q. Hortensius, M. Marcellus, M. Calidius, Faustus Sylla, M. Cato, and M. T. Cicero, of whom the last only attempted to speak. Some were of opinion, that, as the fact was undeniable, it ought to be justified on the plea of necessity and public expedience. Cicero himself thought this too bold a plea, and therefore chose that of self-defence, alledging that Clodius was the aggressor, and intended to assassinate Milo. It is remarked of this celebrated orator, that he began all his orations under considerable solicitude and awe of his audience. On this occasion, when he stood up to speak, the partisans of Clodius, who were likewise inveterate enemies to himself, endeavoured to disconcert him with clamors and menacing cries. The unusual sight of military guards, commanded

by an officer, who was supposed to be prejudiced against his client, it is said, so far overcame and sunk his spirit, and he spoke feebly, and concluded abruptly; and that what he actually delivered was far short of that masterly oration which he composed, and afterwards published under the title of Milo's defence.

The accused, however, even in this alarming scene, stood at the bar with an undaunted countenance; and while every one else, in imitation of the Senators, appeared in mourning, he alone appeared in an ordinary dress. When judgment was given, and the ballots inspected, it appeared that, of the Senators, twelve condemned, and six, or perhaps rather five, acquitted; of the knights, thirteen condemned, and four acquitted; of the Tribuni Ærarii, or representatives of the Plebeian order, thirteen condemned, and three or four acquitted. And Milo, upon the whole, was condemned by thirty-eight, against thirteen.

Before sentence was pronounced, being still at liberty to withdraw, he retired into exile, and fixed his residence at Marseilles. Thither Cicero sent him a copy of an oration in his defence, composed at leisure, as an effort of his eloquence, and a specimen of what could be urged in the cause. The packet containing this writing, it seems, was delivered or read to Milo while he sat at dinner. "How lucky it was," he said, "that this oration was not actually spoken, I should not now have been eating these excellent fish at

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BOOK "Marfeilles ⁴⁰." These marks of indifference
IV. make a striking contrast to the figure which Cicero himself had exhibited in his exile. If he could have thus trifled with apparent or unmerited disgrace, that single addition of constancy and force to his character would have undoubtedly placed him as high in the order of statesmen, as, by the other parts of his character, he stands in the list of ingenious men and virtuous citizens.

Milo was likewise soon after condemned, in absence, by the Prætor, upon a charge of bribery and corruption. Some of his competitors, particularly Hypsæus and Scipio, were brought to trial for the same offence. The Tribune Munatius Plancus and Pompeius Rufus were, at the expiration of their office, tried and condemned for the share they had in the fire which consumed the Senate-house, and in the assault which was committed on the house of M. Lepidus the Interrex.

⁴⁰ Asconius Pædianus in Argument. & Notis in Orat. pro Mil. Dio Cass. lib. xl. Plut. in Pompeio, Catone, &c.

C H A P. III.

Character of Pompey in Capacity of sole Consul. — Privilege of Cæsar to be admitted as Candidate for the Office of Consul, without resigning his Province. General Revolt of the Gauls. — Operations in that Country. — Blockade and Reduction of Alesia. — Distribution of Cæsar's Army in Gaul.

POMPEY, in his dignity of sole Consul, having joined a legal authority to the personal elevation which he always affected, possessed much of the influence and consideration of a real monarch; and it would have been happy, perhaps, for the State, if he could have made such a dignity hereditary, and a permanent part of the constitution, or given to the commonwealth that reasonable mixture of kingly government, of which it appears to have stood so greatly in need. In his present elevation he rose for a while above the partialities of a factious leader, and appeared to adopt that interest which the sovereign ever has in the support of justice. He even seems to have personated the character of a prince, or to have considered himself as above the rank of a citizen. Among other

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instances to this purpose, is mentioned his haughty saying to Hypsæus, late candidate for the Consulate, now under prosecution for bribery, who, as Pompey passed from the bath to supper, put himself in his way to implore his protection, "Detain me not," he said, "you only make supper to cool for no purpose¹." In the midst of the solicitations of his courtiers and flatterers, he even ventured to dispense with his own regulations. Contrary to the rule himself had laid down for the direction of criminal trials, he furnished Munatius Plancus, when brought to the bar, with a commendatory testimony, "I cannot prefer this writing of Pompey," said Cato, "to the law of which he himself is the author." On account of this saying, Plancus, when the judges came to be inclosed, thought proper to reject Cato: the accused was nevertheless condemned².

Besides the measures taken to punish past offences, it was thought necessary to devise some laws to prevent for the future, or to lessen the temptation to the commission of such dangerous crimes. The principal source of the late disorders appeared to be the avidity of candidates for those offices of State, which led immediately to the government of lucrative provinces. To remove this temptation, it was ordained, at the suggestion of Pompey, that no man could be

¹ Val. Max. lib. ix. c. 5.

² Plutarch, in Pompeio, p. 484.

appointed to a province till five years after the expiration of that office, whether of Consul, Prætor, or Quæstor, in virtue of which he claimed a proportionate station in the provinces. C H A P.
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Before the enacting of this law, however, Pompey had the address to procure for himself a prolongation of his government in Spain for five years. This circumstance, which continued to give him the command of an army abroad, while he likewise bore the highest civil office in the State at home, set a very dangerous precedent for the commonwealth.

Cæsar's command in Gaul was soon to expire; and, according to the laws then in force, he must even resign it before he could aspire to the Consulship, or pretend to cope with his rival in civil preferments. It had been wisely ordained by the laws, that the persons offering themselves as candidates for the office of Consul, should appear in person to sue for it; and that no man, without resigning his command and dismissing his army, could enter the city, or even go beyond the limits of the province in which he had governed. By this regulation it was intended to prevent the conjunction of civil power, in the State with the command of an army. Pompey, however, though vested with such a command in Spain, had contrived to be exempted from the observance of this law; and, under pretence that his office of general purveyor of corn for the Roman People did not confine him to any station, and in reality extended to the whole empire,

B O O K or had a particular reference to Italy, still continued to reside in the city of Rome.
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Cæsar, to keep pace with his rival, openly aspired to the same privilege with Pompey, and claimed, as a mere instance of equal treatment, what the other had obtained; but what, if bestowed on himself, with his other advantages, must give him a great and immediate superiority. The army he commanded was already in the most advantageous situation. The addition of Consular power at Rome, to that of general in both the Gauls, was joining Italy itself to his provinces, putting him at once in possession of the empire. Any opposition made to his authority as Consul would be construed as rebellion against the State itself. Pompey would be driven at once from the helm of affairs to the command of a distant province, in which he, at most, could only defend himself; but not entertain any designs on the sovereignty of Italy, which would be covered from his attempts by the Pyrenees and the Alps, and the great armies of Gaul.

With these objects in his view, Cæsar instructed his partisans among the Tribunes to move, That, being continually engaged in a hazardous war, which required his presence, and being necessarily detained abroad in the service of his country, he might be exempted from the law, which required the candidates for office to attend their canvasses in person, and might therefore be elected into the Consulate without presenting himself to the People for that purpose.

This proposition was sufficiently understood by the leading men of the Senate, and by the few who joined with them in support of the commonwealth. It was known to be intended that Cæsar should have a privilege of being elected Consul, without resigning his province, or dismissing his army; and they withstood the motion as of the most dangerous consequence. But Pompey, who ought likewise, for his own sake, to have been alarmed at the progress of Cæsar, and at the uncommon advantage at which he now aimed, was either lulled into security by the artifices of his rival, or thought himself sufficiently raised above any danger from this or any other quarter. He had accepted, in his own person, many unprecedented honors and was possibly unwilling to contend for forms which, at some future period, might limit his own pretensions. Cato loudly renewed his suspicion of Cæsar's designs. Cicero could not be neutral in any dispute that should arise between Cæsar and Pompey. He had been banished by the one, and restored by the other. Besides the personal consideration he owed to Pompey on this occasion, his natural bias was on the side of the Senate, and for the support of the forms which were provided for the safety of the commonwealth. He nevertheless suffered himself to be dazzled with the court which Cæsar had paid to him for some time, with a view to this very question; he condemned the indiscreet zeal of Cato, who, in his opinion, was ruining the cause of the republic

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by setting both Cæsar and Pompey at defiance, while he himself, by temporizing, and by managing the inclinations of these parties, had secured them both in its interests. He stated the danger of a quarrel with Cæsar at this time, supported as he was by a powerful army, and in the bowels of Italy; but did not consider that he was then giving up, without a quarrel, all that any quarrel could extort.

The army of Cæsar was not then so well prepared to follow him against his country, nor he himself furnished with the same colors of justice under which he afterwards made war on the commonwealth. If a civil war were to be dreaded, to temporize, in this instance, was to give a delay which proved favorable to the enemy, or rather, in effect, to deliver up the republic, without a contest to that fate which the prudent councils in question were intended to remove. Under color of this prudence, nevertheless, Cicero, as well as Pompey, supported the Tribunes in their motion, and obtained for the Proconsul of Gaul, the dispensation he desired, to retain his army, while he offered himself a candidate for the highest office of the state at Rome.

Cæsar, immediately upon his arrival on that side of the Alps in the beginning of winter, observing the distractions which took place in the city upon the murder of Clodius, affected much zeal for the laws which had been so grossly violated in that instance; and, under pretence of

furnishing himself with the means of supporting the state against those who were inclined to disturb it, ordered new levies in every part of his provinces, and made a considerable addition to his army; but, contented for the present with the privilege he had obtained of suing for the Consulship, without quitting his province, or resigning his military power, he left the State, as before, apparently in the hands of Pompey; and, in the middle of winter, on the report of a general defection of all the Gaulish nations, repassed the Alps.

Most of the nations that lay beyond the mountains of Auvergne, the original limits of the Roman province, roused by the sense of their present condition, or by the cruel massacre lately executed in a part of their country, were actually in arms. They had submitted to Cæsar, or were separately gained by him, under the specious pretence of alliance or protection against their enemies; and with the title of ally, suffered him to become their master. But the violence with which he had threatened the canton of the Carnutes³, for absenting themselves from the convention which he had assembled on the Seine, and the merciless severities executed by him against the unfortunate natives of the tract between the Rhine and the Meuse⁴, convinced all the nations of Gaul that they were

³ Now Chartres.

⁴ Now chiefly Liege and Guelderland.

BOOK IV. reduced to the condition of slaves ; and that every exertion they made for liberty was to be punished as a crime. They saw the folly of their former dissensions, and suspended all their animosities to enter into a general concert for their common safety. The occasion, they said, was favorable for the recovery of their country. The Romans were distracted at home, and Cæsar had sufficient occupation in Italy. His army could not act in his absence. The present time, they concluded, was the favorable opportunity to shut out the Romans for ever beyond the Cevennes, or even to force them to retire within the Alps.

All the nations on the Seine, the Loire, and the Garonne, quite round to the sea-coast, received these representations with joy. They held private meetings, and instead of exchanging hostages, which would have been too public a measure, and have led to a discovery of their designs, they plighted their faith by a more secret form, commonly practised among them on great occasions, that of pressing their banners together.

The people of the Carnutes⁵ undertook to begin hostilities ; and accordingly, on a day fixed, surprised the town of Genabum⁶, where they put many Roman traders, together with the commissary general of the army, to death.

It


⁵ Chartres.

⁶ Orleans.

It was the custom of the Gauls to convey intimation of such events by means of a cry which they raised at the place of action, and repeated wherever the voice was heard, till passing almost with the velocity of sound itself, it gave the speediest information of what was done. In this manner intelligence of what had been transacted at Genabum at the rising of the sun, was, before night, propagated in every direction to the distance of a hundred and sixty miles, and put all the nations within this compass in a ferment. Its first and principal effects, however, were produced in the country of the Arverni⁷. Here Vercingetorix, a youth of heroic spirit and great capacity, assembled his retainers, took possession of Gergovia, now Clermont, the capital of his country, and from thence sent messengers in every direction to urge the execution of the measures lately concerted for the general freedom of Gaul. He himself, in return for his zeal, being chosen the common head of the confederacy, in this capacity, fixed the quota of men and of arms to be furnished by each separate canton, and took hostages for the regular observance of the conditions to which the several parties had agreed.

Vercingetorix having assembled a considerable army, sent a part of his force to act on the Garonne, and to harass the frontiers of the Roman province, while he himself moved to the Loire,

⁷ Auvergne.



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BOOK in order to rouse the nations of that quarter, who
IV. appeared to be too secure; and he accordingly brought to his standard all the warriors of those cantons that lay on the left of that river. His party on the Garonne, at the same time, were joined by all the nations of Aquitania, and, in formidable numbers, threatened with immediate destruction the cities of Toulouse and Narbonne, or such parts of their districts at least as were open to invasion.

Thither Cæsar, with all the forces he could assemble upon his arrival from Italy, immediately repaired; and, having put the province of Narbonne in a condition not to be insulted, proceeded to give the enemy an alarm in their own country. His object was, if possible, to put himself at the head of the legions which he had left on the northern frontiers of his new acquisitions. He did not choose that those legions should move in his absence so far as to expose themselves to be cut off by the natives. Nor was it easy for himself, with the force under his command, to penetrate through so many enemies as lay in his way to join them. It was yet winter, and the mountains were deeply covered with snow. This circumstance, which increased his difficulties, as it was likely to render the enemy secure, still encouraged him to make his attempt. He accordingly passed the mountains^{*} which lay in his way, at a time when the snow, in many places,

^{*} The Cevennes.

being six feet deep, must be removed with shovels, and when that passage was supposed to be entirely impracticable. After he had surmounted this difficulty, his object being to draw the attention of the prince of the Arverni to his own country, he sent his cavalry abroad in numerous parties to destroy with fire and sword the people with their habitations and possessions. When he thought the alarm was sufficiently spread, and must have reached the Gaulish army on the Loire, he pretended, that his presence was required in the province behind him, gave the command of the troops in Auvergne to Decimus Brutus, then a young man; giving him orders at the same time to keep his parties abroad, and to continue to harass the country as he himself had done.

Having taken these measures to fix the attention of the enemy in one quarter, Cæsar, with a few attendants, made haste to pass in a different direction to Vienna on the Rhône, where he was received by a party of horse, which he had appointed to that place to wait his orders; and, under this escort, without halting by day or by night, he passed by Bibracte⁹ and the country of the Lingones¹⁰, to the nearest quarter of his army on the Seine; and while he was yet supposed to be in Auvergne, had actually assembled his legions which had been distributed on the course of that river.

⁹ Afterwards Augustodunum, now Autun. ¹⁰ Langres.

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Vercingetorix having notice that Cæsar, in this manner, had passed him, and that the Roman army on the Seine was in motion, perceived that the invasion of his own country had been no more than a feint, and that the chief force of the enemy was to be expected from a different quarter, he resumed the operations which he had intermitted on the Loire, and endeavoured to possess himself of a post in the territory of Bibracte, where the people still professed themselves to be in the alliance of the Romans.

Cæsar, notwithstanding the difficulty of procuring provisions and forage so early in the season, thought himself under a necessity of opposing the progress of the enemy. For this purpose he left his baggage, under the guard of two legions, at Agendicum¹¹; and from thence, with the remainder of the army, proceeded to Genabum¹², leaving Trebonius by the way to take possession of a town which the natives, after a little show of resistance, had surrendered.

Upon his arrival before Genabum, the Gauls, who were in arms at that place, resolved to abandon the town; and shutting the gates against the Romans on one side, endeavoured to escape by the bridge of the Loire on the other. But Cæsar, having notice of their design, forced open their gates, and overtook them, while crowded

¹¹ Sens.

¹² Orleans.

together in the entrance of the bridge, and in the narrow streets which led to it, put the greater part to the sword, and, under pretence of revenging the massacre of the Roman traders, who had been cut off at this place, ordered that the town should be destroyed. From thence he penetrated into the country of the Bituriges¹³, on the left of the Loire; and, on his way towards Avaricum¹⁴, the capital of that district, forced every place that opposed his passage.

Vercingetorix, observing the rapid progress of the Romans, and knowing that the Gauls, being without order or discipline, could not withstand them in battle, declined an engagement, but endeavoured to distress the enemy by delays and want of provisions. He had authority enough with his own people to persuade them to lay their country waste every where within many miles of Cæsar's route. Twenty towns of the Bituriges were burnt in one day. Avaricum alone, contrary to the opinion of Vercingetorix, and at the earnest request of its inhabitants, who undertook to defend it to the last extremity, was spared.

Thither, accordingly, Cæsar advanced as to the only prize that was left. He attacked the place, under great disadvantages, in the midst of a country that was entirely laid waste, and trusting for the daily subsistence of his army to the Ædui.

¹³ Now Berri.

¹⁴ Bourges.

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beyond the Loire, who, notwithstanding their professions, were far from being hearty in his cause, or diligent in sending their supplies of provisions to his camp. Such as they sent were intercepted by Vercingetorix, who had occupied a strong post with his army, and infested the highways with his parties. In these circumstances, Cæsar's army was sometimes reduced to great distress; he himself, to pique the resolution of his soldiers, affected a willingness to raise the siege, whenever they were pleased to intimate, that they could endure it no longer: "We are got into a difficult situation," he used to observe; "if the troops are discouraged, I shall withdraw." To this affected tenderness for the sufferings of his men, he was every where answered, with entreaties that he would not dishonor them, by supposing that any hardships could oblige them to forfeit the character they had acquired by the labor of so many successful campaigns. He accordingly continued the attack of Avaricum under all his discouragements.

The place was covered on two sides by a river and a morass, and was accessible only on the third. The walls of the town were ingeniously constructed with double frames of wood, having compartments or pannels filled up with masonry and large blocks of stone. The masonry secured the timber from fire, and the frames preserved the masonry against the effects of the battering ram, which could act only on the stones contained within a single pannel or division of

the frame, without ruining at once any considerable part of the wall, or effecting a breach. The Roman army approached to this wall, by the most laborious and difficult methods which were practised. They began, in the ancient form of attack, at a proper distance, and on a breadth of eighty-three feet, to lay a sloping mound¹⁵, which rising by degrees on the plain, formed, as it advanced, an easy ascent to the level of the battlements. The earth on the sides of this mound was supported by timbers, hurdles, and faggots, and the workmen in front were covered with mantlets and moveable penthouses. The besieged, that they might still overtop the besiegers, raised their walls by additional frames of wood, which they covered with raw hides, as a security against the burning arrows and shafts which were darted against them.

In this contest the works on both sides were raised about eighty feet, and the besieged endeavoured to keep the advantage of superior height, not only by raising their own walls, but likewise by undermining and sinking the mound of the besiegers. They made galleries under the foundation of their own wall to the bottom of the enemy's mound, by which they endeavoured to remove the earth and other materials from their sally-ports on different sides of the mound, and endeavoured to set fire to the wood by which the earth was supported. In all these

¹⁵ The Agger.

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particulars showing that they possessed the arts of defence in common with ancient nations¹⁶. Vercingetorix, in the mean time, continued to harass the Roman army from without, intercepted their supply of provisions, and, by means of the river and the morasses, maintained his communication with the town, and sent in frequent relief.

Notwithstanding all these difficulties, Cæsar by degrees brought forward and raised his mound of approach to the height of the battlements; so that by a single assault he might determine the fate of the town. And while both parties were preparing for a last effort, he took the opportunity, as he frequently did, of a heavy rain to make his attack. The besieged, as he supposed, had taken shelter from the weather, and were in that instant put off their guard. He got possession of the battlements with little resistance, and drove the parties who manned them before him from the walls. The inhabitants formed in the streets, and the Romans who had entered, extending their line to right and left along the ramparts, were about to occupy the battlements over the whole circumference of the place, when the garrison, observing their danger, began to escape by the gates. In the confusion that followed, the town was sacked, and could make no resistance. Of forty thousand persons who had taken

¹⁶ Cæsar de Bell. Gall. lib. vii. c. 22, &c. Vid. Thucyd. lib. ii. in the siege of Plataea.

shelter in it, no more than eight hundred escaped. This massacre was joined to that lately performed at Genabum, under the pretence of completing the vengeance which was due for the murder of the Roman traders who were put to death at the breaking out of the present revolt.

The Gauls, as usual on every calamitous event, were greatly disheartened, and were about to despair of their cause, when their leader reminded them, that, contrary to his judgment, they had reserved this place from the general devastation, and had themselves undertaken to defend it; that what they suffered was the consequence of a mistake, and might be retrieved by abler conduct. His authority as usual rose on the ill success of councils which he had not approved, and brought an accession of numbers to his standard.

Cæsar, finding a considerable supply of stores and provisions at Avaricum, remained some days to relieve and to refresh his army. The country around him, however, being entirely laid waste, or occupied by parties of the enemy, it became necessary for him to repass the Loire, and to open his communication with a country of which the inhabitants still professed to be in alliance with the Romans, and having had their possessions covered by the river from the incursions of the enemy in their late devastations, were still in condition to supply his camp. As in this movement he seemed to retire and to give up the ground he had disputed with the prince of the Arverni, he pretended that he was called to

BOOK settle a dispute which had arisen among the Ædui,
IV. relating to the succession of the chief magistrate, or head of their canton. Having repassed to the right of the Loire without any loss, he made a demand on his allies of that side for ten thousand men on foot, and all the horses they could furnish.

He now had enemies on every quarter, and it was good policy to keep them divided, and to occupy them separately. For this purpose he sent four legions towards the Seine; while he himself took the route of Noviodunum¹⁷, at the confluence of the Loire and Allier; and there leaving his money, spare horses, and unnecessary baggage, he continued his march on the banks of the Allier, with intention to pass that river, and to invade the Arverni, from whom this revolt had originated, and whose chief was now at the head of it. This prince, knowing that the river Allier is never fordable till autumn, and till the melting of snows on the Cevennes begins to abate, ordered all the bridges upon it to be demolished, and hoped to prevent the Romans from passing it during the greater part of summer. As soon as Cæsar marched from Noviodunum, he presented himself on the opposite bank of the river, and regulated his motions by that of the enemy. The two armies commonly decamped, marched, and encamped again in sight of each other; and Cæsar never affected to elude

¹⁷ Nevers,

the vigilance of the Gauls, till he saw an opportunity to do so with advantage.

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It happened that one of the bridges of the Al-
lier had been but imperfectly destroyed; most
of the piles were yet fast in the ground, and ap-
peared above water; so that a passage might be
effected in a few hours. The country around
was woody, and furnished cover, or a place of
ambush, to any number of men. From these
circumstances Cæsar conceived the design to
over-reach the enemy. He put his army in mo-
tion as usual, but himself remained with a suf-
ficient detachment in the neighbourhood of the
ruined bridge, which he meant to repair. In
order that the Gauls might not be led to suspect
that any part of his army was left behind, he or-
dered that those who were to move should di-
vide, and present the same number of separate
bodies, the same distinction of colors and stand-
ards, which they were accustomed to show on a
march of the whole army; at the same time, as
he knew that the Gauls would endeavour to keep
pace with his people, in order to hasten and in-
crease their distance, he ordered them to make a
quicker and a longer march than usual. When
he supposed that this feint or stratagem had taken
its full effect, he began to work on the piles
which were left in the river, and in a few hours
repaired the bridge so effectually, that he passed
with the division of the army he had reserved for
this purpose, and instantly fortified a post to co-
ver them on the opposite bank. From thence

BOOK he sent orders to recal the main body; and before the enemy were apprized of his design, had reunited all his forces on the left of the river.

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Vercingetorix, as soon as he had intelligence that the Romans had passed the Allier, fell back to Gergovia¹⁸, the capital of his own principality, in order to take measures for the safety of that place. It being situated on a height, having an ascent of above a mile from the plain, and surrounded by other hills, which made part of the same ridge, he ordered a stone-wall to be built six feet high about half way up the ascent to the town, and encamped as many as the space could contain within the circuit of this wall. He occupied the other hills at the same time with separate bodies, having communications with each other and with the town. By this disposition Cæsar found all the approaches of the place commanded, and no possibility of investing the whole by lines of circumvallation, or by any chain of posts. He pitched his camp at some distance from the foot of the hill, and from thence in a few days got possession of a height in his way to the town, on which he posted two legions, with a lane of communication, fortified on both its flanks, leading from this advanced station to his main encampment.

In this posture Cæsar foresaw, that all the heights in his neighbourhood being in possession of the enemy, while he pressed upon the town,

¹⁸ Now supposed to be the neighbourhood of Clermont.

he himself might be hemmed in, and cut off from all the supplies necessary for the support of his army. To preserve his communication, therefore, with the Allier and the Loire, he ordered his allies from the opposite side of these rivers to advance with the forces he had formerly required of them, to occupy the country in his rear, and to cover his convoys. They accordingly took the field; but their leaders having been for some time inclined to favor the general cause of the Gauls, they thought this a favorable opportunity to declare their intentions. Being arrived within thirty miles of Cæsar's army, they halted; and, upon a report which was industriously spread amongst them, that he had murdered some of their countrymen who were already in his camp, they put all the Romans in their company to death, and took measures to join their countrymen who were assembled for the defence of Gergovia. They had not yet moved to execute this resolution, when Cæsar had notice of what was intended, and with his usual diligence arrived, after a march of thirty miles, with four legions and all his cavalry, in time to prevent its effects. He presented himself as a friend; and thinking it safest for the present to disguise his resentment, he produced in public view all the persons who were said to have been killed by his orders, convinced such as had been deceived of their error, and brought them, with the seeming cordiality of allies, to his camp.

Cæsar made a merit with the Ædui of this act

BOOK of clemency towards their people, but found,
 IV. that the spirit of defection was not confined to these detachments; that it had pervaded the nation; that the violence committed in the camp was an effect of the resolutions adopted by the whole people, that, in pursuance of the same measures, his purveyors and commissaries had been assaulted and pillaged even where they thought themselves secure, as in a friend's country; and that he could no longer rely on the affections of any nation in Gaul.

The leaders of the Ædui, however, on hearing of the lenity that was shown to such of their people as were in the power of Cæsar, pretended to return to their duty; and Cæsar, not to break at once with the only supposed ally which remained to him beyond the Cevennes, affected to consider the late disorders as the effect of a mere popular tumult, and declared himself willing to rely on the wisdom of the State itself for the reparation of wrongs which a few ill-advised persons of their country had committed.

This able commander appears, on many occasions, to have trusted greatly to the superiority of the Roman soldiers, as well as to that of his own reputation and conduct as a general. His confidence in both was required in the highest degree to support him in continuing, or even in attempting, a siege under his present difficulties, beset by numerous enemies, who were in appearance ably conducted; while he himself was deserted by those who were reputed his friends.

In his last march to repress the defection of his allies, he had left his camp exposed to the attacks of the enemy, and defended only by two legions against the whole force of so many nations as were assembled for the defence of Gergovia. These seized their opportunity in his absence, made a vigorous attack, and must have prevailed, if he had not returned with the utmost celerity to relieve his camp.

With the same confidence in the superiority of his men, Cæsar soon afterwards made an attempt to force the wall, which, as has been mentioned, the Gauls had built on the ascent of the hill which led to the towns; and having made a feint on the opposite side with part of his horse, joined by the followers of the army mounted on horseback, who showed themselves at a distance to appear like cavalry, he drew the enemy from the place he meant to attack, actually passed the wall, and made himself master of part of their camp. A few of his men penetrated even into the town; but not being supported, were surrounded and slain; even those who had succeeded at first under favor of the feint by which he had drawn off the enemy, were, upon the return of the Gauls to the defence of their camp, repulsed with considerable loss. In consequence of this defeat, it was no longer doubtful that Cæsar would be under the necessity of raising the siege.

In order to begin his retreat without any appearance of fear, he formed his army two days

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successively on the plain before his intrenchment, and offered the enemy battle. On the third day he decamped; and, with the credit he derived from this species of defiance or challenge, in three days he arrived at the Allier, repaired his bridge, and repassed undisturbed by the enemy. His passage of the same river, a short time before, was esteemed as a victory, and his return, without having gained any advantage, and merely for the safety of his army, was undoubtedly considered as a defeat. The low state of his fortunes, checked and baffled by a Gaulish leader, yet a youth, and unexperienced, encouraged the nations on the right of the Loire, even while he was advancing towards them, to declare for the liberties of Gaul; and as a commencement of hostility, they carried off or rifled the treasure he kept for the pay of his army, and seized all the spare horses and baggage which he had left at Noviodunum¹⁹, as at a place of security at the confluence of the Allier and the Loire.

He himself was yet inclosed between these two rivers, having enemies on every side, and no magazines or stores for the supply of his army. He deliberated whether he should not fall back on the province of Narbonne; but the danger to which he must expose Labienus, commanding a division of the Roman army on the Seine, the difficulty of passing the mountains of Auvergne, then occupied by his enemies, and

¹⁹ Nevers.

the discredit which his arms must incur from such a retreat, prevented him. He determined therefore to advance; passed the Loire by a ford above its confluence with the Allier; found a considerable supply of provisions and forage in the country of the Ædui, and continued his march from thence to the Seine. CHAP. III.

Labienus, with the troops he commanded in that quarter, had besieged Lutetia, the original germ from which the city of Paris has grown, then confined to a small island in the Seine, and had made some progress in the siege, when he heard of Cæsar's retreat from Gergovia, of the defection of the Ædui, and of preparations which were making by the nations on his right against himself. In these circumstances, he laid aside his design on Lutetia, and ascended by the left of the Seine to the country of the Senones, through which Cæsar was now advanced to meet him. In passing the river at Melodunum²⁰, he was attacked by the enemy, but obtained a considerable victory; and with the credit of this event in his favor, continued his march to a place which is now called Sens, near to which he was soon afterwards joined by Cæsar.

While the Romans were thus reuniting their forces on the Seine, Vercingetorix had passed the Loire, and held a general convention of the Gaulish nations at Bibracte. He was attended by deputies of all the cantons from the Moselle

²⁰ Now Melun.

BOOK to the Loire, except the Treviri, Remi, and
IV. Lingones²¹. The first stood in awe of the Germans, who kept them in continual alarm. The two last professed an attachment to the Romans, who were still masters of the field in their neighbourhood.

The leader of the Gaulish confederacy being at this meeting confirmed in his command, made a requisition for an augmentation of force, chiefly of cavalry, and accordingly increased this part of his army to fifteen thousand. To the end that he might give the Romans sufficient occupation in their own defence, he projected two separate invasions of the province of Narbonne: one to be executed by the nations which lay between the Rhône and Garonne, towards Toulouse; the other, from the Saone and the upper parts of the Loire, towards Geneva and the left of the Rhône. He himself, though still determined to avoid any general action, was to harass the enemy in their movements, and to cut off their supplies of provisions.

Cæsar, on his part, wished to open his communication with the Roman province, that he might have access to cover it against the designs of the enemy, and to avail himself of its resources for the subsistence of his army. For this purpose it was necessary for him to return, by the Saone and the Rhône, through a level country which was in possession of the enemy, to whom

²¹ Now Treves, Rheims, and Langres.

he was greatly inferior in cavalry. He sent into Germany for a reinforcement of horse; and the natives of that part of the continent being already sensible, that wherever they were admitted to act as soldiers of fortune, they were qualifying themselves to act as masters, without scruple bestowed their services for or against any cause; two thousand of them joined Cæsar, but so ill mounted that he was obliged to supply them with horses, by borrowing such as belonged to his officers of infantry, and as many as could be spared from his cavalry. To compensate their defect in horses, the men were brave, and, in many of the operations which followed, turned the event of battles, and determined the fate of the war.

The Roman army being thus reinforced, Cæsar began his march to the southward; and having passed the heights at the sources of the Seine, found the Gauls already posted in three separate divisions, contiguous to the different routes he might take, with numerous flying bodies of horse, ready to harass him in any movement he should make in their presence. By continuing his march, he soon gave their leader an opportunity to try his fortune in a sharp encounter, in which the whole cavalry of both armies came to be engaged. The Gauls were routed chiefly by the valor and address of the Germans, to whom Cæsar imputed his victory. This event was decisive in respect to the cavalry, that part of both armies on which it was supposed

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that the fate of the war must turn. And Vercingetorix, not to expose his infantry to the necessity of a general action, instantly retired to the heights from which the Seine, and a number of other rivers which mix with it before its confluence with the Marne, have their source. Cæsar, no longer apprehensive of the enemy's horse, resumed the confidence with which he always pursued his advantages, and followed his flying enemy into this retreat.

Vercingetorix, with his very numerous army, took post at Alesia, a place raised on a hill at the confluence of two rivers; the point on which it stood being the termination of a ridge which separated the channels by which these rivers descended to the plain. The fields on one side were level, on the other mountainous. The Gauls were crowded together on the declivity of the hill of Alesia, under the walls of the town, and in that position thought themselves secure from any attack. But not aware of the resources, enterprise, and genius of their enemy, while they endeavoured to render themselves inaccessible, they had got into a place in which they might be cooped up; and Cæsar immediately began to surround them, making a proper distribution of his army, and employing working-parties at once on a chain of twenty-three posts and redoubts.

Vercingetorix, though too late, perceiving the enemy's designs, sent his cavalry to collect what provisions could be found in the neighbouring country; but these troops, in

consequence of their late defeat, not being able to keep the field against the Roman and German horse, he proposed to diminish the consumption within his lines by dismissing them altogether, giving them instructions to make the best of their way to their several cantons, and there to represent the situation in which they had left the army, and the necessity of making a great and speedy effort from every quarter to relieve it. He had eighty thousand men under his command, and might be able to subsist them for thirty days, and no longer.

Cæsar, from the enemy's having sent away their cavalry, concluded that they meant to act on the defensive, and to remain in their present situation until they should be relieved. With little apprehension of disturbance, therefore, from within his lines, he proceeded to execute amazing works; at once to secure his prey and to cover himself against any attempts which might be made to rescue them. This great commander owed many of his distinguished successes to the surprising works which he executed; so far exceeding the fears or apprehensions of his enemy, that they found themselves unexpectedly forced into difficulties with which they were not prepared to contend.

The Roman armies in general, and those which served under Cæsar in particular, had learned to make war with the pick-ax and the shovel, no less than with the javelin and the sword, and were inured to prodigies of labor

BOOK IV. as well as of valor. In the present case they were made to execute lines of circumvallation and countervallation over an extent of twelve or fourteen miles. They began with digging, quite round the foot of the hill, a ditch twenty feet wide, with perpendicular sides, in order to prevent any surprise from the town. At the distance of four hundred feet from this ditch, and beyond the reach of the enemy's missiles, was drawn the line of countervallation, consisting of a ditch fifteen feet wide, and a rampart twelve feet high, furnished, as usual, with a palisade. At a proper distance from this first line which fronted the town, so as to leave a proper interval for the lodgement and forming of his army, he drew another line, consisting of the same parts and dimensions, fronting the field. From the nature of the ground, part of these works were upon the hills, and part in the hollows or valleys; and the ditches, wherever the level permitted, or could not carry off the water, were allowed to be filled.

As he had reason, at least after the distress of a blockade began to be felt, to expect from a garrison, which exceeded his own army in numbers, the most vigorous sallies from within; and, by the united exertions of all the Gaulish nations in behalf of their friends, every effort that could be made from without; and as his own army, consisting of no more than sixty thousand men, could not equally man, in every place, works of such extent, he thought it necessary to

cover his lines with every species of outwork then practised in the art of attack or defence, the *Cippi*, *Liliæ*, and the *Stimuli*.

The first were forked stakes, or large branches of trees planted in rows in the bottom of a ditch five feet wide, bound together to prevent their being pulled up separately, and cut short and pointed to wound the enemy who should attempt to pass them.

The second, or *liliæ*, consisted of single stakes sharpened and made hard in the fire, planted in the bottom, of tapering or conical holes, of which there were many rows placed in quin-cunx; so that a person who had passed in the interval of any two must necessarily fall into a third. This device was commonly masked or concealed with slender brushwood covered with earth.

The last, or the *stimuli*, were wooden shafts set in the ground and struck thick with barbed hooks, to fasten or tear the flesh of those who attempted to pass them in the night, or without the necessary precautions.

All these several works, it appears, the Roman army completed, considerably within the thirty days for which Vercingetorix had computed that his provisions might last. Both parties concerned in this blockade, without any attempt to hasten the event, seemed to wait for the several circumstances on which they relied for the issue. Cæsar trusted to the effects of famine, and the Gauls to the assistance of their friends, who were

BOOK in reality assembling in great numbers from
 IV. every quarter to effect their relief. They are
 said to have mustered at Bibracte²² no less than
 two hundred and forty thousand foot, with
 eight thousand horse. But if these numbers are
 not exaggerated, they may be considered as a
 proof how far those nations were ignorant of
 the circumstances on which the fortunes of armies
 really turn. The supreme command of this
 multitude was given to Comius, a chieftain of
 the northern cantons, who having some time
 made war in conjunction with the Romans, owed
 the rank which he held in his own country to
 the favor of Cæsar, but could not resist the
 contagion of that general ardor with which his
 countrymen now rose to recover their freedom.

While this great host was assembling, the
 unhappy garrison of Alesia received no tidings
 of relief. Their provisions being near exhaust-
 ed, they began to despair of succour. A coun-
 cil was held to deliberate on their conduct, and
 to form some plan of escape. Some were of
 opinion that they ought to surrender themselves,
 and to implore the victor's mercy. Others, that
 they should make a general sally, endeavour to
 cut their way through the enemy, and escape or
 perish with swords in their hands. Critog-
 natus, a warrior of rank from the canton of the
 Arverni²³, treated the opinion of those who

²² Autun.

²³ Auvergne.

proposed to surrender as mean and dastardly; that
 of the second, as brave rather in appearance than
 in reality. "Bravery," he said, "does not consist
 " in sudden efforts of impatience and despair,
 " but in firmly enduring for any length of time
 " what the circumstances of war may require.
 " Shall we think merely, because we have no
 " communication with our friends, that they
 " have deserted us, and do not intend to make
 " any effort to save us? Against whom do you
 " think Cæsar hath constructed so many works
 " in his rear? Against whom does he man them
 " in your fight with so much care? He has in-
 " telligence, although you have not, that a
 " powerful army is preparing to relieve you.
 " Take courage, and wait the coming of your
 " friends. Even if your provisions should fail,
 " the example of former times will point out a
 " resource. Your ancestors, being surrounded
 " by the armies of the Cimbri and the Teutones,
 " rather than surrender themselves, fed on the
 " bodies of those who were unserviceable in the
 " war; and by this expedient held out till the ene-
 " my was obliged to retire. And yet on that
 " occasion, our ancestors had less cause than we
 " have to make every effort of constancy and
 " fortitude. *Their* enemies were passing, and
 " meant only to plunder a country which they
 " were soon to abandon; *our* enemies come to
 " bind us in perpetual chains, and to establish a
 " dominion at which human nature revolts."

The Gauls kept their resolution to hold out,

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but rejected the means that were proposed to supply their necessities, or reserved them for a time of greater extremity. The proposition of Critognatus is, by Cæsar, who was himself the unprovoked author of so much distress, and who continued, without remorse, to gratify his ambition at the expense of so much blood, mentioned with horror as an act of nefarious cruelty²⁴. So much are men affected with appearances which shock the imagination more than with the real measure of what is hurtful to mankind. What followed, however, was probably no less cruel on the part of the Gaulish army than it was on the part of Cæsar; the first, to lessen the consumption of food, turned out the women, children, and unarmed inhabitants of the town to the mercy of the enemy; and Cæsar, in order to accumulate the sufferings of the besieged, would neither relieve nor suffer them to pass. From these circumstances we may presume, although it is not mentioned, that they must have perished a spectacle of extreme anguish and suffering in the presence of both armies.

In the midst of these extremities, Comius, with the united force of the Gaulish nations, at last appeared for the relief of Alesia, and with their multitudes covered the neighbouring hills. Being favored by the nature of the ground, they

²⁴ Nec prætereunda videtur oratio Critognati propter ejus singularem ac nefariam crudelitatem. De Bell. Gall. lib. vii. c. 77.

were enabled to advance within five hundred paces, or less than half a mile, of Cæsar's lines. On the following day the cavalry on both sides began to act. The Gaulish horse, trusting to their superiority in numbers, or the defensive plan which the Romans were likely to follow on the present occasion, drew forth on the plain below the town, and proposed to encourage their friends by braving the enemy. Cæsar thought it necessary to repel this species of insult, and sent his cavalry to accept the challenge. An action began about noon, and lasted till the setting of the sun, when the Gaulish horse, who till then had maintained the fight with great obstinacy and valor, being taken in flank by the Germans in Cæsar's service, were obliged to give way. Both sides, on this occasion, had mixed parties of infantry with their horse; and the Gaulish foot, who were engaged in this action, being now abandoned to the swords of the enemy, fled in the utmost confusion to the rear of their own army.

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After this action nothing passed for a day and a night; but it appeared that, during this time, the Gaulish army in the field were collecting faggots and hurdles to fill up the trenches of Cæsar, and preparing grapplings to tear down the palisade and the parapet; and that they only waited till these preparations should be finished to make a vigorous attempt to raise the siege. They accordingly came down in the middle of the night, and, with a great shout, the only

B O O K signal they supposed could be understood by
IV. their friends in the town, gave a general assault on Cæsar's line of circumvallation, as far as their numbers could embrace it, and without any choice of place.

Cæsar had assigned to every legion and separate body of men their station, and had repeatedly, to render them familiar with his disposition, given the alarm, and taught them to repair to their posts; he had placed Marc Antony and Trebonius, with a body of reserve, to succour any part of the lines that might be in danger of being forced. So prepared, he now received, without any surprise, the general assault of the Gauls. His men suffered considerably from the first shower of missiles that came from so numerous an enemy, but as soon as the assailants advanced to the outworks, and felt themselves entangled in the snares which had been laid for them, and against which they had taken no precaution, they were sensible that they fought at a great disadvantage, and desisted at once from this rash and inconsiderate attempt.

The besieged, in anxious expectation of what was to pass in the field, hearing the shout that was raised by their friends, returned it to make known their intention, to co-operate in every attack, and instantly began to employ the preparations which they likewise had made to fill up the trenches, or force the lines. They continued, during the greater part of the night, to cast such materials as they could throw into the

broad ditch at the foot of the hill; but, when day appeared, seeing that their friends had retired, without making any impression on the exterior line, they too, not to expose themselves in an attempt in which they were not to be seconded, withdrew to their station on the hill.

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From this disappointment, the Gauls, both within and without the blockade, were sensible of their error in having made an attack before they had examined the enemy's works. To correct this mistake, they visited the whole circumference of Cæsar's lines. They observed, in a particular place, that the exterior line was interrupted by a hill which it could not embrace without making a great circuit. That Cæsar, to avoid so great an addition to his labor, and so much outline to defend, had encamped two legions in that place with their usual intrenchment, which formed a kind of fortress on the summit of the hill, trusting to this camp as a redoubt that would connect his defences on that side.

This place was chosen by the Gauls for a second and better concerted attempt than the first; and they determined, instead of the night to make their attack at noon-day, when the enemy were most likely to be off their guard. Five-and-fifty thousand men were selected for this service; and they began their march early in the night, arrived at their ground before break of day, and lay concealed under a ridge of hills till noon. At this time they came forward, furnished not only with grappling irons to

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tear down the palifade, which was formed on the parapet, but with hurdles and faggots to fill up the ditch, and to smother the stimuli from which they had suffered so much in their former attacks.

Cæsar, though not thrown off his guard, either by the time of the day, or by his former success, was sensible, that he was now attacked in his weakest place. He ordered Labienus instantly, with six cohorts, to support the legions that were posted in that station; and as he had reason to expect, at the same time, a general assault, both from within and from without his lines, to favor this principal attack, he ordered every separate body to its post of alarm; and he himself, with a considerable reserve, took a station from which he could best observe the whole, and be ready to sustain any part that was pressed. He had given Labienus instructions, in case he found that the lines could not be defended, to sally forth, and bring the action to an issue, in which the Romans were generally found to have an advantage by mixing with the enemy sword in hand.

The Gauls, who were shut up on the heights of Alesia, only waiting to second the attempts of their friends in the field, began the action on their part nearly about the same time; and the Romans, being alarmed with hostile cries and shouts, at once both in their front and in their rear, were in danger of being seized with a panic, from which the best troops, on occasion, are not exempted.

Labienus was so much pressed where the Gauls made their principal effort, that Cæsar detached two several parties from his reserve to sustain him. First, a body of six cohorts under Decimus Brutus, and afterwards a body of seven cohorts under Fabius. At length, upon receiving information that Labienus had not been able to prevent the enemy from passing the intrenchment, but that he meant, with all the troops who had joined him from different stations, amounting to nine-and-thirty cohorts, to make a general sally according to his instructions, and to mix with the enemy sword in hand; he himself instantly moved to support him.

Cæsar had, by this time, observed, that the enemy, by a gross misconduct, had made no feint or no attempt on any other part of the lines to favor their principal attack; and he therefore, with those he still retained as a body of reserve, not only left the post of observation he had taken in the beginning of the action, but ventured even to unfurnish some other parts of the line as he passed, and advanced with great rapidity to join in the sally which Labienus was about to attempt. In his coming he was known from afar by the conspicuous dress which he generally wore in time of battle; and his arrival, on this occasion, with the reinforcement which he brought, greatly animated that part of his army which had begun to despair of the event. He had, in this critical moment, with his usual genius and presence of mind, ordered his cavalry to get out of

BOOK the lines; and, while the foot were engaged in
IV. front, to take the enemy in flank or in the rear. If the event had been otherwise doubtful, this movement alone, it is probable, must have secured it in his favor. The Gauls, although in the attack they had acted with ardor, yet lost courage when pushed to defend themselves; and, upon the appearance of Cæsar's cavalry in their rear, took to flight, and were pursued with great slaughter.

This flight at once decided the fate of both attacks; of the Gauls, who were shut up in Alesia, and of their countrymen, who had come to their relief. During the night, those in the field, discomfited by their repulse, were separating, leaving their chieftains, and dispersing in different directions. Many fell a prey to the parties who were sent in pursuit of them. Those from within the lines, who had suffered so long a blockade, now seeing all their hopes of relief at an end, were no longer disposed to contend with their fate. Vercingetorix, having assembled the leaders together, told them, That, as he had undertaken this war, not from motives of private ambition, but from an earnest desire to recover, if he could, the freedom of his country, so he was now ready to become a sacrifice to the safety of his countrymen, and in any manner they thought proper to dispose of him, whether dead or alive, was willing to be made the means of appeasing the victor's revenge.

At this consultation it was determined to
 surrender;

surrender ; and Vercingetorix suffered himself to be delivered up. With respect to the treatment he received, Cæsar is silent ; but it is probable, that, like other captive chiefs, on such occasions, he was destined to grace the future triumph of his conqueror ; though, upon a fair review of the parts they had severally acted, likely to furnish a comparison not altogether to his advantage, and in some respects fit to obscure his glory.

The other prisoners also, except those who belonged to the cantons of the Ædui and Arverni, underwent the ordinary fate of captives ; and, in this capacity, were exposed to sale, or divided as plunder among the troops. Cæsar reserved the prisoners of the Ædui and Arverni, on this occasion, to serve him as hostages in securing the submission of their respective cantons, and in obtaining from thence an immediate supply of provisions.

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Cæsar remains in Gaul. — Pompey assumes Scipio into the Office of Consul. — Succession of Servius Sulpicius and M. Claudius Marcellus. — Arrangement for the Provinces. — Motion to recal Cæsar. — Continued Debates in the Senate. — Operations of Cæsar in Gaul. — Intrigues in the City. — Affairs in the other Provinces. Campaign of Cicero. — Succession of Consuls. — State of Parties in the City and in the Senate. — Arrival of Cæsar in Italy in the Spring. — Return to Gaul. — Parts with two Legions to Pompey and the Senate. — Alarm of Cæsar's March. — The Consul Marcellus commits his Sword to Pompey.

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THE seventh and the most difficult campaign of the war in Gaul being now at an end, Cæsar sent Labienus, with two legions beyond the Saone¹; Caius Fabius, with two more, to the heads of the Marne and the Meuse; other officers with separate bodies, amounting in all to three legions, into different stations beyond the Loire and towards the Garonne; Quintus Tullius Cicero,

¹ The Arar.

with some other officers, to a station allotted them on the Saone, to superintend the formation of magazines and the supply of provisions, which were chiefly transported by the navigation of that river.

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Cæsar himself, having now no other object of equal importance with that of securing the possession of a country so populous and of so great extent, from which he might draw such resources of men and of revenue, as must put him on the foot of a great monarch, determined to pass the winter on this side of the Alps. He had obtained a dispensation from the law, which excluded him from the Consulate, so long as he retained his army; but as it was not yet time to avail himself of his privilege, he resolved, by remaining at a distance, as much as possible to shun the notice of such parties at Rome as were known to observe his proceedings, and to state them as matter of general alarm. He nevertheless did not suffer any thing of moment to pass in the city without taking some part by means of his agents and partisans, and was continually employed in gaining to his interests all those who were likely to come into office, or who, by their personal consideration, were of any importance in the State, and ever strove to exclude from office such as were disinclined to himself, or who could not be gained.

Pompey had now, for some months, exercised the office of sole Consul. In that time he had, in some measure, restored the authority of government, and had exercised it with moderation.

B O O K He had shown himself qualified to act the part of
IV. an excellent prince, though ill qualified to endure the equality which is claimed by the citizens of a commonwealth. His continual desire of unprecedented honors was one of the evils that distressed the republic. This evil, however, was partly mitigated by the facility with which he parted with power. Having enjoyed his present dignity from the first of March to the beginning of August, he took for colleague his father-in-law Metellus Scipio, suspending the prosecution under which he then lay, for bribery, in soliciting votes at a preceding election.

The newly elected colleague of Pompey, desirous to signalize his administration by some act of reformation, moved and obtained the repeal of the act in which Clodius had so greatly circumscribed the power of the Censors; and he attempted to revive the authority of this magistracy, but in vain. Few citizens, now in public view, could bear the rigorous inspection of this once awful Tribunal, as few had the courage to undertake or to exercise its trust. The institution accordingly had fallen into disuse, because it was not fitted to the times. And there being few of the People that were fit either to censure, or that could bear to be censured, it was not in the power of laws to revive what the general sense and manners of the age had abolished.

Disorders arising from the weakness of government had come to that extreme at which states

must either correct themselves, or undergo some fatal change. The example of punishments inflicted, and of prosecutions still carried on against persons lately in office, for the illegal methods employed at elections, deterred many from offering themselves for any of the offices of State; and the late law, excluding Consuls, Prætors, and other magistrates from any provincial appointments for five years after the expiration of their terms, removed one powerful motive by which citizens were induced to seek for such honors.

At the elections for the ensuing year only three candidates appeared; M. Marcellus, Servius Sulpicius, and M. Cato: all of them supposed to be of the Senatorian party; but very differently considered by those who now endeavoured to rule the State. Marcellus had, in fact, recommended himself to Pompey; and Sulpicius, as afterwards appeared, had been gained by Cæsar; and both were warmly espoused by these powerful patrons in the present contest in opposition to Cato, whose success might have proved a considerable obstruction to Cæsar's designs.

It is observed of this competition, that it was carried on without bribery or tumult. As the competitors were supposed to be all of the Senatorian party, the Senators thought their interest secure which ever of the candidates should prevail. And as the Senatorian party divided upon the occasion, the influence of Cæsar and Pompey

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easily cast the balance on the side of Sulpicius and Marcellus. Cato, during the competition, continued in the same habits of friendship as usual with both; and when the choice was decided in their favor, instead of withdrawing from public view, as was common under such disappointments, he went to the field of Mars as usual from the assemblies of the People, stript and went to exercise, and continued from thence forward to frequent the Forum in his common undress. To those who condoled with him, or pressed him to continue his suit for another year, as he had done when first disappointed of the Prætorship, he made answer, That he thought it was the part of a good man to undertake the public service, whenever he was intrusted with it, and to make his willingness known, but not to court the public for employments as a favor to himself. "The people," he said, "at the time that they refused me the Prætorship, were under actual violence: in this case, they have made a free choice, and it appears that I must either violate my own mind, or renounce their good-will. My own mind is of more consequence to me than their favor; but, if I retain my character, I shall not be so unreasonable as to expect consideration from persons to whom it is not agreeable²."

U. C. 702.
Serv. Sulpicius, M.
Claud.
Marcellus,
Coss.

When the new Consuls were received into office, their immediate predecessors being by the

² Plutarch, in Caton. p. 268.

late act precluded for five years from holding any provincial government, it became necessary to fill stations of this sort with those who had formerly been in office, and who hitherto had not been appointed to any command in the Provinces. Accordingly Bibulus, who had been the colleague of Cæsar in his Consulship, was appointed to the government of Syria, vacant by the death of Crassus. Cicero was named to succeed Appius Claudius in Cilicia and Cyprus, Atius Varus was appointed Prætor in Africa, and P. Cornelius Spinther in Achaia. Pompey, who had hitherto enjoyed a dispensation from the law, in continuing to hold by his lieutenants the government and command of the army in Spain, while he filled the office of Consul in the city, now professed an intention to take possession of his province in person, and he actually set out from Rome for this purpose; but was induced to suspend his journey by a motion, which was made in the Senate by Marcellus, soon after his accession to the office of Consul.

Cæsar was now in possession of a very important privilege, which entitled him to sue for the Consulship, without resigning the command of his army. His view in coveting this privilege; his continual augmentation of the troops in his province; his address in attaching the army to himself; his insinuation, his liberality; his assiduity to gain every person that could be won, and to preclude from power every one likely to oppose himself: the whole tendency of his conduct, and

B O O K IV. the enormous power he had acquired, began to be observed, and gave a general alarm. What Cato had so often represented, to no purpose, began to be generally perceived; and persons, formerly the least attentive to the warnings they received, would now have been glad to remove Cæsar from the post of advantage they had given him.

The greater part of the Senate had become remiss in their attendance, and regardless even of their own political interests. The few who exerted themselves, were distracted with personal jealousies and distrust of each other. Cicero in particular, who before his banishment had been strenuous on the side of the aristocracy, now grown timorous from the sufferings he had incurred, was chiefly attentive to his own safety, which he studied by paying his court to the prevailing powers. There was no bar in Cæsar's way, beside the great consideration and the jealousy of Pompey, who had assisted him in procuring his privilege to stand for the Consulship in absence; but now saw its tendency, and wished to recal it. It was probably, therefore, with the approbation of Pompey, though after his departure from Rome, that the Consul Marcellus, while the Senate was deliberating on the other removes and appointments in the provincial governments, proposed that, the war in Gaul being finished, Cæsar should be recalled; or, if his friends insisted on his being continued in his command, that he should not be admitted on the

list of candidates for the Consulate, until he presented himself personally for this purpose. CHAP. IV.

This motion gave rise in the Senate to warm debates, which were frequently adjourned, and as often resumed. The Consul Sulpicius, supported by numbers of the Tribunes who were in the interest of Cæsar, opposed the proceeding. Pompey himself, under pretence that he waited the issue of these debates, stopped short in his journey to Spain, passed some time at Ariminum in reviewing the new levies which were destined to reinforce the troops of his province; and at last, being summoned to attend the Senate on the fifteenth of August, to consider of the provincial arrangements³, he returned to Rome.

On this day, Pompey affected to censure the violence with which it had been proposed to recall, before the expiration of his term, an officer legally appointed. He acknowledged his opinion, that Cæsar ought not to unite the government of a province, and the command of an army, with the dignity of Consul; but dissuaded the Senate from taking an immediate resolution on that head. The debate was adjourned to the first of September⁴. Then no meeting of the Senate could be formed; but as soon as the subject was again resumed, the late Consul Cornelius Scipio, the father-in-law to Pompey,

³ Cicer. Epist. ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 4. Dio Cass. lib. iv. c. 58, 59.

⁴ Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 9.

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proposed, that on the first of March, when the persons destined to succeed the present Consuls must have entered on office, a day should be fixed to consider of the province of Gaul, and moved that this question should be resumed in preference to every other business'. Marcellus accordingly prepared, and laid before the Senate, a decree for this purpose on the last of September. By the first clause of this decree, the Consuls elected for the following year were required, on the first of March, to move in the Senate the consideration of the consular provinces, to admit no other business to precede or to be joined with this, and to suffer no interruption in the meetings of the Senate, even on account of the assemblies of the people. By the same clause, it was resolved, That the three hundred Senators, appointed judges for the year, might be called off from their sittings in the courts to attend the Senate on this business; and if it should be necessary to make any motion on this subject in the assemblies of the People at large, or of the Plebeians⁵ separately, that the Consuls Sulpicius and Marcellus, the Prætors, the Tribunes, or such of them as shall be agreed upon, should move the people accordingly.

To this clause were prefixed, in the usual form, the names of twelve Senators, as the authors or movers of it.

⁵ Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 9.

⁶ Ad Populum Plebemve ferrent. Ibid.

By a second clause, bearing the same names, a caution was entered against any obstruction to be given in this business by persons empowered to control the Senate's proceedings; and it was resolved, That whoever should put a negative on this decree, should be declared an enemy to his country; and that the Senate, notwithstanding any such negative, should persist in recording its own decree, and in carrying its purpose into execution. In the face of this resolution, the Tribunes C. Cœlius, L. Venicius, P. Cornelius, C. Vibius Panfa, interposed their negatives.

By another clause, the Senate resolved, That on the same day, the case of the armies of the republic should be taken into consideration, and all who claimed their dismissal, either on account of the length of service, or any other consideration, should be heard; and that this likewise should be entered as a decree of the Senate, notwithstanding any negative interposed to the contrary. Here the Tribunes C. Cœlius and C. Panfa, again forbade the decree. The last clause related to the mode of carrying into execution the purpose of the Pompeian law, with respect to the nomination of Pro-prætors to the province of Cilicia, and the other eight Prætorian provinces; and on this clause likewise, the two last mentioned Tribunes entered their negative⁷.

⁷ Cicero ad Familiar, lib. viii. ep. 8.

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Thus the resolutions of the Senate, though preserved in their own records, were, by the continual interposition of the Tribunes, prevented from having any real effect. And Cæsar, from the disputes which had arisen on his account, had sufficient warning, if this had been necessary, to prepare himself for an approaching conflict. It is indeed likely, that though in action the principal characters of his mind were decision and rapidity, yet no man ever laid his designs more deep, looked forward to consequences more remote, or waited with more patience the proper time for the execution of his purpose. He had now, by the unremitted application of eight years, acquired the advantage, for the sake of which he had coveted the command in Gaul; he was at the head of a numerous army, which he had gradually augmented from two or three legions, the establishment of his province, to twelve, well inured to service, and attached to his person. He was in possession of a privilege to stand for the Consulate, without disbanding his army; and when he should unite the first civil and political authority in the state, with an army at the gates of the capital, there is no doubt that he might be considered as sovereign of the empire. His apparent right to the advantages he had gained was such that the resolutions of the Senate against him, however necessary to the preservation of the commonwealth, might have the semblance of injustice, and were likely to engage both his own

army and the populace of Rome in his quarrel. C H A P.
 He himself prepared for the issue, by removing IV.
 every cause of embarrassment in his province,
 and by paying fresh court to the legions under
 his command with gratifications and bounties.

He had dispersed or destroyed all the great
 armies which the utmost efforts of the Gaulish
 nations, in the preceding campaign, had been
 able to assemble against him; but he had not
 reconciled the spirits of that people, nor inured
 them to his government. He had a plausible
 ground, therefore, from which to refute the al-
 legations of the Senate, who proceeded in their
 resolutions against him, on a supposition, that
 the war in his province was ended; and at the
 same time, had a fair pretence to gratify his army
 with the spoils of the country. For these purposes,
 soon after he had placed his army in winter-quar-
 ters he had intelligence, or affected to believe, that
 the war was likely to break out afresh in different
 cantons; and under this pretence, took occasion
 to carry his legions successively into action.
 Leaving M. Antony to command at Bibracte*,
 on the right of the Loire, he himself, with the
 eleventh and twelfth legions, passed that river,
 took the canton of the Bituriges by surprise,
 plundered their habitations, carried many of the
 people into captivity, and continued to lay waste
 the country, until they and all the neighbouring

* Afterwards Augustodunum, now Autun.

B O O K cantons on the left of the Loire, to avert these
IV. calamities, surrendered themselves at discretion.

From this expedition, in which he spent forty days, he returned to his quarters, and ordered the two legions, which had been thus employed, a gratuity of two hundred *sestertii*, or about thirty shillings a man, to the private foldiers; and of about two thousand *sestertii*, or sixteen pounds, to the Centurions. This money, it is observed by the historian⁹, was not immediately paid; but was retained by Cæsar as a pledge in his own hands, or remained as a debt due to the army, giving to every individual a special interest in the safety and success of his general.

About eighteen days after this first division of the army was brought back to its quarters, other two legions were employed on a like expedition between the Loire and the Seine¹⁰. The inhabitants of this tract were to suffer military execution, upon a complaint that they infested the newly acquired subjects of Cæsar beyond the Loire. He accordingly marched to protect his new allies; and being arrived in the country, from whence they were said to be invaded, found the supposed enemy, by the devastations of the preceding campaign which had ruined their towns and villages, reduced to live in temporary huts, in which they withstood with difficulty the inclemency of the season, and were rather

⁹ Cæs. de Bell. Gallico.

¹⁰ To the country of the Carnutes.

objects of pity than of hostile resentment. On the approach of the Romans, they fled to the woods, where they perished in great numbers, from the effects of the famine and cold. To force them to an immediate surrender, or to cut off all hopes of advantage from delay, Cæsar made a disposition to prevent their having any respite from their present sufferings. He ordered the ruins of Genabum ¹¹ to be repaired as a place of arms, quartered his legions there, and kept the horse and light infantry in the field to pursue the natives, to seize their persons, and to multiply the evils to which they were exposed. In this service too, it was likely that the army was rewarded by the distribution of captives, the only spoils of such an enemy, and came to have a demand on Cæsar for gratuities equal to those which had been granted to the eleventh and twelfth legions.

These operations led on to the spring, when a more real service took place on the frontiers of the low countries. From that quarter, the people of the Remi ¹² had given information, that the Bellovaci, or inhabitants of what is now called the Beauvois, with other cantons on the right of the Oise, were actually arming, and meant to make war on the Romans and their allies.

¹¹ Now Orleans.

¹² Rheims.

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On this intimation, Cæsar thought proper again to call forth the eleventh legion into service; and it is remarkable that this legion, though now in its eighth campaign, is expressly said to have been thus employed out of its turn, in order to improve a discipline, in which, when compared to the other legions, they were deemed to be still defective. The eighth and ninth legions, the one from the station of Fabius, and the other from that of Labienus, were ordered to join them in the country of the Suefones¹³, near the confluence of the Oise and the Aisne. With this force Cæsar passed the Oise; but arrived too late to surprise his enemy. The Bellovaci¹⁴, with some of their neighbours, apprehending, from the fate of the nations on the Loire, that they could not rely for safety on their innocence, nor on the care which they had taken to avoid giving offence to the Romans, had taken arms for their own security, and had retired with all their effects to a strong post. They had a hill in the front, beyond which there lay a morass, and in that situation they thought themselves sufficiently secure without any artificial work.

Cæsar posted himself in their neighbourhood; and supposing that the superiority of their numbers would inspire them with confidence, took measures to augment their presumption, and to derive some advantage from the errors they were

¹³ The Soissons.

¹⁴ The Beauvois.

likely

likely to commit, under the effects of this disposition. He affected unusual caution, fortified his camp with uncommon care, scarcely ventured abroad to cover his foragers, and seemed to be entirely occupied in securing himself.

The enemy however continued to avoid any general action, and were satisfied with the successful war they were suffered to make on the foraging parties which were sent from the Roman camp. Being joined by five hundred German horse, they attacked and destroyed the cavalry, which had come to the assistance of Cæsar from the cantons of the Remi and Lingones ¹⁵, and on which he chiefly relied for covering the avenues to his camp. By this loss he might have been in a little time reduced to great distress, or even forced to retire, if he had not procured a speedy reinforcement, by ordering Trebonius, with the two legions lately stationed at Genabum ¹⁶, and a third from Avaricum ¹⁷, to join him without delay.

The Gauls, on hearing of this great accession of strength to their enemy, and recollecting the fatal blockade and ruin of their countrymen at Alesia, determined to change their ground. They began to execute this resolution in the night, by removing their sick, wounded, and baggage; but had made so little progress at

¹⁵ Rheims and Langres.

¹⁶ Orleans.

¹⁷ Bourges.

BOOK break of day, that their intention was discovered,
 IV. and Cæsar, before they began their march, had time to pass the morafs, and to take possession of the rising ground in their front. This he did with the greatest dispatch; and though he did not think it expedient to attack them in their present position, he had it in his power to take advantage of any movement they should make, and continued to awe them and to keep them in suspense.

The Gauls therefore, instead of being able to depart as they expected before day-light, were obliged to continue to front the enemy, in order to cover the retreat of their baggage. They still flattered themselves, that Cæsar before night would be obliged to retire to his camp; but observing, that while the greater part of his army continued in readiness for action, he began to intrench himself where he stood, they bethought themselves of a stratagem to elude his design. They brought forward the wood and straw, which remained, as usual, on the ground of their late encampment, laid them in a continued train along the front, and having set them on fire, produced such a line of smoke, as darkened the whole fields between the two armies. Under this cover they began their retreat, and before Cæsar could venture to penetrate the cloud of smoke in pursuit of them, had gained a considerable distance. On the first sight of this uncommon appearance, he suspected their design, and began to advance; but the precautions, which

he was obliged to take, in order to guard against an ambuscade or surprise, gave the Gauls the time they wanted to effect the first part of their retreat undisturbed. C H A P.
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Before night they halted again, about ten miles from their former station, and recurred to the same means they had hitherto employed to distress the Roman army. They succeeded in most of their attempts on the parties that were sent abroad by Cæsar to procure him provisions; and having reduced him to the necessity of depending entirely for the subsistence of his army on what a particular district could supply, they formed a design, with the choice of their army, to surround and cut off the parties, which they expected he must employ on that service. Cæsar had intelligence of their design, and prepared, in his turn, to counteract them. He placed his army in a proper position to surprise the great detachment they had made; and having thus taken or destroyed the flower of their army, obliged the remainder, who were thrown into despair by so great a loss, to surrender themselves at discretion; in consequence of this surrender, he got possession of all the cantons in that neighbourhood.

The Belgic nations being thus finally subdued, and Cæsar having no longer any enemy to oppose him in the field, except a few desperate bands from different parts of the country, who, either from fear of his severity, or aversion to his government, had deserted their settlements, he determined to act against them in different quarters

BOOK at once, and to cut off the retreats, which, in
 IV. case of distress, this remnant of the nations who
 lately opposed him mutually gave to each other. He sent C. Fabius, with twenty-five cohorts, to act on the left of the Loire; the twelfth legion, towards the sources of the Garonne, with orders to cover the approaches to Narbonne from the incursions of any stragglers, whom his intended severities might force upon desperate attempts on that side. He himself, with Labienus and Marc Antony, proceeded to the Meuse, where the territories of the late unfortunate Ambiorix¹⁸, beginning to be re-peopled, and the nation reinstated under its former leader, were become again the object of his vengeance. To convince this unhappy people, that they were not to enjoy peace under the government of a Prince who had presumed to circumvent and to destroy a part of the Roman army, he renewed his military execution against them, issuing his orders, as in the former instance, to spare neither sex nor age.

While Cæsar himself was employed in this manner, C. Fabius being arrived at the place of his destination, between the lower parts of the Loire and the Garonne, found a considerable force in arms against Caninius Rebilus, the Roman officer, who was stationed in that quarter. The natives had laid siege to a fortress that was in the possession of the Romans; but alarmed by the approach of Fabius, they withdrew, and endeavoured to

¹⁸ Now Liege, Juliers, and Guelderland.

pass the Loire to the northward. In this attempt being intercepted in their march, and obliged to fight the Roman detachment, they were defeated with great slaughter. After this calamity, about five hundred, who escaped from the field under Drapes, a prince of that country, formerly distinguished in the war against the Romans, took their flight in the opposite direction, and proposed to attack the Roman province of Narbonne, in order to compensate their losses with its spoils.

Fabius, in consequence of his victory, received the submission of all the nations from the Loire to the Seine, and quite down to the sea coast. And having taken measures to secure his conquest, followed Drapes to the southward, overtook him beyond the Garonne, and obliged him, being no longer in condition to make any attempt on the Roman province, to take a refuge at Uxellodunum¹⁹, a place of strength, situated on a steep rock, at the confluence of some of those streams, which, falling from the Cevennes, form the Garonne by their junction.

Here Caninius and Fabius having joined their forces together, made dispositions to invest their enemy; but before their works were completed, Drapes, while he had yet access to the fields, willing to spare the magazines which he had made up in the town, ventured abroad with a detachment, at the head of which he was surprised and taken. The natives, however, who

¹⁹ Supposed to be Cadenau.

B O O K remained in the place, being supplied for a considerable time with provisions, resolved on a vigorous defence; and, by keeping the Roman army for some time at bay, began to raise up anew the hopes and expectations of the nations around them. Cæsar thought the reduction of this place an object that required his own presence. Having therefore sent Labienus to the Moselle; and having left M. Antony to command in the low countries, he himself, with his usual dispatch, crossed great part of Gaul, and appeared on the Garonne, equally unexpected by his own people, and by the enemy who were besieged in the town of Uxellodunum.

The place being strong by nature, and in no want of provisions, could be forced only by cutting off its access to water. For this purpose Cæsar lined the banks of the river with archers and slingers, and effectually prevented the besieged from supplying themselves from thence. He proceeded next to exclude them from the use of a spring which burst from the rock in the approach to their town; for having got the command of the ground, he pushed a mine to the source from which the water came, diverted it from its former direction, and, by depriving the besieged of this last resource, obliged them to lay down their arms and trust to his mercy. In this, however, they experienced what the author²⁰, from whom these accounts are taken, considered as more than

²⁰ Hist. de Bell. Gall. lib. viii. c. 44.

the usual severity of ancient war. Cæsar, according to this historian, having given proof of his clemency, bethought himself now of an example of justice; and for this purpose ordered such as had carried arms in defence of Uxellodunum to have their hands struck off²¹. And this refined act of cruelty being joined to the many barbarous executions with which the conquest of that country had been achieved, thus ended the war in Gaul.

The usual time of putting the troops into winter-quarters not being arrived, Cæsar thought proper to visit the nations upon the Adour, or what is called now Gascony²²; the only part of his new conquests in the acquisition of which he had not acted in person. He marched through this country at the head of two legions, and was every where received with the most perfect submission. From thence he repaired to Narbonne, the capital of his original province, held the usual meetings for the dispatch of civil affairs, and made a disposition for the quarters of his army during the winter. By this disposition two legions were stationed in the high country, from which spring the Garonne and the Loire, or in the territories of the Limovaci and Arverni²³:

²¹ Cæsar quum suam lenitatem cognitam omnibus sciret. — Omnibus qui arma tulerant manus præcidit. Vitam concessit quo testatior esset poena improborum. De Bell. Gall. lib. viii. c. 44.

²² Aquitania.

²³ Limoges and Auvergne.

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two at Bibracte, between the Saone and the Loire; two between the Loire and the Seine²⁴; and the remaining four under the command of Trebonius, Vatinius, and Quintus Tullius Cicero, in different parts of the low countries. To this extremity of his new conquests he himself repaired, and fixed his quarters at Nemetocenna²⁵, in the centre of his northern stations.

By this distribution of his army, Cæsar formed a kind of chain from the frontier of his original province, quite through the heart of his new acquisitions to the Meuse and the Scheld. And by his seeming anxiety for the safety of the northern extremities of his province, and still more by his own distance from Italy, he probably lulled for a while the vigilance or jealousy of his principal opponents at Rome. His own attention, however, to the state of politics was never less remitted.

Marc Antony, a person profligate and dissipated; but when the occasion required exertion, daring and eloquent, destined to be frequently mentioned in the sequel of this history, now began to be employed by Cæsar in the affairs of the city; and, under pretence of standing for the priesthood, was sent from Gaul, where he had recently served in the army, to bear a principal part among the agents and emissaries of his general. These agents were continually busied in magnifying his

²⁴ At Tours and Chartres.

²⁵ Supposed to be Arras.

services, and in gaining to his interest every person of consideration who could in any degree advance or obstruct his designs. In the conquest of Gaul, they alledged that he added to the patrimony of the Roman People a territory of no less than three thousand miles in circumference, and a revenue of forty millions Roman money²⁶. They took care at the same time, in his name and by his directions, under the pious pretence of celebrating the memory of his daughter, the late wife of Pompey, to cajole the people with public entertainments and feasts; and proceeded to execute, at a great expence, the splendid works which Cæsar had formerly ordered.

He himself, at the same time, was careful to secure the affections of the army; doubled their pay, and was lavish in all the other articles which were derived from his bounty. Besides his occasional liberality to the legions in time of the war, he gave, or engaged himself to pay, to each particular soldier, what to persons of that condition was a considerable object. In the city he even entered into the secrets of every family, and, as has been mentioned, gained the master by courting the mistress or favorite slave. His purse was ever open to gratify the covetous with presents, to relieve the necessitous, and to silence the creditors of those who were oppressed with debt. He encouraged the prodigal to squander their patrimonies,

²⁶ Plutarch, in Vit. Catonis, p. 263. Sueton. in Jul. Cæs. c. 25. Between about three and four hundred thousand pounds.

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and freely lent them the aids which their extravagance rendered necessary to them. He kept a correspondence at the same time with dependant and foreign princes; and took upon him the protection of provincial towns, in order to secure their affection and their confidence²⁷.

While Cæsar was thus extending his influence in the empire, he had amused Pompey by assigning to him, in all their arrangements, what was apparently the place of honor and of importance at the head of affairs at Rome; as he had gratified Crassus likewise by leaving him to choose the most lucrative government, while he himself submitted to be employed as a mere provincial officer, to explore a barbarous country, and to make war with its natives. But by thus yielding the supposed preference of station to his rivals, he actually employed them as the willing tools and ministers of his own ambition. The former, with all his disposition to emulation and jealousy, and perhaps for some time the dupe of these artifices, imagined that Cæsar advanced by his permission, and that the present state of parties was the fruit of his own address. As he himself, for the most part, endeavoured to obtain his ends by means indirect and artificial, he was the more easily duped by those who affected to be deceived by him, and who were able to over-reach him. Although it was impossible for him now to remain any longer insensible to the superiority which Cæsar had

²⁷ Sueton. in Jul. Cæs. c. 26, 27, 28.

acquired, or to those still more important objects at which he was aiming, yet he had not hitherto taken his part openly nor directly against him, but contented himself with employing others in ill-concerted and ineffectual attacks, which he sometimes disowned, and always feebly supported. At last, and in the prosecution of the measures of which we have observed the beginning in the Senate, he hazarded the whole authority of that body against Cæsar, without having provided any military power to enforce their commands.

Pompey himself, while most under the influence of ambition, and when he had it most in his power to trample on the civil constitution of his country, had shown a respect for the commonwealth, which kept him within bounds that were consistent with this species of government; and he imagined that no man could presume to surpass himself in pretensions to rise above the ordinary level. In the course of debates relating to the present state of affairs, he generally spoke ambiguously or affected to disbelieve the designs that were imputed to Cæsar; but finding, on the last motion which was made to recal him from Gaul, that the eyes of the whole Senate were turned upon himself, he was forced to break silence; and, with some degree of embarrassment, said, that although it was his opinion, that the proconsul of Gaul could not, in consistence with justice, be instantly recalled, yet that after the first of March he should have no difficulties on the subject. "But," says one of the Senators, "What if this motion should

BOOK IV. “ then have a negative put upon it ? ” “ I shall
 “ make no distinction,” replied Pompey, “ be-
 “ tween Cæsar’s refusing to obey the order of the
 “ Senate, and his procuring some one here to
 “ forbid that order.” “ But what if he persist in
 “ demanding the Consulate while he retains his
 “ province and his army ? ” “ What,” replied
 Pompey, “ if my own child should offer me
 “ violence ”²⁸. ”

After the attempt which had been made to fix the question of Cæsar’s recal for the first of March, Pompey being at Naples, was taken ill, and supposed to be in danger. His recovery gave a general satisfaction, of which he had afterwards very flattering proofs in his progress through Italy. He was every where met by processions, found the ways strowed before him with flowers, and was received by multitudes, who appeared to be frantic with joy for the return of his health.

Whatever part Pompey himself or his emissaries may have had in procuring these demonstrations of respect and affection, it is probable he was highly flattered with them, and either mistook them himself, or hoped that others should mistake them, as the proofs of a consideration and power which no attempt of his rival could overset or impair.

The principal attention of all parties, during this summer and autumn, as has been mentioned, had been turned to the affairs of Cæsar, and the

²⁸ Cicer. Epist. ad Familiares, lib. viii. ep. 8.

dangerous tendency of the course he pursued: and they were but for a little while diverted from this object by an alarm on the side of Syria. The Parthians, encouraged by their late success against Crassus, passed the Euphrates with a great army, commanded by Pacorus, son to Orodes, under the direction of Osaces, a veteran and experienced leader. They had, during the preceding winter, made an alliance with the king of Armenia, and were to be joined by his forces in this invasion. The disaster of Crassus had rendered the Parthian name terrible at Rome; and this intelligence struck a momentary panic in the city, as if an enemy were already at the gates. Some proposed to give Pompey the command in Syria; some to send Cæsar thither, and others, to send both the present Consuls to the army with a proper reinforcement²⁹.

But before these measures could be determined, or before any reinforcement could be ready to join the army in Syria, the people were relieved of their fears by Caius Cassius, the general then commanding in that province, who had obliged the Parthians to withdraw from Antioch; in their retreat attacked them, and made great slaughter. Osaces in that action received some wounds, of which, in a few days afterwards, he died, and the Parthian army continued in their retreat during the following year beyond the Euphrates; sensible, in their turn, that a war carried over the wastes of

²⁹ Cicer. ad Familiares, lib. viii. ep. 10.

BOOK that desolated frontier might be ruinous to any
IV. power by which it was attempted.

Bibulus, the present Proconsul of Syria, soon after the retreat of the Parthians, arrived in his province, and, according to the established practice of the Romans, laid his pretensions to a triumph for the victory which, under his auspices, though before his arrival, had been obtained by his lieutenant.

This invasion of Syria, as well as some disturbances in his own province, furnished Cicero, at the same time, with the occasion of some military operations, of which we have a particular account, in his letters, and which, though not material to the military history of the times, are not unworthy of notice, as they relate to this eminent personage. He had taken possession of his command in Cilicia, and however better fitted by his habits for the Forum and the political assemblies at Rome than for the field, possessed abilities to qualify him for any station, put himself at the head of an army, and prepared for the defence of his province. He had set out from Rome in May; and having had a conference with Pompey at Tarentum, arrived at Brundisium on the twenty-first of that month³⁰.

The military establishment of Cilicia being no more than twelve thousand foot and two thousand horse, Cicero applied for an augmentation of it, and on the fourth of June was still at Brundisium,

³⁰ Cicero ad Familiar. lib. iii. ep. 3.

waiting for an answer to this application. But finding that his request, having been opposed by the Consul Sulpicius¹¹, was unsuccessful, he set sail from that place, arrived at Actium on the fifteenth of that month, and passing through Athens, reached his province on the last of July. Here he found the troops, in consequence of a mutiny which had recently broke out among them, separated from their officers, dispersed in places of their own choosing, the men of entire cohorts absent from their colors, and considering themselves as exempt from any authority or government whatever. Trusting to the respect that was due to the name and commission of Proconsul, he ordered M. Annius, one of his lieutenants, to assemble as many as he could of the mutinous troops, and to encamp at Iconium in Lycaonia. There he joined them on the twenty-fourth of August; and, having intelligence of the Parthian invasion, took measures for the security of his province; marched, without loss of time, to Cybistra, on the frontier of Cappadocia; took under his protection the king Ariobarzanes, who was then threatened by a powerful faction in his own kingdom, and by receiving him as a prince in alliance with the Romans, dispelled the storm that had been gathering against him. He accepted, at the same time, of the offers that were made by Dejotarus to join him with all his forces; and being in this situation when he received accounts

¹¹ Cicero ad Familiar. lib. iii. ep. 3.

BOOK that the Parthians had presented themselves before
IV. Antioch, he supposed that his presence might be wanted to cover his own frontier on the side of Syria. He accordingly moved to that quarter, in order to secure the passes of the mountains. Here however he learnt, that the storm had blown over; that the enemy had retired, and had sustained a considerable loss in their retreat; and that Bibulus was then at Antioch. This intelligence he communicated to Dejotarus, intimating, at the same time, that his assistance was no longer necessary.

The province of Cilicia had been for some years subject to the Romans; but the inhabitants of the mountainous part had never acknowledged their authority, nor even that of their own national sovereigns. Cicero, on his arrival in the neighbourhood of their country, finding that the people had retired to their strong holds, and were still determined to oppose his authority, formed a design to surprise them; and, for the better execution of his project made a feint to withdraw to Epiphania, where he halted for a day, as if to refresh his troops. On the day following, which was the eleventh of October, in the evening, he put his army again in motion towards the mountains, and before morning arrived in the midst of his enemies, who by this time had returned to their usual habitations; cut them off separately, pursued such as fled, forced their strong holds, and in about sixty days reduced some towns and
 a consider-

a considerable tract of country, which had never before acknowledged the Roman government. CHAP.
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The troops, on this occasion, saluted Cicero with the title of Imperator; which being usually given to victorious leaders³², was commonly understood as the suffrage of the army for obtaining a triumph. He himself, accordingly, on this circumstance, together with the service which gave occasion to it, afterwards grounded his claim of that honor. This claim he scarcely seems to have seriously entertained; he even treats it as a jest in some of his letters: yet the triumph being in these latter times considered rather as the means of acquiring a certain rank in the commonwealth, than as the just reward of military merit, he submitted his claim to the Senate, and urged his friends to support it. His conduct as governor of a province, at a time when this station was supposed to give a licence to every species of rapine and oppression, did honor to his own disposition, and to those literary studies in which he was taught to choose the objects of his ambition and his habits of life. In this character he declined, both for himself and for his attendants, all those presents, contributions, and even supplies of provisions, of which custom or law had authorized the Roman governors, in passing through the provinces, to avail themselves. In his command he distinguished himself by his humanity, condescension, and disinterestedness; was easy of

³² Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xv. ep. 4.

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access and hospitable; open, in particular to all persons of literary merit and ingenuity, whom he entertained without ostentation. In such situations other Roman generals, though of great merit, indulged themselves in what was the custom of their times; they drained the provinces to accumulate their own fortunes, or placed their money there at extravagant interest. He was governed by different maxims, and wished to rise above his contemporaries by the fame of his disinterestedness, as well as of his ingenuity and civil accomplishments. Other citizens might possess greater steadiness, and force or elevation of mind; but his fine genius, his talents and fair disposition, of which his weakness indeed often prevented the full effect, still rendered him an important acquisition to either of the parties in the commonwealth. And as they endeavoured to gain, so they even seemed to acquire, his support in their turns.

Whilst the affairs of the respective provinces were thus administered by the commanders to whom they were intrusted, the usual time of elections at Rome being arrived, L. Æmilius Paulus, and C. Claudius Marcellus were elected to succeed to the Consulate for the following year. Soon after these elections attempts were made, though without effect, to carry into execution some of the regulations devised by Pompey, in his late administration, to check the corruption of the times. Calidius had been engaged in the last competition, and immediately upon his

disappointment was brought to trial for illegal means employed in his canvass. He was acquitted; and, in resentment, retorted the charge on Marcellus, in order, if possible, to annul his election; but failed in the attempt.

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Of those who were now elected Consuls, Caius Marcellus, as well as his relation and immediate predecessor Marcus Marcellus, was understood to be in the interest of Pompey. Æmilius Paulus, a Senator of rank, and of course interested in the preservation of the republic, the honors of which he was so well entitled to share, was expected to support the measures of the Senate, and adhere to the established forms. Together with internal tranquillity, the government seemed to recover its ancient severity. Appius Claudius, late Proconsul of Cilicia, and Calpurnius Piso were chosen Censors, and appeared to have authority enough to carry into execution the powers lately restored to this office by the ordinance of Scipio. It was expected that these Censors would hold an even balance between the factions. Appius favored Pompey, and Piso, from his relation of father-in-law to Cæsar, was necessarily disposed to check the partiality of his colleague. The hopes of the Senate were likewise considerably raised by the unexpected nomination of Caius Scribonius Curio to be one of the Tribunes. Servius Pola, after being elected into this office, had been convicted of bribery, the election was set aside, and Curio substituted in his place. This young man was of an honorable family;

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and possessing talents which qualified him for the highest preferments, naturally set out on a foot of independence, and joined those who were for maintaining the freedom of the commonwealth, and their own equal pretensions to honor and power. Being active and bold, as well as eloquent, the Senators were fond of a partisan who was likely to take upon himself much of that fatigue and danger which many of them were willing, even where their own estates and dignities were concerned, to devolve upon others.

U. C. 703.
L. Æmilius
Paulus, and
C. Claudius
Marcellus.

The new magistrates accordingly entered on office with high expectations that the dangerous pretensions of ambitious citizens, particularly those of Cæsar, would be effectually checked. The Consuls were possessed of a resolution of the Senate, requiring them to proceed to the business of Cæsar's province by the first of March. This resolution wanted only the consent of the Tribunes to render it a formal act of the executive power, of which this branch was by the constitution lodged in the Senate. But one of the Tribunes having forbid the decree, M. Marcellus, late Consul, moved that application might be made to this officer to withdraw the negative, which prevented the effect of what the Senate had resolved. But the motion was rejected by a majority^{''} of the Senate itself; and many other symptoms of Cæsar's great influence, even over this order of men, soon after appeared.

^{''} Cicero ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 13.

This able politician, probably that he might not seem to have any views upon Italy had fixed his quarters, and that of his army, in the low countries, and at the extremity of his recent conquests. But, instead of seizing every pretence, as formerly, for making war on the natives of Gaul, he endeavoured to quiet their fears, and to conciliate their affections³⁴; and while he kept the whole province in a state of profound tranquillity, collected money, provided arms, and completed his legions, as if preparing for a dangerous and important war. His distance from Italy lulled the jealousy of his opponents, and enabled him to carry on his operations unobserved. He spared no expence in gaining accessions to his interest; and when promises were accepted, seemed to make them with unbounded confidence in the means on which he relied for the performance of them. In this he acted as on the eve of a great revolution, the event of which was to raise him above the want of resources, or above the necessity of a scrupulous faith with private persons. He actually remitted at this time great sums of money to Rome; and no less than fifteen hundred talents, or about 289,500 l. to the management of the Consul Æmilius alone, who was supposed to expend this money in erecting public buildings for the use of the city. But not being superior to corruption, at least not to that which was addressed to his vanity, in being made

³⁴ Hist. de Bell. Gall. lib. viii. c. 49.

BOOK IV. agent and trustee for so popular a leader as Cæsar, he disappointed the hopes of his friends, and in all the contests which arose during his Consulship³⁵, became an active partisan for the person who had honored him with so flattering a trust.

It was likewise very early observed in these debates, that the zeal of Curio, who set out with violent invectives against Cæsar, began to abate; that he for a while endeavoured to divert the attention of the public to other objects³⁶; and at last fairly withdrew himself from the support of the Senate, and espoused the interest of Cæsar in every question.

This interest was now likewise strengthened by the accessions brought to it in consequence of the disputes of the Censors. These magistrates concurred in expunging from the Rolls of the Senate such as were of servile extraction, and many even of noble family, on account of some infamy or blemish in their character. But Appian, having carried his affection of zeal beyond what the age could bear, and being suspected of partiality to Pompey's friends, gave offence to Piso, who, by protecting many citizens who were stigmatized by his colleague, gained them to the interest of Cæsar. From these several causes this party became very numerous even in the Senate, and continued to suspend any decrees that were proposed

³⁵ Appian, Plutarch.

³⁶ Cicero ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 6.

to deprive Cæsar of his command, or to recal the extraordinary privilege which had formerly been granted to him. CHAP. IV.

It was afterwards discovered, in the sequel of these transactions, that Curio, some time before he openly declared himself for Cæsar, had been actually gained by him. This young man, like the youth of that age in general, had dissipated his fortune, and contracted immense debts. His popularity was the effect of his profusions; and the load of his debts made him a very uncertain friend to government, and to laws which supported the just claims of his creditors against him. He readily listened to Cæsar, who offered to relieve him of this burden, and actually paid his debts to a great amount³⁷; according to some reports, to the amount of ten millions Roman money³⁸; according to others, of six times that sum³⁹.

Curio, after he took his resolution to join Cæsar, continued to speak the language of his former party, and to act in concert with them, until he should find a plausible excuse for breaking with them. Such a pretence⁴⁰ he sought by starting many subjects of debate without consulting them, and by making proposals in which

³⁷ Plutarch. Dio. Sueton. Appian.

³⁸ Velleius, lib. ii. c. 48—80, 729 l. See Arbuthnot's Tables.

³⁹ Valerius Maximus, lib. ix. c. i.

⁴⁰ Dio. Cass. lib. xl. c. 61. Appian, de Bello Civili.

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he knew that the leading men of the Senate would not concur. To this effect he devised a project for the preparation of the highways, offering himself to have the inspection of the work for five years. And when much time had been spent in fruitless debates on this subject, he insisted, that a considerable intercalation should be made to lengthen the year, to give him sufficient time to ripen his projects. Being opposed in this by the college of Augurs¹, he employed his Tribunitian power to obstruct all other business, and separated himself entirely from his friends in the Senate.

Curio, having in this manner withdrawn himself from his former party, did not at once openly join their opponents; but, with professions of independence, affected to oppose the errors of both; and, by this artful conduct, seemed to have received the instructions, or to have imitated the policy of his leader. When the great question of Cæsar's recall was revived, he inveighed, as formerly, against the exorbitant powers which had been committed to this general, and urged the necessity of having them revoked; but subjoined, that the powers granted to Pompey were equally dangerous, and proposed, that both should be ordered to disband their armies, and return to a private station. The partisans of Pompey insisted, that the term of his commission was not yet expired; nor that of Cæsar's, replied

¹ Cicero ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 6.

Curio. If either is to be disarmed, it is proper that both should be so; if only one army be disbanded, we are certainly the slaves of that which remains. CHAP.
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There were probably now three parties in the State; one devoted to Cæsar, another to Pompey, and a third that meant to support the republic against the intrigues or violence of either. The latter must have been few, and could not hope to be of much consequence, except by joining such of the other two, as appeared by the character of its leader least dangerous to the commonwealth. Cæsar had shown himself in his political course a dangerous subject, and an arbitrary magistrate. In the capacity of a subject, he had supported every party that was inclined to commit disorder in the State, or to weaken the hands of government. In that of a magistrate he spurned every legal restraint, acted the part of a demagogue, supporting himself by popular tumults, and the credit of a faction, against the laws of his country; and it was the general opinion of considerate persons, that his thirst of power and emolument was not to be satisfied without a total subversion of government: that if, in the contest which seemed to impend, his sword should prevail, a scene of bloodshed and rapine would ensue, far exceeding what had yet been exhibited in any calamity that had ever befallen the republic. The description of his adherents⁴², and

⁴² Cicero ad Atticum, lib. vii. ep. 7.

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the character of persons that crowded to his standard, justified the general fear and distrust which was entertained of his designs. All who had fallen under sentence of the law, all who dreaded this fate, all who had suffered any disgrace, or were conscious they deserved it; young men who were impatient of government; the populace who had an aversion to order; the bankrupt, to whom law and property itself were enemies; all these looked for his approach with impatience, and joined in every cry that was raised in his favor.

Pompey, the leader of the opposite party, had never ceased to embroil the State with his intrigues, and even invaded the laws by his impatience for extraordinary and unprecedented honors; yet, when possessed of power, he had employed it with moderation, and seemed to delight in receiving these singular trusts by the free choice of his country; not in extorting them, not in making any illegal use of them, nor in retaining them beyond the terms prescribed by his commission. It appeared, that in nothing he had ever injured the commonwealth so deeply, as in caballing with Cæsar while he rose to his present elevation, from which he was not likely to descend, without some signal convulsion in the State⁴³.

This comparison of the parties which were now to contend for power at the hazard of the

⁴³ Cicero ad Atticum, lib. vii. ep. 3.

republic, made it easy for good citizens to choose their side. But they, nevertheless, naturally wished to prevent the contest from coming to extremities; as in the event of the war, which they dreaded, it was scarcely possible to avoid a military government. They considered the proposal of Curio as a mere pretence to justify Cæsar in keeping possession of his army: but they saw that there was no force in the republic sufficient to resist him. They wished to arm Pompey for this purpose; but were prevented, either by the confidence which he still gave them of his own superiority, or by their fear of precipitating the State into a civil war, by seeming to take any precautions against it.

Cæsar would have considered every attempt to arm the republic as a declaration against himself; and was ready to commence hostilities before any such measure could be carried into execution. The proposal for disarming at once both Cæsar and Pompey, in the mean time, was extremely acceptable to the popular party, who perpetually sounding the cry of liberty against the Senate, and lately too against Pompey himself, who, on account of the spirit of his administration when last in office, and the severity of his prosecutions against bribery and other offences, which are not odious to the vulgar, was become in a considerable degree unpopular, and supposed to aim at a tyranny. With such powers as Pompey already possessed, it was reckoned an effort of courage to oppose him. And Curio, in

BOOK IV. coming from the Senate, with the lustre of having acted so bold a part, was received by the populace with shouts and acclamations, was conducted to his house over ways strewn with flowers, and, like a victor in the circus, presented with chaplets and garlands, in reward of his courageous, patriotic and impartial conduct. This happened about the time that Pompey, as has been observed, was making a show of his great popularity in the country-towns, where he was received with feasts, processions, and acclamations, on occasion of his recovery from a supposed dangerous illness. Cæsar too had a like reception in the towns of the Cisalpine Gaul; but it is likely, that of these three pretenders to popularity, Pompey was most elated with his share of the public favor, and the most likely to mistake these appearances of consideration for the stable foundations of power. Under this mistake probably it was, that when one of his friends asked him, with what force he was to oppose Cæsar if he should march into Italy with his army? "In Italy," he answered, "I can raise forces with a stamp of my foot." He was however, greatly alarmed by the motion which had been made by Curio, and by the reception it met, both in the approbation of the Senators, and in the acclamations of the People. He wrote a letter, on this occasion, to the Senate, in which he acknowledged the services of Cæsar, and mentioned his own. "His late Consulship," he said, "was not of

“ his seeking ; it was pressed upon him to save
“ the republic in the midst of great dangers ;
“ the command he then bore had devolved upon
“ him in consequence of his having been Consul,
“ and was given for a term of years, yet far from
“ being expired ; but he was ready , neverthe-
“ less , without waiting for the expiration of his
“ term , to resign with alacrity what he had ac-
“ cepted with reluctance. ” He continued , on
every occasion , to repeat the same professions ,
adding , “ That he made no doubt , his relation
“ and his friend Cæsar would chearfully make a
“ like sacrifice to the fears and apprehensions of
“ his fellow-citizens ; and that , after many years
“ of hard struggle with warlike enemies , he would
“ now hasten to retire in peace , and to solace
“ himself in the midst of domestic repose. ”

Pompey , for the most part , chose to dissemble his sentiments , and advanced to his purpose by indirect means ; he was therefore like most artful men , easily over-reached by persons who perceived his designs ; and probably , on the present occasion , was the only dupe of his own artifices , or of those that were employed against him. Curio , in the Senate , openly attacked this part of his character , insisting that actions , and not professions , were now to be regarded : that the army of Cæsar was , to the republic , a necessary defence against that of Pompey ; that nevertheless , both should be ordered to disband , under pain of being declared , in case of disobedience , enemies to their country ; and that an army should be

BOOK instantly levied to enforce these orders. "Now,"
 IV. said he, "is the time to reduce this assuming and
 "arrogant man, while you have a person who
 "can dispute his pretensions, and who can wrest
 "those arms out of his hands, which he never
 "would have willingly dropped."

The friends of Cæsar, in the Senate, offered to compromise the dispute, and provided Pompey retired to his province, and Cæsar were allowed to retain the Cisalpine Gaul with two legions, they proposed, in his name, to disband the remainder of his army, and to resign the other part of his provinces. "Observe the dutiful citizen and good subject," said Cato, "how ready he is to quit the northern parts of Gaul, if you only put him in possession of Italy and of the city; and how ready to accept of your voluntary submission, rather than employ your own army against you to enforce it."

In the result of these debates, the Senate, upon the motion of the Consul Marcellus, came to a vote on the following questions, which were separately stated, relating to the appointments both of Cæsar and of Pompey. On the first question, Whether Cæsar should disband his army? the *Ayes* were general throughout the house. On the second, relating to Pompey, the *Noes* greatly prevailed. Curio and M. Antony insisted, that the questions were not fairly put; and that they

* Plutarch in Cato.

did not collect the sense of the Senate; that the majority might be of opinion, that both should disband; and that both, therefore, should be included in the same question. To this purpose, accordingly, a third question was put; and the Senate having divided, a majority of three hundred and seventy *Ayes* appeared against twenty-two *Noes* ⁴⁵, Whether these proceedings of the Senate were annulled by any informality, or were deprived of effect by any other circumstance, does not appear? The only immediate consequence they seem to have produced, was an order to Pompey and Cæsar, requiring each of them to march a legion to reinforce the army in Syria, where the Parthians, though repulsed from Antioch in the preceding year, had wintered in the *Cyrrhestica*, a district of that province, and threatened to repeat their invasion in the present spring and summer; and this appears to have been no more than a feeble attempt to strip Cæsar of two legions, of which, when it came to be executed, he well knew how to disappoint the effect.

While the subject of Cæsar's appointments occupied all parties at Rome, he himself, with his army, passed a quiet winter in Gaul; and at the end of it, or early in the spring, set out for Italy. He employed, as a pretence for this journey, the election to a vacant place in the college of

⁴⁵ Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. ii. Plutarch in Cæsar. p. 134.

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Augurs, which was fast approaching; and for which his friend Marc Antony was a candidate. Many votes were to be procured in the colonies and free cities bordering on that part of his province which was beyond the Alps; and he made his journey with uncommon speed to secure them: but being informed, on the road, that the election of Augurs was past, and that his friend Antony had prevailed, he nevertheless continued his journey, and with the same diligence as before he received this information, saying, It was proper he should thank his friends for their good offices, and request the continuance of their favor in his own competition for the Consulate, which he proposed to declare on the following year. He alledged, as a reason for his early application, that his enemies, in order to oppress him, or to withstand his just pretensions, had placed C. Marcellus and P. Lentulus in the magistracy of the present year, and had rejected the pretensions of Galba, though much better founded.

He was met in all the provincial towns and colonies of Cisalpine Gaul with more than a kingly reception, with sacrifices and processions every where made by innumerable crowds, which were assembled to see and admire him. Having made the circuit of this province, and sounded the dispositions of the People, he returned with great dispatch to his quarters at Nemotocenna⁴⁶, in the low countries, where he

⁴⁶ Arras.

likewise

likewise wished to know the disposition as well as the state of his army; and, for this purpose, ordered the whole to assemble on the Moselle. He foresaw, that the Senate might possibly pass a decree to supersede him; and that he must then depend upon the attachment of his legions, and make war, or submit as he found them inclined; in this, however, it is probable he was in a great measure resolved, or had no doubt of their willingness to become his partners in a military adventure for the sovereignty of the empire.

In this state of affairs he assigned to Labienus his station within the Alps; and seeming to have conceived a suspicion of this officer, or rather knowing that he was not disposed to follow him, in case his commission should be withdrawn by the Senate, nor to co-operate in any act of hostility against the republic, he wished to prevent the disputes which might arise on such an occasion, and to avoid the difficult task of determining how he should deal with a citizen, who being an offender against himself, was nevertheless exact in his duty to the State, and who either, by his impunity or by his sufferings, might start dangerous questions, and divide the opinions and affections of the soldiers. He dismissed him, therefore, from the army in northern Gaul, to command on the Po, a station from which he could easily quit the province, and join the forces of the republic; and by this means rid him at once of a person on whom he could not rely, and whom he would

BOOK scarcely dare to punish for defection. But in
IV. whatever manner we understand this separation, it is noticed, that while Cæsar himself remained with the army upon the Moselle, and made frequent movements merely to exercise the troops and to preserve their health, a rumor prevailed, that his enemies were soliciting Labienus to desert him, and to carry off the troops that were under his command. At the same time it was reported, that the Senate was preparing a decree to divest Cæsar of his government, and to disband his army. These insinuations he affected to treat as groundless; observing, that he could not believe such an officer as Labienus would betray his trust; and that for himself, he was at all times ready to submit his cause to a free Senate. The proposals of Curio, and his other friends, he said, had been so reasonable, that the Senate would have long ago accepted of them, if that body had not been under the improper influence of his enemies.

About the same time, Cæsar received the famous order of the Senate to detach a legion from his army to be transported into Syria, and employed in the Parthian war; and likewise to restore that legion which he had borrowed from Pompey. It is probable, that he had desired the last might be sent to him merely to take off a part of his rival's force; and though he now, with seeming cheerfulness, complied with the requisition to restore them, yet he afterwards

complained of this measure respecting the two legions in question, as a mere artifice to turn his own forces against him. In compliance with the Senate's order, he sent the fifteenth legion, then upon the Po, and relieved it by one from his present camp. In dismissing the soldiers of Pompey, he was, under pretence of gratitude for past services, most lavish of his caresses and thanks; and as an earnest of future favor, ordered each private man a gratuity of two hundred and fifty denarii⁴⁷. By this artful conduct, while he parted with the men, he took care to retain their affections, and sent them, together with his own legion, as at best but an uncertain and dubious accession of strength to his enemies⁴⁸.

The officers, who were sent to make these demands, and to conduct the troops into Italy, brought to their employers a very flattering report of the state and dispositions of Cæsar's army: that they longed to change their commander; had a high opinion of Pompey; and, if marched into Italy, would surely desert to him: that Cæsar was become odious on account of the hard service in which he had so long employed them, without any adequate reward, and on account of the suspicion that he aimed at the monarchy⁴⁹.

⁴⁷ About 5*l*.

⁴⁸ Appian. de Bello Civili, lib. ii. Plutarch, in Vita Pomp. p. 435.

⁴⁹ Plutarch, in Vita Cæsaris, p. 133. & in vita Pompeii, p. 486.

BOOK It is in the highest degree probable, that their
IV. crafty leader employed proper persons to hold this language to the commissioners of the Senate, and to the officers of Pompey; and to utter complaints of their commander, and of the service, on purpose that they might be repeated in Italy. His own preparations were not of more importance to him than the supine security into which he endeavoured, by this and every other measure, to lull his enemies.

On the approach of winter he conducted his army back to their quarters in the Low Countries, and the interior parts of Gaul. Trebonius was stationed with four legions on the Scheld and the Meuse, and Fabius, with other four between the Saone and the Loire, in the canton of Bibracte, now Autun. This disposition, like that of the former winter, was calculated to avoid giving any alarm to his opponents in Italy. He himself intended to winter within the Alps, but had no troops on that side of the mountains that could occasion any suspicion; only one veteran legion is mentioned, the thirteenth, which he had sent to replace the fifteenth; that, upon pretence of the Parthian war, had been called away from his province. Upon his arrival in Italy he affected surprise upon hearing that the two legions lately demanded from him had not been sent into Asia, but were kept in Italy, and put under the command of Pompey. He complained, that he was betrayed; that his enemies meant to disarm and circumvent him. "But while the republic is

“ safe, and matters can be made up on amicable
 “ terms, I will bear,” he said, “ with any in-
 “ dignities, rather than involve the State in a civil
 “ war”⁵⁰. ”

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While the factions that were likely to divide the empire were in this situation, C. Marcellus now third of this name in the succession of Consuls, together with Publius Lentulus, were chosen for the following year. Before they entered on office a rumor arose, that Cæsar, with his whole army, was actually in motion to pass the Alps. Marcellus, Consul of the present year, assembled the Senate; laid before them this report, and moved, that the troops then in Italy should be prepared to act, and new levies should be ordered. A debate ensued, in which Curio contradicted the report, and, by his Tribunitian authority, forbade the Senate to proceed in any resolution upon this subject.

On this interposition of the Tribune, the Consul dismissed the assembly, using, together with other expressions of impatience, the words following: That if he were not supported by the Senate, in the measures which were necessary for the preservation of the commonwealth, he should put the exercise of his power into hands more likely to make the State be respected: then, together with Lentulus, one of the Consuls elected for the ensuing year, he repaired to the gardens where Pompey resided; this officer being obliged, on

⁵⁰ Hirtius de Bello Gallico, lib. viii. c. 46.

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account of his military command, to remain without the city; and presenting his sword, bid him employ it for the defence of his country, and with it to assume the command of the forces then in Italy. To this address, Pompey, with an air of modesty, made answer, "If nothing better can be devised for the commonwealth."

C H A P. V.

Return of different Officers from their Provinces. —

Decree of the Senate to supersede Cæsar. — Forbidden by the Tribunes. — Commission to the Consuls and to Pompey. — Their Resolutions. — Flight of the Tribunes Antony and Quintus Cassius. — Speech of Cæsar to the Legion at Ravenna. — Surprise of Ariminum. — March of Cæsar. — Flight of Pompey and the Senate, &c. — Approach of Cæsar. — Embarkation and Departure of Pompey from Brundisium. — Return of Cæsar to Rome. — Passes by Marseilles into Spain. — Campaign on the Segra. — Legions of Pompey in Spain conducted to the Var.

IN this posture of affairs, the officers, who had been sent in the preceding year to the command of provinces, were returned to Rome, and some of them remained with their ensigns of magistracy in the suburbs, to solicit the military honors to which they thought themselves entitled by their services. Bibulus, though not present in the action in which Cassius defeated the Parthians, yet being then governor of the province, and the advantage gained, with the number of the enemy slain, coming up to the legal

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description of those services for which the triumph was obtained, he entered his claim; and was accordingly, upon the motion of Cato, who probably wished him this consolation for the mortifications he had received in his Consulship, found to be entitled to this honor. It had been long appropriated as the specific reward of victories, obtained by the slaughter of a certain number of enemies, and would have been preposterous in the case of any other merit: Cicero, nevertheless, now likewise applied for a triumph, partly in emulation to Bibulus, of whom he expresses some jealousy; and partly, that he might have a pretence for his stay in the suburbs, and for absenting himself from the Senate, and from the assemblies of the people, being very much perplexed how to steer between the parties of Cæsar and Pompey, who had both applied to him by letters to join them in the present dispute¹. He had, some time before his departure from Cilicia on his return to Rome, sent an account of his military operations to Cato, and to some others of his friends, with an earnest request, that a thanksgiving might be appointed for the victory he had obtained. Such an appointment was reckoned one of the greatest honors which a Roman officer could receive in absence, and might lead to a triumph. Cato replied in terms that were polite; but carrying some degree of indirect reproof for the improper ambition which

¹ Cicero ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 1.

Cicero betrayed in this request, intimating that his merit was not so much that of a general, as of a humane, upright, and able magistrate; that he had moved the Senate to pass a decree to this purpose in his favor, as thinking it more honorable than a thanksgiving, which always had a reference to some event, depending on chance or the valor of an army; but, since Cicero had chosen to put his services on the last footing, he had a double satisfaction, that of having done what he thought incumbent on himself, and that the desire of his friend was gratified².

Cicero at first received this declaration of Cato as a proper expression of friendship, and in the highest degree honorable to himself³; but on hearing of the military honors which were decreed to Bibulus upon Cato's motion, he was greatly provoked, and considered this conduct as partial to his rival, and invidious to himself⁴. He was instigated or confirmed in these sentiments by Cæsar, who gladly seized the opportunity to incite him against Cato. "Observe," he said in one of his letters, which is quoted by Cicero on this subject, "the malice of the
"man, he affects, to give you the commenda-
"tions of clemency and integrity, which you
"did not desire, and withholds a piece of
"common respect, which you had asked. This

² Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xv. ep. 5.

³ Ibid. lib. xv. ep. 6.

⁴ Cicero ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 2.

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"conduct," continues Cicero to Atticus, "be-
"speaks the envy from which it proceeds. It
"is not sufferable, nor will I endure it. Cæsar,
"in his letter to me, has not missed the proper
"remarks." Such were the concerns that
distracted the mind of this ingenious but weak
man, even while he himself foresaw a conflict,
in which the republic itself, and all the
honors it could bestow, were probably soon to
perish.

In the present situation of affairs, every reso-
lution which the friends of the republic could
take was fraught with danger, and every day in-
creased their perplexity. To leave Cæsar in
possession of his army, and to admit him with
such a force to the head of the commonwealth,
was to submit, without a struggle, to the domi-
nion he meant to assume. To persist in confin-
ing him to one or other of these advantages, was
to furnish him with a pretence to make war on
the republic. The powers which were necessary
to enable Pompey to resist Cæsar, might be
equally dangerous to the republic in the posses-
sion of the one, as they were in that of the other.
This person, on whom the State was now
to rely, even while his own consideration, with
that of every other Senator, was at stake, did
not seem disposed to act, until all the powers
that were wanting to gratify his ambition should
be put into his hands. With appearance of ease
and negligence, he went upon parties of plea-
sure through Italy, while every one else appre-

hended that Rome itself, as well as Italy, must soon become a scene of blood. At an interview with Cicero, whom, on his way to the city, he met near Naples, he himself spoke of a civil war as unavoidable'. Upon his return to Rome, on the twenty-sixth of December, he even seemed averse to any accommodation. He declared his mind openly, that if Cæsar should obtain the Consulate, even upon laying down his arms, the state must be undone; that in his opinion, whenever a vigorous opposition appeared, Cæsar would choose to retain his army, and drop his pretensions to the Consulate; but continued he, if Cæsar should proceed headlong, and bring matters to the decision of the sword, how contemptible he must appear, a mere private adventurer against the authority of the state, supported by a regular army under my command.

To justify this security, or presumption on the part of Pompey, it must be remembered that while Cæsar was forming an army in Gaul, Pompey, by means of his lieutenants, likewise formed a great army of six complete legions, and many auxiliaries, in Spain; and that if Cæsar should make any attempt upon Italy, it is probable he intended that his army should pass the Pyrenees as fast as that of Cæsar past the Alps, occupy his province, cut off his resources, and while Pompey himself received him with the forces of Italy, that the Spanish army should

' Cicero ad Atticum, lib. vii. ep. 8.

BOOK IV. preps upon his rear, and place him at once between two attacks. It ought likewise to be considered, that although few troops were then actually formed in Italy, yet this was the great nursery of soldiers for the whole empire, and multitudes could, on any sudden emergency, be embodied in every part of that country^{*}.

Pompey, with these securities in his hands for the final success of his views against Cæsar, suffered this rival to run his career, leaving the Senate exposed to the dangers which threatened them; and under the influence of apprehensions, which he expected would render them more tractable, and more ready in every thing to comply with his own desires, than he had generally found them in times of greater security.

In the same strain of policy, Pompey had frequently ventured to foment or to connive at the growing troubles of the republic, in order to render himself the more necessary, and to draw from the Senate and the People offers of extraordinary trust and power. By the address of Cato, and of other active men in the Senate, he had been obliged on a late occasion, when he aimed at the powers of a Dictator, to be content with those of sole Consul. It is probable, that he had entertained the same views on the present occasion, and permitted the evils to accumulate, until the remedy he wished for should appear to be necessary. He continued accordingly with

^{*} Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xvi. ep. 12.

votes and resolutions of the Senate to combat C H A P.
Cæsar, who was at the head of a numerous army, V.
ready on the first plausible pretence to fall upon
Italy, to seize the seats of government, and avail
himself of that name and authority of the republic,
on which Pompey himself so greatly relied.

Mean time, the new year commenced, and U. C. 704.
C. Claudius Marcellus with L. Cornelius Len- C. Claudius
tulus, entered on their office as Consuls. Both Marcellus
parties were prepared for a decisive resolution on et L. Cor-
the subject of Cæsar's claims. He himself for nelius Len-
some years had wintered near to the northern tulus.
extremity of his provinces. He was now at Ra-
venna, the nearest station of his army to Rome;
but without any troops, besides what appear
to have been the usual establishment of the
Cisalpine province; that is, the thirteenth legi-
on, which had been sent thither to supply the
place of a legion, with which he had been re-
quired to reinforce the army in Syria, and three
hundred horse, making in all between five and
six thousand men ⁷. Soon after his arrival at
Ravenna, he had been visited by Curio, who, at
the expiration of his Tribunate, made this jour-
ney to receive his directions in respect to the fu-
ture operations of the party; and after their con-
ference, returned to Rome with a letter from
Cæsar, addressed to the Senate, which was pre-
sented on the first of January, at the admission
of the new Consuls into office ⁸.

⁷ Appian. de Bello Civil. lib. ii. p. 447. Plut. in Cæsare.

⁸ Dio Cassius, lib. xli. c. 1.

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The Consul Lentulus moved, that, prior to any other business, the state of the republic, and that of the provinces, should be taken under consideration; and alluding to the resolutions which were already on record, relating to Cæsar's province, said, that if the Senate stood firm on this occasion to their former decrees, his services should not be wanting to the commonwealth. He was seconded by Scipio, and was applauded by the general voice of the Senate; but Cæsar had procured the admission of Marc Antony and of Quintus Cassius, two of his most noted and determined partisans, into the college of Tribunes. These could make riots, or furnish the pretence of violence in the city, whenever the military designs of their patron were ripe for execution: they were to be the executors of what had been concerted with Curio, or whatever else should be thought proper to promote Cæsar's designs. They began with threatening to stop all proceedings of the Senate, until Cæsar's letter was read; and prevailed on this meeting to begin with that paper. It was expressed, according to Cicero, in terms menacing and harsh⁹, and contained in substance a repetition of the proposals, which Cæsar had been all along making through Curio, and his other adherents at Rome, "That he
 " should be allowed to retain the honors, which
 " the Roman People had bestowed upon him;
 " that he should be left upon a foot of equality

⁹ Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xvi. ep. 12.

“ with other officers, who were allowed to join
 “ civil office at Rome with military establish-
 “ ments in the provinces; and that he should not
 “ be singled out as the sole object of their distrust
 “ and severity ”.

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This letter was considered as an attempt to prescribe to the Senate, and unbecoming the respect due to their authority. It was by many treated as an actual declaration of war. The debates were renewed on this subject for some days successively, from the first to the seventh of January. On the last of these days, a resolution was framed, ordering Cæsar to dismiss his army, and by a certain day to retire from his provinces, or in case of disobedience, declaring him an enemy to his country. The Tribunes, Marc Antony and Quintus Cassius, interposed with their negative.

The hands of the Senate being thus tied up by the prohibition or interdict of the Tribunes, it was moved that the members should put on mourning, in order to impress the People with a deeper sense of the calamity which was likely to ensue from the contumacy of these factious officers. This likewise the Tribunes forbade; but the Senate being adjourned, all the members, as of their own accord, returned to their next meeting in the habits of mourning, and proceeded to consider in what manner they might remove the difficulty which arose from this factious interposition

” Suetonius in Cæfare, c. 29.

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of the Tribunes. In the conclusion of this deliberation, it was determined to give to the Consuls and other magistrates, together with Pompey, in the character of Proconsul, the charge usual in the most dangerous conjunctures; *to preserve the commonwealth by such means as to their discretion should appear to be necessary.*

This charge suggested to the minds of the People, what had passed in the times of the Gracchi, of Saturninus, and of Catiline. The Tribunes, who had occasioned the measure, either apprehended, or affected to apprehend, immediate danger to their own persons: they disguised themselves in the habit of slaves, and, together with Curio, in the night fled from Rome in hired carriages¹¹. The Consuls repaired to Pompey in the suburbs; and, agreeably to the order of the Senate, claimed his assistance in discharging the important duties with which they were jointly intrusted. It was agreed, in concert with him, that they should support the authority of the Senate with a proper military force, that they should proceed to make new levies with the greatest dispatch; and in order to give effect to these preparations, that Pompey should have the supreme command over the treasury, and all the forces of the republic, in every quarter of the world.

Winter was now set in, or fast approaching.

¹¹ Appian. de Bello Civili, lib. ii. Dio Cass. lib. xli. c. 3. Cicero ad Familiar. lib. xvi. ep. 12.

The

The season, although nominally in the month of January, being only about fifty days past the autumnal equinox, or about the twelfth of November, Cæsar had few troops on the side of Italy; the force of his army was yet beyond the Alps, and the officers now intrusted with the safety of the commonwealth, flattered themselves that much time might be found to put the republic in a state of defence, before his army at this season could pass those mountains, even if he should be so desperate as to make war on the commonwealth; which Pompey did not even, in this state of affairs, appear to have believed.

When Cæsar received accounts of the Senate's resolution, he drew forth the troops then at Ravenna, and in a harangue enumerated the wrongs which for some years he alledged had been done to himself; complained that his enemies had now found means to excite against him even Pompey, a person whose honor he had always promoted with the warmest affection; that the interposition of the Tribunes, in behalf of the army and of himself, had been defeated by means of threats and of actual force; that their sacred persons had been violated, in order to oppress him; that resolutions which had never been taken but in the most dangerous and threatening conjunctures, to prevent ruinous laws from being carried by insurrection and violence, were now formed against peaceable magistrates, and in times of profound tranquillity; he therefore exhorted

BOOK the army to maintain the honor of an officer,
IV. under whom they had now, for nine years, faithfully served the republic; under whom they had gained many victories in Gaul and in Germany, and reduced a most warlike province into a state of absolute submission. He was answered with a shout of applause, and a general acclamation from the ranks, that they were ready to avenge the injuries done to their general, and to the Tribunes of the People.

On receiving these assurances from the troops then present, Cæsar immediately dispatched an express to the quarters of the twelfth legion, which, from the time at which it afterwards joined him, appears to have been already within the Alps with orders to march. The remainder of his army being supposed in the low countries, or in the heart of Gaul, it would not have appeared to an ordinary capacity, that even in case of hostilities any decisive operation could take place before the spring. At that season, indeed, the measures now taken by both parties seemed to threaten a dangerous convulsion; but it is not to be doubted that Cæsar had foreseen, or prepared, many of the most important circumstances of the present conjuncture; that he had brought his affairs into that posture, at which he intended hostilities should commence; and that the seeming neglect with which he suffered himself to be taken with so small a force on the side of Italy, was probably the best concerted preparation he could have made for the war. While he brought no

alarming force towards Rome, his antagonists continued secure, and made no effectual provision to resist him. He apprehended more danger from the legions which Pompey had formed in Spain, than from any force then subsisting in Italy, and he made his disposition against those legions, by placing the strength of his army between the Pyrenees and the Alps. There the army formed in Gaul, served him sufficiently in his design against Italy, by securing him from any interruption on that quarter. When the war broke out, being well aware that the effects of surprise are often greater than those of force, even if he had wished for more troops in Italy, it is probable that he would not have awaited their coming.

On the very day that he delivered the harangue just mentioned to the legion that was quartered at Ravenna, he ordered a chosen body of men, in the manner of stragglers roving for pleasure through the country, and armed only with swords, to take the road separately, and without any appearance of concert, to Ariminum, the first fortified place of Italy beyond the Rubicon, which was the limit of his province; there to remain, and at a certain time of the night to seize upon one of the gates. He likewise ordered a party of horse to parade at some distance from Ravenna, and there to wait for an officer who was to deliver them orders. He himself passed the day, as usual, in forming combats of gladiators, and in attending the exercises of the

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legion; at night he went to supper at the usual hour, and after he had taken his place, pretending business, or some slight indisposition, which called him away from the company, he mounted a carriage that waited for him, drove through a gate opposite to that of Ariminum, and having travelled for a little time in that direction, turned into the road on which he had posted a party of horse; and having joined them, marched about thirty miles before break of day, entered Ariminum by a gate which the party he had sent before him kept open; and thus without any resistance took possession of the place.

It was of importance, that the first report of hostilities at Rome should carry an account of his success; not merely of his having made an attempt. This circumstance may justify the measures which he took to surprize a place which, without so many precautions, might have been easily reduced, though at the hazard perhaps of delay for a few days. He himself indeed, in his Commentaries, makes no mention of any such measures, nor of the doubts and hesitations under which he is said to have halted on the banks of the Rubicon, by the passing of which he entered into a state of war with the commonwealth.

At Ariminum his little army, on the following day, arrived from Ravenna, and the Tribunes, Marc Antony and Quintus Cassius joined him from Rome. He presented them to the army in

the disguise in which they affected to have escaped from the violence of a tyranny then established in the city. "Observe," he said, "to what extremities persons of noble birth, vested with the sacred character of Tribunes are reduced, for having supported their friends, and for having pleaded the cause of an injured army¹²." The occasion was suited to popular eloquence; and this eminent master of every art did not neglect the opportunity. He is said to have acted his part with great vehemence; to have torn open his vest from his breast, and to have shed tears; frequently held up to view the hand on which he wore his ring, the common ensign of noble birth among the Romans, and declared, that he would sacrifice all the honors of his rank to reward those who were willing to support the public cause, and who adhered to himself on the present occasion. From these signs, where he was not distinctly heard, it was supposed that he promised the honors of nobility, and a large sum of money to every soldier in his army¹³.

Lucius Cæsar and the Prætor Roscius, who, while the decree against Caius Cæsar was depending in the Senate, made offer of their good offices to treat with him, and bring matters to an amicable accommodation, were now come without any public commission, probably to hinder their friend

¹² Appian. de Bell. Civili, lib. ii.

¹³ Sueton. in Cæf. c. 33.

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from taking any desperate resolution. They brought, at the same time, a private message from Pompey, with some expressions of civility, and an apology, taken from the necessity of the public service, for the hardship which he supposed himself to have put upon Cæsar. Pompey, in his message, protested, "That he had always preferred the public to private considerations;" and subjoined, "That he hoped Cæsar would not suffer any passion to carry him into measures hurtful to the State, nor, in avenging himself of his private enemies, stretch forth his hand against the republic."

Such professions had little credit with Cæsar; but if they were to be of any weight with the public he was not likely, in his turn, to fail in the use of them. He desired those persons, by whom Pompey had favored him with this message, to carry for answer, "That the republic had always been to him dearer than his fortune or his life; but that he could not suffer the honors which the Roman People had bestowed upon him in public, to be contemptuously torn away by his private enemies. His commission, he said, would have expired in six months; his enemies, in their eagerness to degrade him, could not bear even with this delay, but must recal him immediately. The Roman People had dispensed with his attendance at the elections, yet he must be dragged to town at that time to gratify private malice. These personal insults he had patiently borne for the

“ sake of the public ; and being resolved to
 “ disarm, requested the Senate only that others
 “ should disarm as well as himself ; that even
 “ this was refused, and new levies were ordered
 “ throughout Italy ; that two legions which had
 “ been called off from his own army, under
 “ pretence of the Parthian war, were now re-
 “ tained against him ; that the whole State was
 “ in arms ; for what purpose but for his destruc-
 “ tion ? that, nevertheless, he would suffer any
 “ thing for the good of the commonwealth. Let
 “ Pompey repair to his province ; let all parties
 “ disband, and no army whatever be assembled
 “ in Italy ; let no one pretend to overawe the
 “ city ; let the assemblies of the People and of
 “ the Senate be free ; and, in order the more
 “ speedily to terminate these disputes, let the par-
 “ ties meet and confer together ; let Pompey say
 “ where he will be waited on, or let him
 “ name a proper place of meeting ; at a friendly
 “ conference every difficulty will be soon re-
 “ moved¹⁴. ”

From this time forward Cæsar affected, on
 every occasion, to have no object in view but
 to prevail on his enemies, by some reasonable
 accommodation, to save the republic from a ruin-
 ous war, and to stop the effusion of innocent
 blood¹⁵. He continually repeated his proposals

¹⁴ Cæsar de Bell. Civil. lib. i.

¹⁵ Cæsar. Appian. in lib. viii. Cicer. ad Atticum,
ep. 13.

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of peace, while he urged his military operations with uncommon rapidity. He ordered new levies at Ariminum, and sent Antony to occupy Arretium¹⁶, a pass in one of the branches of the Flaminian Way through the Apennines; and as fast as troops could march he seized Pisaurum¹⁷, Faunum, Auximum, with the town of Ancona, and all the places necessary to give him the command of that district, or to open his way to Rome.

A general consternation spread over all the country before him; the people fled from their habitations, and communicated the alarm, with every sort of exaggeration, to the city. Pompey had relied much on the name and authority of the commonwealth, and no less on his own. Others thought themselves secure while this renowned and experienced commander gave them assurances of safety. Now, like a person awake from a dream, he seemed to perceive the whole was illusion. Cæsar paid no regard to the authority of the Senate, nor stood in awe of the State. He was at hand, with the reputation of a general equal to Pompey, at the head of troops fresh from service, and inured to blood. The republic was but a name; and they who composed it, though respectable at a distance, were, on the approach of an enemy, irresolute, disunited, and incapable of the exertions which such an

¹⁶ Arrego.

¹⁷ Pisaro, Feno, and Osimo.

occasion required. Orders had gone forth to raise troops in every part of Italy; but no great progress in so short a time could yet have been made in that service. Besides the two legions which had served so long under Cæsar himself, there were not any forces embodied in the country. These were justly suspected of inclining to their former general; and, instead of enabling Pompey to meet the danger which threatened the commonwealth, furnished him, at the head of such troops, with particular reasons for his keeping at a distance from the enemy. In a letter to Domitius Ahenobarbus, "I sent you word," he writes, "that with these two legions I did not choose to be near Cæsar"¹⁸. If I should retreat, therefore, at his approach, be not surprised¹⁹."

Domitius had been appointed to succeed Cæsar in the government of Gaul; and, with some other officers in the Picenum²⁰, had made some progress in raising troops. Their numbers, perhaps, surpassed those of Cæsar. If Pompey, therefore, had thought it possible to defend the city, he must have hastened to that quarter, and have put himself at the head of those troops. But he was timorous in hazarding his own reputation, a weakness from which Cæsar was altogether

¹⁸ Meaning probably that he did not choose to give them an opportunity to desert.

¹⁹ Cicero ad Atticum, lib. viii. ep. 2.

²⁰ March of Ancona.

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exempt, and which was unworthy of the great military talents of either. Pompey seldom committed his fame where the prospect was unfavorable, or events extremely uncertain. Cæsar, on such occasions, never chose to trust his affairs in any other hands than his own.

Pompey, acting under these motives, assembled the Senate, and informed them that it was necessary to abandon Rome; that he would meet them again at Capua, where he proposed to assemble his forces; that he should consider all those who remained in the capital to countenance or witness the violences of Cæsar as equally guilty with those who should be found in his camp.

It being unlawful for the officers of the republic to absent themselves from the city, the Senate passed an act to dispense with their attendance at Rome, and to enable them to exercise the powers of magistracy wherever the necessities of the State might require their presence. These preparations for dislodging the government, together with the actual flight of Pompey, damped all the courage that remained in any order or class of the People. It made Cæsar appear at once more odious and more terrible²¹. It was generally expected²²; that he would exceed either Cinna or Sylla in rapacity and cruelty²³; and that the city, if he should surprise his opponents there,

²¹ Cicero ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 11.

²² Ibid. ep. 12. 22.

²³ Ibid. ep. 7.

would become a scene of blood. The Consuls, and most of the other officers of State, set out with their ensigns of power. All night the gates were crowded with Senators and other persons of rank who fled on this occasion; some with their families and most valuable effects, others alone, and distracted by the general panic, without knowing whither they were to retire, or to what fate they were leaving their families.

Cæsar, in the mean time, making a rapid march through Umbria, or what is now the duchy of Urbino ²⁴, and the Picenum, or March of Ancona ²⁵, not only took possession of every place as he passed, but gained daily accessions of strength by the junction of the new levies that had been raised to oppose him. Soldiers are averse to the losing side; and Pompey's flight put an end to his military power in Italy. The Prætor Thermus had, with five cohorts, amounting, if complete, to twenty-five hundred men, taken post at Iguvium ²⁶, among the Apennines, on the Flaminian Way. Observing that Pompey's party in general was retreating, and that Curio was advancing towards him with a part of Cæsar's forces, he resolved to abandon his post; but as soon as he began to execute this purpose, and was on the road to Rome, the troops deserted him on the march, returned to the post from

²⁴ Umbria.

²⁵ Picenum.

²⁶ Gubio.

B O O K which he had removed them, and declared for
IV. Cæsar.

The dispositions of the towns of which Cæsar had got possession, made it unnecessary for him to leave any garrison behind him, and permitted him to advance with all his forces. Auximum²⁷ declared for him before his arrival, and obliged Atius Varus, who held that post for the republic, to abandon it. This officer was overtaken by Cæsar's advanced parties, and, like Thermus, was deserted by his People.

At Cingulum, in the Picenum, Cæsar was joined by the twelfth legion, to which, on his first motion from Ravenna, he had sent orders to march. With this accession of force, he advanced to Asculum²⁸ on the Fronto; and having dislodged from thence Lentulus Spinther, who commanded ten cohorts, the greater part of these troops deserted to him. The remainder put themselves under the command of Vibullius, who was just arrived from Pompey to support the hopes of the cause in that quarter.

As Cæsar made his principal push on the Adriatic side of the Apennines, the troops that were suddenly raised for the republic were, without any well-concerted plan, drawn together upon that coast. And Pompey himself had not yet openly laid aside the design of making head against Cæsar in those parts. Vibullius having assembled

²⁷ Osimo.

²⁸ Osca.

in all about fourteen cohorts, fell back to the Aternus, now called the Piscara, and joined L. Domitius Ahenobarbus at Corfinium, a pass in the Apennines that commanded the Valerian way to Rome. This officer having assembled twenty-five cohorts, meant to have joined Pompey wherever he should be found, and had ordered Thermus to follow with five cohorts more²⁹; but imagining probably that Pompey still intended to cover Rome from the incursions of Cæsar, and that Corfinium was an important post for this purpose, he determined to observe the motions of the enemy from that place.

Pompey by this time had moved from Capua to Luceria, and seemed to have taken the resolution not only of abandoning the posts that covered the access to Rome, but even all Italy, to Cæsar. The Consuls, the greater part of the magistracy, and the Senate, had followed him to Capua. Here was received the message which Cæsar had given to Roscius and to L. Cæsar. It contained several reflections and insinuations in the highest degree provoking to Pompey; and to this circumstance Cæsar probably trusted, that he should not be bound by any of the offers he had made, and that the odium of rejecting the peace would fall upon his enemies. But the friends of the commonwealth, deeply impressed with the necessity of their own affairs, gladly listened to any terms of accommodation. They objected

²⁹ Pomp. ad Cicer. in lib. ad Att. ep. 11.

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indeed to the proposed interview between Pompey and Cæsar, remembering the dangerous concerts which at their meetings had been formerly entered into against the commonwealth.

Pompey himself was so sensible of the disadvantage at which he was taken, that he dissembled his resentment of the personal reflections cast on himself, and consented to conditions which he had hitherto rejected with disdain. It was agreed accordingly that he should repair to Spain, and that, his province being in profound peace, he should reduce his military establishment. Cæsar, on his part, besides the conditions he himself had offered, was required to evacuate all the towns which he had lately seized in Italy; and it was proposed that the Consuls, Magistrates, and Senators should return to the city, and from the usual seat of government give all the sanction of public authority to these arrangements. From such appearances it was not doubted that an accommodation must follow. And in this belief Cato, though appointed to command in Sicily, chose to abide by the Senate while the treaty remained in dependance. And Cicero thought, the agreement almost concluded. "The one," he wrote to his friend Atticus, "begins to repent of his precipitation, and the other, is sensible he has not a force sufficient to support such a war¹⁰."

Cæsar therefore was likely to be caught in the

¹⁰ Ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 14.

snare he laid for his enemies, or obliged to lay aside the disguise which he had assumed in affecting such earnest desires for peace. To avoid either of these inconveniencies, he objected to some of the conditions which the opposite party had subjoined to his proposals, and complained of the silence which they kept on others, as proceeding from a deliberate purpose to circumvent and betray him. "Pompey will repair to Spain," he said, "but when? I am required to evacuate all the towns of Italy, while Pompey and the whole State continue in arms against me, and while my enemies not only make new levies, but employ for my destruction legions which they have actually taken away from my own army. If Pompey be sincere in desiring a peace, why does he decline the personal interview which has been proposed for that purpose?"

Cæsar had, by this time, advanced with hasty marches to Corfinium, drove in a detachment from the garrison, which he found breaking down a bridge about three miles from the town; sat down under the walls, and employed three days in fortifying his camp, and in filling the magazines with corn from the neighbouring country. Being joined by the eighth legion and twenty-two cohorts of the new levies from Gaul, with three hundred auxiliary horse, he ordered proper posts to be seized on every side of the town, and effectually shut up those who were within from any

BOOK relief, or from any communication with their
IV. friends. When his works began to appear against the place, Domitius published a reward to any one who should carry letters to Pompey. Different messengers were dispatched for this purpose and brought for answer, that Pompey disapproved of his having allowed himself to be invested by Cæsar, had foretold him the bad consequences of this measure; and now earnestly exhorted him, if possible, to extricate himself; for that it was not in his power with these doubtful legions, which had been so lately drawn from Cæsar's army, or with new levies, to force the hardy and veteran troops of the enemy³¹.

This answer Domitius endeavoured to conceal from his army; encouraged them with hopes of a speedy relief from Pompey, and seemed intent on the defence of the place, while he was actually taking measures to get off in person, without any hopes of preserving the forces he had assembled for the commonwealth. This design being suspected, the troops surrounded his quarters in the night, took him prisoner, and to pay their court, while they delivered up their general and surrendered the town, made offer of their own services to Cæsar.

Upon this surrender, Cæsar took possession of the gates, manned the walls, and gave orders that no person whatever from his army should enter the

³¹ Pompeius ad Domitium, lib. viii. Et ad Atticum, ep. 12. Cæs. de Bell. Civ.

the place before it was day. He knew, that besides Domitius and Vibullius, there were many Senators and Roman knights now shut up in the town. These he ordered in the morning to be brought before him, expostulated with them on the subject of their enmity to himself, and their precipitation in hurrying the State into this unnatural war. He then dismissed them with the respect that was due to Roman citizens of their rank, and being told that a considerable sum of money, amassed at Corfinium for the support of the troops, had been seized by his people, to complete this scene of unexpected moderation, by an exhibition of disinterestedness as well as of clemency, he ordered this money to be restored to Domitius. The fame of this wonderful mildness and generosity, as he expected, was every where diffused; and though, by over-acting his part in abstaining from the public money, he furnished every thinking person with a sufficient comment on the other parts of his conduct; yet many were happy to understand, that, in this alarming contest, their lives and properties were, from any motives whatever, to be spared.

Rome was now open to Cæsar; but he thought the possession of it of no moment, until he had suppressed the military arrangements, that were making in the country, and had decided who was to have the possession of Italy. He therefore, on the very day on which he became master of Corfinium, detached to Sicily, under the command of Curio, the troops that deserted to him in making this

BOOK conquest ³². He himself set out for Apulia, and,
IV. before sunset, accomplished a considerable march; but while he thus urged the war with the greatest rapidity, sent messengers before him to the leaders of the opposite party, with professions of friendship and overtures of peace.

Immediately after the reduction of Corfinium, Balbus, an officer in Cæsar's army, was dispatched with a message to the Consul Lentulus, containing earnest entreaties, that this magistrate would return to Rome, and prevent the disorders that were likely to arise from the suspension of government. To induce him to comply with this request, Balbus had secret instructions to assure the Consul of a proper appointment in the provinces at the expiration of his year in office. The bearer of this message declared, that Cæsar desired nothing so much as to join Pompey, and to make peace with him on any equitable terms. And the father of this young man, one of Cæsar's retinue, wrote, at the same time, to Cicero, that Cæsar had no object but to enjoy peace and security under Pompey ³³. But while the fame of his clemency at Corfinium, and of this wonderful disposition to peace was spread throughout Italy, and reconciled the minds of many to whom he had been till then an object of terror ³⁴; while

³² Cæsar de Bello Civ. lib. i. c. 25.

³³ Cicer. ad Att. lib. viii. ep. 9.

³⁴ Ibid. ep. 13. Si mehercule neminem occiderit, nec cuiquam quidquam ademerit, ab his qui eum maxime timuerant, maxime diligetur.

he hoped to amuse his enemies, and to relax the diligence of their military preparations, he advanced with so much rapidity, that, in order to avoid him, they had no more than the time that was necessary to cross the mountains from Capua to Luceria, to fall back from thence to Canusium, and from this last place, without a halt, to Brundisium.

Pompey, while he moved in this direction, having sent Metellus Scipio, and his own son Cnæus into Syria; to provide and assemble the necessary shipping to embark his army³⁵; his intention to abandon Italy began to be suspected, and shook the great authority which he still derived from his military reputation. His officers were every where deserted on the march by the new levies, who returned to offer their services to Cæsar. His own presence kept the other parts of the army together, and brought them safe to the port from which it was suspected they were to take their departure from Italy. Soon after his arrival at this port he effectually verified these suspicions, embarking a great part of his army with the Consuls, while he himself, not having sufficient shipping to transport the whole, remained with a second division to wait for the return of his ships. Such was the posture of Pompey, when Cæsar, with six legions, four of veteran troops, and two newly raised or completed from those who came over to him on the march, arrived at the gates of

³⁵ Plutarch, in Pompeio.

BOOK Brundisium. Even here, he never dropt the project of amusing his enemy with proposals of peace.
IV. Cn. Magius, an officer in the service of the commonwealth, having been taken on the march, was dismissed with great courtesy, and a message to Pompey, containing a request, that he would admit Cæsar to an interview; and observing, that differences are soon made up at a conference, which otherwise might occasion many journies and messages to no purpose.

This pacific message, as in other instances, only constituted a part in the military plan of Cæsar, and was accompanied with effectual preparations for a blockade and a siege. It did not as yet appear, whether Pompey meant to transport all his troops, and to abandon Brundisium, or to keep possession of this post, in order to retain a passage into Italy, and to command both sides of the gulf. Cæsar, to try his intentions, and either to shut him up, or to hasten his departure, observing, that the entrance of the harbour was narrow, and might be shut up, began an alarming work for this purpose. He employed numerous parties to throw stones, earth, and other heavy materials into the passage between the two moles, and expected, in a little time, to be able to join them, and thus effectually to exclude all communication with the sea.

In this work the besiegers advanced, for some time, with great rapidity; but being come into deeper water, where the materials they threw in were absorbed or unsettled, and displaced by the

motion of the sea, they found it necessary to change their plan, and endeavoured to shut up the harbour by means of floating rafts and hulks firmly anchored in the passage. In executing this project they were disturbed by a continual discharge of arrows, stones, and other missile weapons from vessels in the mouth of the harbour, on which proper engines were mounted for this purpose. C H A P.
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While the parties where thus, without intermission, engaged at the entrance of the port, Cæsar again made a show of proposing a treaty. As he had received no answer to his former message by Magius, he affected to despair of making any progress by direct applications to Pompey, and sent into the town Caninius Rebilus, one of his lieutenants, who, being in great intimacy with Scribonius Libo, had directions to make application to him, and, in Cæsar's name, to entreat his good offices in bringing on a negociation; particularly, if possible, in procuring an interview between Pompey and himself. Representing to Libo, that if an interview were obtained, some way might be discovered to stop the issues of blood, a blessing which, in that case, would for ever be mentioned as the effect of so essential a service performed by Scribonius Libo to his country.

Pompey, upon receiving these proposals, which, though addressed to Libo, were carried directly to himself, made answer, That, in the absence of the Consuls, he could not treat. In this instance,

B O O K IV. he perceived, no doubt, the insincerity of Cæsar's pacific declarations, and was not tempted to remit the vigilance of his defence, or the ardor with which he now at last prepared for the contest: yet he could not altogether prevent one advantage which Cæsar meant to reap from these repeated professions of moderation and desire of peace, that of appearing in the eyes of the People, not the author of the war, but a person forced to these extremities by the violence and obstinacy of his enemies.

After the works at the mouth of the harbour of Brundisium had been continued three days, and had made considerable progress, the transports which had carried the first division of Pompey's army returned from Dyrrachium, and, as the passage at the mouth of the harbour was still open, he prepared to embark with the remainder of his forces. The inhabitants of the town, being disaffected to him, were likely to give intelligence to Cæsar of all his motions; and made no doubt that as soon as he should withdraw his guards, they would throw open their gates, and expose him to be attacked in his rear, and possibly to lose such part of his army as might be overtaken on shore. To provide against this event, and to retard Cæsar's entry into the town, he built up the gates with solid mortar and stone, and traversed the streets with walls and large ditches replenished with sharp stakes, which were masked or hid with a slight covering of brush-wood and earth.

When the legions began to move towards the harbour, the rear-guard still endeavoured to present the usual appearances on the ramparts, by occupying every post with archers, slingers, and other light troops. These being to remain in their post while the main body was embarking, had orders, at a signal given, to abandon the walls, and to repair on board the transports which were ready to receive them.

The troops in Brundisium thus began to embark in the night, and Cæsar, having immediate intelligence of it from the town, brought forward his scaling ladders, and, as soon as the ramparts appeared to be deserted, began to ascend them in several places at once, and effected one part of his purpose, by gaining the battlements without opposition; but when he was about to descend from thence into the streets, having notice of the snares and obstructions which were placed in his way, he was obliged to halt, or to advance with so much precaution, that the enemy had time to put off from the mole, and get under sail. Only two transports, that struck and were aground on the banks which had been formed or begun at the mouth of the harbour, fell into his hands. The remainder, with the greater part of the Senate, attended by the officers of State and the ensigns of magistracy, proceeded in their passage to Epirus; thus leaving Cæsar in possession of Italy and of the seats of government, from which the world could scarcely disjoin, in their idea, the right to command.

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Cæsar having, in this manner, surprised the republic, and in sixty days obliged all his opponents to evacuate Italy, and to leave him sole master of the forces which began to be mustered against him, it is probable, notwithstanding the question he states relating to the expedience of following his enemy into Epirus, that he had already taken his resolution to consider the reduction of Spain as the next object of consequence to that of Italy. In that province, which was full of resources, a regular army of seven or eight legions had been for some time formed, with an evident purpose to keep him in awe. He was threatened therefore with the most immediate danger from thence. Some arrangements too were yet wanting for the security of Italy. The professions which he had made of pacific dispositions, and of zeal for the republic, were to be confirmed by showing a proper respect to the forms of the constitution, and by endeavouring to restore a government which he had actually overthrown.

For these reasons, Cæsar contented himself, for the present, with having ordered shipping to be provided at the port of Brundisium, that he might amuse the enemy with appearances of his intending to continue the war on that side, or that he might be actually ready to do so, when he had elsewhere accomplished the purpose on which he was bent. Notwithstanding his pacific declarations, and his ostentation of clemency on every

occasion, the People still trembled when they saw almost every citizen of reputation and honor obliged to fly from the seats of government, and in their place, collected from different quarters of Italy, every bankrupt, every outlaw, and every person of infamous character³⁶. These being at variance with the laws of their country, had flocked to Cæsar, and were received by him under the denomination of the injured and the oppressed citizens, whose wrongs he was come to redress.

With this company, still multiplying around him, having given orders to secure Brundisium from the sea, and posted there, and at Sipontum and Tarentum, each a legion; and having ordered ships from every part of the coasts of Italy and Gaul, he set out for Spain, intending, while the troops with whom he had over-run Italy, took some repose in quarters, and while those who were destined for the service in Spain were on the march, that he himself should visit Rome, and observe the aspect of his party. His father-in-law, Calpurnius Piso, although, by his relation to Cæsar, hindered from following Pompey, yet would not countenance his son-in-law so far as to remain in the city to receive him. Marcus Lepidus, then Prætor, was the officer of highest rank who continued in his place; and beside the Tribunes who

³⁶ Cicer. ad Att. lib. ix. ep. 19. Cave autem putes quemquam hominem in Italia turpem esse, qui hinc absit. Vidi ipse Formiis universos, &c.

BOOK IV. had been the instruments in kindling this war, was the only magistrate who resigned himself entirely to the victor's disposal. Among the Tribunes, Cæcilius Metellus, though disposed to have followed the Senate, being detained in the city by the sacred duties of his function, had taken his resolution to employ the negative with which he was intrusted, in restraining the violations of law and government, which were to be expected in such a scene as was now to be opened at Rome.

Cicero, upon the commencement of hostilities, having still the ensigns of Proconsul, was appointed to inspect the levies and other affairs of the republic on the coasts of Campania and Latium. Upon Pompey's retreat, he remained in this station with a mind overwhelmed with perplexity and irresolution. He affected respect and gratitude to Pompey, though he surely owed him no obligation, bore him no real affection, and blamed him highly for his flight from Italy; but in the last perhaps he only meant to justify himself for not having immediately joined him in his retreat, and for not having embarked with more decision in the cause. He sincerely lamented the state of the republic, of which he now certainly despaired, and only wished to steer a course, the safest he could for his own reputation and his person.

Cæsar, in the beginning of this contest, had contributed much to perplex the resolution of Cicero, who generally saw so many objects in

every question of State, that it was difficult for him to decide between them. He had been kept undetermined by means of a flattering correspondence, in which Cæsar made repeated applications for his good offices towards preventing the present troubles. Being now in the way of Cæsar from Brundisium to Rome, he was honored with a personal interview; at which, says Cicero to his friend Atticus, I shall study rather to appear an object of his respect than of his liking. He accordingly; on that occasion, resisted his flattery, and withstood his entreaties to attend a meeting of the Senate, which Cæsar had ordered to be assembled by a messenger dispatched from Formiæ. Cæsar appeared to be piqued at this refusal: "It will be supposed you condemn me," he said, "and others will be led by your example." Cicero replied. "That his case was different from that of others who had less connexion with Pompey." "Come, then," continued Cæsar, "and treat of an accommodation with Pompey." "Shall I be at liberty to do so in my own way?" "Who will restrain you?" "Shall I move the Senate then, that the war shall not be carried into Spain, nor into Greece?" "Shall I lament the treatment which Pompey has received?" "That indeed," said Cæsar, "I shall not like to have said." "I thought so," replied the other, and chose to absent myself. At parting, Cæsar desired him to consider of the matter. "If you desert me," he said, "I must

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“ have recourse to other counfels, and know not
“ what I may be forced to do ”.³⁷”

Upon the arrival of Cæſar in the ſuburbs of Rome, ſuch of the Senators as were in the city, or in the neighbourhood, aſſembled at his ſummons. He opened the meeting by enumerating the wrongs he had received, and by loading his opponents with the guilt of the preſent war. “ He “ never had aſpired,” he ſaid, “ to unprecedented “ ed honors. The office of Conſul was now again “ open to him by the laws of the commonwealth; “ and the Roman People had diſpenſed with his “ perſonal attendance in ſuing for it. An act to “ this purpoſe,” he ſaid, “ had been obtained in “ the faireſt and moſt conſtitutional manner. Ten “ Tribunes had concurred in propoſing it. His “ enemies, particularly Cato himſelf, had been “ heard at full length againſt it, and had practiſed “ his uſual artifice for diſappointing the Senate or “ the People, by prolonging the debates. Pompey “ himſelf was Conſul when this act was paſſed. “ If he diſapproved of the act, why did he not “ oppoſe it then? If he approved of it, why rob “ him now of the privilege it beſtowed? He “ reminded this meeting of the moderation with “ which he himſelf had offered to reſign his “ command, while others were ſo tenacious of “ theirs; or while they impoſed conditions on “ him, to which they themſelves would not “ ſubmit, and choſe to throw the State into

³⁷ Cicer. ad Atticum. lib. ix. ep. 18.

“ confusion, rather than abate the least of their
“ own pretensions. He observed, that his enemies
“ had made use of a false pretence to call off two
“ legions from his army; that they had violated
“ the sacred character of the Tribunes, who were
“ guilty of no offence, but that of protecting him
“ against the oppression of his enemies; that they
“ had rejected all offers of an accommodation,
“ or even of a conference.

“ He now exhorted the Senate not to desert the
“ commonwealth, nor to oppose such as, in
“ concert with him, might endeavour to restore
“ the government; but if they should shrink in
“ this arduous task, he should not press it upon
“ them. He knew how to act for himself. If his
“ opinion were followed, deputies should be now
“ sent from the Senate to Pompey, with entreaties,
“ that he would spare the republic. He knew,
“ that Pompey had formerly objected to his having
“ any such deputation sent to himself, considering
“ such advances as a concession of right in him to
“ whom they were made, or of fear in those who
“ made them. These, he said, were the reflections
“ of a narrow mind; for his own part, as he
“ wished to overcome his enemies in the field, so
“ he wished to excel them in acts of generosity
“ and candor.”

Such were the colors in which this artful man
endeavoured to disguise his cause; and while he
took effectual measures to maintain it by force,
employed likewise an insinuation, and an elo-
quence not less dangerous than his sword. The

BOOK IV. proposals of a treaty were received in this meeting with joy; but no man was willing, after having assisted at such a meeting of the Senate, to hazard his person in Pompey's camp.

While Cæsar, to reconcile all men to his cause, affected clemency even to those who were taken in arms against him, Pompey, supposing himself intrusted with the powers and severities of the law, had threatened to employ those powers and severities to the utmost extent against every person who staid behind him at Rome. *Proscription* and *massacre* of those who abandoned the commonwealth were the ordinary language at his quarters¹⁸. He proposed to operate in this case by fear alone, and had forgotten, that legal government itself, on certain occasions, with all its authorities and powers, stands in need of insinuation and of popular arts.

Cæsar, in taking the opposite tone, and in affecting to commit his affairs to the issue of a fair negociation and treaty, relied on the difficulties that were likely to occur in the conduct of any negociation; or he presumed upon these difficulties in making offers which he did not wish his enemies to accept. His intention was to load his antagonist with the blame of a war which, it is probable, he had a long time been devising. If he had really meant to renew his former concerts with Pompey, he would have employed again the same concealed

¹⁸ Cicer. ad Attic. lib. viii. ep. 11.

methods by which those concerts had been formerly obtained, and would not have intrusted the mediation to the Senate, a body which, however composed, had a natural claim to authority, and might have carried their negotiations farther than he proposed. He had ever entertained a serious aversion to the name and pretensions of the Senate. Being altogether indifferent to public interests of every sort, the mediocrity of parts, that must ever appear in the majority of such a body, was to him an object of contempt. He had espoused the cause of every faction, of every tumult, of every criminal against them; and, at one time, rather than be subject to their authority, had proposed, that Pompey himself should transport this army from Asia to usurp the government. Even the few Senators, who, upon the former occasion, from indifference to public questions, or from a disposition to favor his cause, had remained in the city, became the objects of his disgust. Many of them, though willing to be his instruments, were not yet formed for his purpose. When he affected to treat them with respect, they received his addresses as matter of right; when he proposed any measure, they took the matter into serious consideration, and affected to deliberate of what was to be done. "He detests the Senate," said Curio to Cicero, "now more than ever; he will leave them no authority. I meant to have held my commission by a fictitious decree of that body: but he said, I should hold it of himself;

BOOK IV. "and that every power should be derived from
"him".

Cæsar, however, meant to make this remnant of a legal assembly the tools of every ungracious or improper measure he had occasion to execute, and, in particular, to avail himself of their authority in seizing the public money. Pompey, before he left Rome, had been authorized to draw from the treasures of the commonwealth whatever money he wanted for the service. At his departure, he ordered the whole to be removed; and the Consul Lentulus was about to execute this order, when a sudden alarm of Cæsar's approach obliged him to desist, and left him time only to carry away the keys of the public repositories. Cæsar now moved the Senate, that the doors should be opened; and that the public money should be issued from thence to defray the expense of the war". To this motion the Tribune Metellus Celer opposed his negative; and Cæsar, disdaining any longer to wear a mask which subjected him to the observance of insignificant forms, proceeded to the treasury, and ordered the doors to be forced. The Tribune had the boldness to place himself in the way, and was about to reduce Cæsar to the disagreeable alternative of being disappointed of his purpose, or of rendering himself the object of popular detestation, by violating the sacred person

³⁹ Cicer. ad Att. lib. x. ep. 4.

⁴⁰ Dio Cassius. lib. xli. c. 17 & 18.

of a Tribune, from a veneration to which, he himself professed to have undertaken the war. On this occasion, contrary to his usual character, he appeared to have lost his temper, and threatened Metellus with immediate death. "This," he said, "is easier for me to execute than to utter." It was thought, that if the Tribune had persisted, not only this officer, but numbers of Senators, and many of the more respectable citizens, whom he considered as enemies and promoters of the Tribune's contumacy, would have been involved in a general massacre. "Think not," said Curio, in relating these particulars to Cicero, "that his clemency proceeds from temper, or is secured to you by any real disposition of his mind. It is a mere effect of his policy, he is naturally indifferent to blood, and if he is provoked, will make it to run in the kennels."

The Tribune Metellus, however, when matters were coming to this extremity, suffered himself to be removed. The doors were forced open, all the money was taken from thence, even the sacred deposit, supposed to have remained from the time of the rebuilding of Rome after its destruction by the Gauls, and still kept as a resource for the utmost exigency of public affairs, was now carried off. I have subdued the Gauls, said Cæsar, and there is no longer any need of such provision against them. He is said, on this

* Cicero ad Atticum. lib. x. ep. 4.

BOOK occasion, to have carried off in bars, 25 000 lb. "
 IV. of gold, 25, 000 lb. " of silver, and in coin,
 40,000 000 Roman money ".

After this act of violence, it appears that Cæsar distrusted the affections of the people. He had proposed to harangue them in a public audience, which had been appointed for that purpose; but apprehending that he might be exposed to insult from some one in the crowd, he declined that solemnity, even avoided the public view altogether, and having passed but a few days at Rome, set out for Spain fullen and displeased. It was no longer a doubt, that his victories led to the subversion of the republic, and of every species of civil government whatever ".

Marcus Emilius Lepidus, who, as has been observed, was at this time Prætor, and the officer of highest rank then at Rome, was left to govern in the city. Marc Antony had the command of Cæsar's forces in Italy; and by the use which he made of his power, treating persons of the most respectable condition with great insolence, and indulging himself in all the extravagance of debauch, for which his genius appears to have been peculiarly fitted, increased the dismal apprehensions of the public. He is said to have travelled through Italy himself in an open litter, with

" According to Arbuthnot, ch. 12.

L 678,125 3 0

" 94,937 10 0

" 322,916 13 4 Vid. Plin. lib. xxxiii. c. 3.

L 1,095,982 3 4

" Cic. ad Att. lib. x. ep. 4.

Citheridé, a celebrated actress, followed by seven other carriages replenished with courtesans, and even attended by his wife Fulvia, the widow of the late famous Clodius, who, to enjoy her husband's state, and partake with him in the licence of his military power, connived at his infidelities, and made a part of this scandalous train⁴⁶. The whole, a lively specimen of the purpose for which the accomplices of Cataline, and many of the followers of Cæsar wished to be masters of the republic, and a foretaste of the wanton caprice with which this overgrown republic, so long a prey to outrageous faction, was now likely to be made the subject and the sport of a military usurpation.

Soon after hostilities had commenced, Cotta had been sent to command for the republic in Sardinia, and Cato to command in Sicily. Cæsar, when about to carry the war into Spain, thought it necessary, if possible, to get the possession of these islands, as well as to reduce Pompey's forces in every other part of the empire. Having stationed Dolabella, with C. Antonius, on the coast of Illyricum, he ordered Valerius, with a proper force, into Sardinia, and Curio, with three legions, to attack Cato in Sicily. The Sardinians, hearing that one of Cæsar's officers was appointed, in his name, to take possession of their island, declared for his interest, took arms against Cotta, and obliged him to fly into Africa,

⁴⁶ Cic. ad Att. lib. x. & xiii.

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where he joined Atius Varus, who had occupied that province in the name of the republic.

Cato, some time after his nomination to command in Sicily, and while there were any hopes of a negociation, remained at Capua, then the quarters of Pompey, in order to give his assistance in forming an accommodation, the least ruinous that could be obtained for the commonwealth. On Pompey's retreat into Apulia, he went into Sicily, and the province being unprovided with every means of defence, he gave orders to repair, and to build ships in all the ports of the island, and in those of the neighbouring coast of Italy. He had likewise ordered all the towns to furnish their quota of troops; but had not been able to assemble any force, when Curio landed at Messina, with the two legions destined by Cæsar to take possession of the island. Sensible that any attempts to resist this force could only expose the lives of a few well-affected citizens or subjects, who might on this occasion be disposed to support him as an officer of the republic, he discontinued his military preparations, and withdrew from the island.

This officer had often disapproved of Pompey's conduct; and on this occasion, complained particularly of the defenceless state in which he had suffered the republic to be surprisèd in all its possessions. Cæsar, who no doubt wished to have the suffrage of such a citizen, and of his own enemy against Pompey, represents Cato as complaining that he was betrayed,

that the Senate had been deceived, and that the war itself was unnecessary ⁴⁷. The conduct of Pompey, not only as a citizen, but as an officer of state and as a foldier, has been censured in many parts of this memorable contest; and it is indeed easy to spy faults after the event, and when experience has exposed them to view. Cæsar himself is said to have censured him for abandoning Italy; and it is probable would have respected him more, if in executing this resolution, instead of passing into Macedonia, he had gone to the head of his army in Spain. His celebrated saying, in leaving Brundisium, when he was about to carry the war into that country, implied an opinion to this purpose, "We go," he said, "from this general who has no army, to an army that has no general."

Cæsar's own disposition of his forces, as has been already mentioned, in assigning what appeared to have been the reasons of his conduct, had been made with the greatest ability; and the more, that they gave him the appearance of a person acting without design, and suddenly forced to the measures which he embraced. In talking of ordinary men, we may err in imputing too much to design and concert; but with respect to Cæsar, the mistake to be feared, is not perceiving the whole extent of his foresight and plan. He at once armed himself with a military force, and artfully guarded the appear-

⁴⁷ Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. xxx.

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ances under which he was to use it. When the Senate passed their resolution against him, he seemed to be caught unprepared to resist; but the Senate was still less prepared to attack. He had artfully avoided giving them any cause of suspicion, by any unnecessary assemblage of forces on the side of Italy, while he had sufficient strength to take the full benefit of the consternation into which they were thrown by his first alarm. Though long meditating the invasion of Rome with an army, he contrived an incident, in the flight of the Tribunes, to make it appear the effect of a sudden provocation, and of his zeal in a popular cause. When we consider that Marc Antony was the Tribune who furnished this pretence, there is no doubt that Cæsar had his choice of the time at which it should be presented to him.

At this conjuncture, the greater part of his army still remained beyond the Alps, and in the precise situation in which they were most likely to be wanted to encounter the first considerable difficulty that would probably arise in the war, from the veteran legions which had been levied for Pompey, and which were stationed under Afranius and Petreius in Spain^{**}. If these legions had attempted to pass the Pyrenees, the army of Cæsar was stationed in Gaul to intercept them, and he was accordingly secure of being

^{**} See p. 136. 141. 142. the preceding parts of this chapter.

able to finish the war in Italy, without any interruption from thence. When this service was effected, his army in Gaul remained in the most advantageous position, from which to enter upon what was likely to become the second object of his enterprize, the reduction of Spain.

The antagonists of Cæsar, without any apprehension of these dispositions, and perfectly secure before hostilities commenced, were completely surprised, overwhelmed, and routed in every quarter on which they attempted to make any defence. Armies indeed had been formed in Italy, according to the saying of Pompey, *at the stamp of his foot*; but they were armies that served the purpose of his enemies, not that of the republic, or his own; and though raised to secure Italy against Cæsar, became in the reduction of Italy itself an accession to his force, and were ready to be sent in separate divisions to occupy different provinces of the empire in his name; insomuch, that while Cæsar himself, with the strength of the veteran legions with which he had conquered Gaul, hastened into Spain to reduce what was the most formidable part of his rival's power, his officers were detached with separate bodies of these newly acquired troops, into Sardinia, Sicily, and Africa.

Pompey, although he had never visited his government in person, nor sought for occasions of war, as Cæsar, in order to form his army and inure them to service, had done in Gaul, had nevertheless formed a great military establishment,

BOOK IV. consisting of seven Roman legions with five thousand horse and eighty cohorts of provincial infantry equal in number to eight legions more; and Cæsar had reason to believe, that this great force, if the war could have been protracted in Italy, would have come upon his rear, cut off his resources in Gaul, or obliged him to defend himself on the north of the Alps. He accordingly, instead of bringing into Italy the legions that lay in the low countries, or the interior parts of his province, had moved them only to the neighbourhood of Narbonne, to be near the confines of Spain, from which this storm was to be dreaded; and meant, if the success of his affairs in Italy should admit of it, that these legions should cross the Pyrenees, and fix the scene of war amidst his rival's possessions.

Spain had been formerly divided into two provinces, under two separate Roman governors; but the whole being united under Pompey, was committed by him to three lieutenants, Varro, Petreius, and Afranius. The first commanded, from the river Guadiana westward to the extremities of Lusitania⁴² and Gallicia; the second, from the Guadiana eastward to the mountains of Murcia; and the third, from thence to the Pyrenees.

Soon after the war broke out in Italy, Pompey sent Vibullius into Spain, with orders to these officers to assemble their forces, and to

⁴² Portugal.

prepare for the defence of their province. Varro affected indifference in the quarrel, or an equal regard to the opposite parties concerned in it. An accident, he said, had placed him under the command of Pompey; but he had an equal attachment to Cæsar. The other two, from regard to the commonwealth, or from fidelity to their commander in chief, engaged with more zeal in the cause. They determined, in concert with Vibullius, to leave Varro in the western province, while they themselves drew the principal part of their force towards the eastern frontier; and by occupying the passes of the mountains, or some strong post on the Ebro, endeavoured to defend the country intrusted to their care, until Pompey should either arrive in person to take the command on himself, or until, having rallied his forces in Macedonia, he should bring the scene of the war again into Italy. For this purpose, they took post at Ilerda⁴⁰, a place of strength on the Sergo, and about twenty miles above the confluence of this river with the Cinca; Afranius with three legions, Petreius with two more, together with five thousand horse, and eighty cohorts of provincial infantry.

Such were the dispositions that were making in Spain, when Cæsar, having expelled his rival from Italy, took possession of Rome, and having passed a few days in that city, in the manner above related, set out for his army in the province of Narbonne.

⁴⁰ Now called Lerida.

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Being to pass by Marseilles, he intended to take possession of that city; but the inhabitants were already disposed to favor his antagonists, and shut their gates against him. This ancient Greek colony, after having long defended their settlement against the rude tribes in their neighbourhood, had placed themselves at last under the protection of the Romans; but with a reserve of all their immunities, and an exemption from all the burdens of a Roman province. Cæsar proposed to have entered their city as a neutral place, and to prevail on the citizens to receive him, cited the examples of Rome itself, and of all the other cities of Italy who had opened their gates, and given a passage to his army, without taking any part in the present disputes. To this proposal, the people of Marseilles made answer, That in every case where the Romans were divided among themselves, every ally in their situation must so far preserve their neutrality, as not to receive the forces of either party within their walls; and that in the present case particularly, they lay under such high obligations to the leaders of both parties, that they must carefully avoid giving offence to either.

It soon after appeared, however, that this plausible answer was intended merely to gain time. Vibullius had passed by Marseilles in his way to Spain, and had delivered to the people of that place a message from Pompey, with assurances of support; on which they fully relied. The receipt of this message, was followed by a

resolution to admit the officers and men of Pompey's party into their town, and to exclude his antagonists. C H A P.
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Domitius Ahenobarbus, after he had been dismissed from Corfinium, no ways affected by the ostentatious clemency of Cæsar, had, in pursuance of the Senate's appointment to the government of Gaul, repaired to that province, raised some troops, with which he was expected to take possession of Marseilles, and actually, in a few days after this answer was given to Cæsar entered the harbour of that place with seven ships, and some land-forces on board. Upon his arrival, the People of this republic called in to their assistance the force of some neighbouring cantons from the mountains; repaired their fortifications; replenished their magazines; employed many hands in fabricating arms; and took every other precaution that was necessary, in case they should be attacked, to enable them to make a vigorous defence.

Cæsar being greatly provoked, invested the town with an army of three legions; and having ordered some ships to be built on the Rhône, prepared to assail it at once by sea and by land. He committed the attack by land to Trebonius; and that from the sea to Decimus Brutus. While he was making these preparations, a report prevailed that Pompey was passing the seas into Africa, and intended, with the troops which were in that province, and a body of Numidian cavalry, to reinforce, and to take the command of his army

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in Spain. It is probable that Cæsar, in like circumstances, would have even taken a shorter road to the head of his army. He appears at least to have believed this report of his enemy, or to have thought it extremely probable, and to have been somewhat alarmed. As if the prospect of meeting with Pompey, having under his direction a well-appointed and regular force, had rendered him doubtful of the affections of his own men, he mentions an artifice practised by himself on this occasion, which may be considered as a specimen of his address, and of the influence which he employed with his army. He borrowed money from the officers, and gave it in gratuities to the soldiers; thus taking a pledge for the fidelity of the one, and purchasing that of the others by his bounty.

While Cæsar was yet employed in opening the siege of Marseilles, he ordered Fabius, who commanded his forces at Narbonne, to advance into the Pyrenees; and if the passes were open or slightly guarded, to penetrate into Spain, and occupy some advantageous station on the frontier of that country. This officer accordingly, having forced the passes of the Pyrenees, penetrated to the Segra, or, as it was then called, the Sicoris; and took post on the right of this river, in the front of the united armies of Afranius and Petreius, who were encamped near the town of Ilerda.

Fabius, not to be interrupted by occasional floods in his communication with the country

through which he had passed, and to keep open the ordinary route from Gaul, laid two bridges upon it, at the distance of four miles from each other. By these communications, he was chiefly supplied with provisions; and as the Spanish army had an easy access by the bridge of Ilerda to intercept his supplies, it was necessary to cover every convoy and foraging party with numerous and powerful escorts. Two entire legions, under the command of Plancus, had marched on this service, and were to be followed by a body of cavalry. After the infantry had passed the river, and the cavalry was entered on the bridge, it broke down, and deprived those who were already over, of any communication with the camp. The timber and wreck of the bridge floating by the town of Ilerda, gave the enemy intimation of what had happened, and suggested the design to scour the country on the left of the Segra, with a powerful detachment, in order to intercept any parties who might by this accident be cut off from the main body of the army. For this purpose, Afranius marched with four legions, and might have taken or destroyed those who remained under Plancus on the left of the river, if this officer had not retired to a height, on which he was able for some time to resist the superior numbers of his enemy. In the mean while, Fabius suspecting the danger to which his detachment was exposed, dispatched two legions more by the other bridge to support the former. On the appearance of this reinforcement, Afranius,

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whose plan in the present campaign was altogether defensive, thought proper to retire, without hazarding an action, in which he might be exposed to a too hasty decision of the cause.

Two days after this adventure, Cæsar, with an escort of nine hundred horse, arrived in the camp of Fabius. Having examined the situation of both armies, and ordered the bridge on the Segra to be rebuilt, he proceeded as usual to act on the offensive, and to occupy the enemy's attention with successive operations against them, by which he left them no leisure to form any designs of their own. It was his fortune, indeed, in this and other periods of the present war, to need a speedy decision, which made him take measures that forced his enemies to remain on the defensive, and inspired his men with a notion of their own superiority; an opinion which, after it has been some time received, seldom fails to verify itself.

In a few days after his arrival, he advanced with his army in three divisions to the foot of the hill on which the Spanish army was encamped, and while they continued to observe, and endeavoured to penetrate his intentions, he began to break ground, and to make a lodgement for himself in that place. That his purpose might not be known, until the work was considerably advanced, he kept the first and second lines under arms, and ordered the third, without raising a parapet, or planting their palisades, to sink a ditch fifteen feet wide, and of

a sufficient length to cover his front. This being done, he retired with his whole army behind it, and ordered them to lie upon their arms all night. Under cover of this temporary intrenchment, he on the following day completed the usual fortifications of his camp, and brought forward the tents and baggage of his army, which till then had remained under proper guard on his former ground.

Being now in possession of a post within four hundred paces, or less than half a mile of the enemy's lines; and having a view of the ground which lay between their camp and the town of Ilerda, extending about three hundred paces, and mostly plain, with a small height in the middle of it; he formed a project to seize this height; and knowing that the enemy lodged their magazines and stores in Ilerda, proposed to cut off their communication with the town. In this view, he drew up a body of three legions in a proper position, from which to execute his purpose; and ordered the front-rank["] from one of those legions to start from their colors, and with the utmost speed to gain the height which he intended to occupy. The sudden movement of this body explained his design to the enemy, and they instantly put all the piquets and extraordinary guards of their camp in motion to prevent its effects. Having a nearer way, and the

["] Unius Legionis Antesignanos. Cæsar. de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 43.

B O O K advantage of the ground, they prevented Cæsar's
IV. party; and being in possession of the height before they came up, repulsed and beat them back to their main body. Here too, they pursued their advantage; and as they rushed with little regard to order, but with an appearance of undaunted courage, on the flanks as well as the front of the legions which Cæsar had advanced, they put the whole in some degree of confusion, and forced them back to the heights in their rear.

While the leaders of the Spanish army probably committed an error in not redoubling their blow, or remained in suspense, Cæsar issued from his camp with a fresh legion to support the flying division of his army, obliged the enemy to retire in their turn, and having overtaken them before they could reach their camp, obliged them to take refuge under the walls of the town.

The ground at the foot of these walls was steep, and the access to it was by lanes and narrow ways. Thither the troops, with whom Cæsar had renewed the action, flushed with victory, had followed the enemy, and got into a situation in which they could not gain any advantage, nor retire without loss. The parties however continued to skirmish during five hours, and being continually reinforced from their respective armies, a general engagement was likely to ensue on ground extremely unfavorable to Cæsar.

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In order to extricate himself with the least possible appearance of disgrace, he ordered a general charge, and having drove his antagonists before him to the foot of the wall, he sounded a retreat from thence, and brought off his men, before the enemy could rally or return to the pursuit.

In this manner, Cæsar retired to his camp with considerable loss, and foiled in his design; but on account of the last impression he made on the enemy, with some pretensions to a victory, of which, to support the courage of his troops, he did not neglect to avail himself.

In a few days after this miscarriage, the army of Cæsar suffered a worse and more alarming calamity. The summer being far advanced, and the snow on the Pyrenees melting, all the rivers which are supplied from thence, rose of a sudden to their greatest height. The Segra carried off both the bridges erected by Fabius, and baffled all the endeavours that were used to restore them. As often as any attempt was made for this purpose, the work was interrupted by the enemy from the opposite bank, or the materials were swept away by the flood. Neither the Segra nor the Cinca were passable, and the country between them, though extending in breadth about thirty miles, being exhausted, could no longer furnish any supply of provisions to Cæsar's camp.

About the time that the army began to feel their distress, a convoy which arrived from Gaul, consisting of many carriages, escorted by a large

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body of Gaulish horse, and accompanied with many officers and persons of distinction, who came to witness the glories of this campaign, the whole, together with their attendants and equipage, amounting to about six thousand men, were attacked by Afranius, and, with great loss, obliged to take refuge in the neighbouring mountains.

In consequence of this disaster, and under the sense of the present, and apprehension of the future distress, the modius ⁵² of corn sold in Cæsar's camp for fifty denarii, or at the rate of thirty shillings a peck. All their attempts to procure a supply were frustrated by the difficulties of their situation, or by the vigilance of the enemy. As the height of the floods was a permanent effect of the season, in swelling every river which descends from mountains that retain their snow in the summer, and as the enemy were plentifully supplied from their magazines in the town of Ilerda, or had, by the bridge of that place, an open communication with the fertile country which is now named Catalonia on their right, Cæsar could have no immediate prospect of relief. The Spanish army accordingly triumphed in their good fortune, and sent exaggerated accounts of their advantage to all parts of Spain, to Italy, and to Macedonia. Many persons, who had hitherto hesitated in the choice of their party, were now determined. Varro began to exert himself in his

⁵² Little more than a peck.

province, and levied two entire new legions in the name of Pompey. Many hastened from Italy into Macedonia, to be the carriers of such agreeable tidings, or to have the merit of declaring themselves of the party of the republic, while the issue of the war yet remained in any degree of suspense.

The triumphs, however, which anticipate events are often deceitful; and, by the overweening security and confidence which they inspire, give an able enemy great advantage, even in his distress, or facilitate the changes of fortune in his favor. Afranius and Petreius, while they trusted to the ordinary course of the seasons, were not sufficiently upon their guard against the superior resources of so able an adversary. They suffered him to build, unobserved, a number of boats, upon a construction which his workmen had learned in Britain; having a keel in the ordinary form, and some timbers of strength on the sides; but, instead of plank, finished between these timbers with basket-work and covered with hides. These vessels being of easy carriage, were transported by land about twenty miles above Cæsar's camp; and in a first embarkation ferried over a party sufficient to make a lodgement on the opposite bank. Cæsar continued to reinforce this party, until, having an entire legion intrenched on that side, he ventured to employ his carpenters openly in constructing a bridge, which they began at once from both sides of the river. This work was

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completed in two days, and again gave him access to the left of the Segra, where he surprised some of the enemy's parties, and procured immediate relief by a supply of provisions to his own camp.

About the time that Cæsar had effected this change in the state of his army, he had news of a naval fight on the coast of Gaul, in which his fleet, under Decimus Brutus, had defeated that of the enemy, and given a speedy prospect of the reduction of Marseilles. This report, together with the disappointment he had recently given to the hopes of his enemies, had at once all the effects of victory, and made him appear more formidable than he was supposed to be, even before the distresses which he had lately experienced. His antagonists, from a state of sanguine expectation, sunk into a proportional degree of despondency, and became so much in awe of his superior conduct, that they abandoned the country on the left of the Segra to his foragers, and never ventured, except in the night, to go abroad for the necessary supplies of their own camp. These events affected the natives of the country in a still higher degree, and brought them from every quarter to make a tender of their services in supplying Cæsar with provisions, or in seconding him in his military operations.

In conjunction with the natives, who were now become his allies, Cæsar again found himself in condition to act on the offensive, and to devise new alarms for the enemy. His first object was

to render the passage of the river at all times practicable; and as he had failed in his purpose of separating the Spanish army from the town of Ilerda, he now proposed to extend his command of the country, and to form a chain of posts, by which he might circumscribe the town itself, together with the enemy's camp, which depended upon it.

The bridge which he had lately built was at too great a distance, and he experienced the insecurity of such communications over torrents, which came with such force and so much inequality from the mountains. Instead, therefore, of attempting to erect any more bridges, he proposed to render the river fordable, by separating its course into many different channels; and for this purpose made a number of cuts, of about thirty feet deep, through the plain, to receive as much of the waters of the Segra as might sufficiently drain the principal stream.

The enemy, as soon as they understood the purpose of these operations, were greatly alarmed. They foresaw that Cæsar, having the passage of the river secured, might command its opposite banks below, as well as above the town of Ilerda, block up the bridge of that place, and, with the aid of the country around him, which, since the late defection of its inhabitants, was ready to support him in all his designs, might have it in his power to prevent their supplies, and distress them, in their turn, for want of provisions.

To remove from a situation in which they were

B O O K exposed to so many evils, they resolved instantly
IV. to abandon their present station, and to retire beyond the Ebro, where the people, either from fear or affection, were still in their interest. They proceeded to the execution of this purpose with much seeming precaution and foresight. Having fixed upon a proper place at which to lay a bridge over the Ebro, they ordered all the boats, within a certain distance on that river and on the Segra, to be collected together for that purpose. They placed a proper garrison in Ilerda, to check the motions of the enemy in their rear, or if he attempted to reduce that place, to employ his forces until they themselves should have effected their retreat, and made their arrangements in the new position they intended to take.

As their first movement in filing off from their present encampment, and in passing through the town of Ilerda, incumbered with all their baggage, was likely to detain them some time in presence of the enemy, and exposed them to the attacks of cavalry and light troops, they intended no more, on the first day, than to file off by the bridge; and they fixed on a post at which they might halt on the left of the Segra, and make the proper dispositions to continue their march. This post they sent two legions before them to occupy and to secure.

Having taken these preparatory steps, they decamped, defiled without molestation through the town of Ilerda, and came to the ground on which they had taken care to secure their reception;

here they halted until the middle of the night, when they again were in motion. They had a plain of some miles before them, bounded by a ridge of hills, which they were to pass in their way to the Ebro. They might be exposed to Cæsar's light troops in crossing this plain; but as soon as they reached the mountains, they could by securing the passes in their rear, effectually prevent any further attack from the enemy. Thither they accordingly directed their march; but Cæsar, who had observed their intentions, and who had so far succeeded in his operations on the river as to be able to ford it with his horse, sent the greater part of his cavalry, in the beginning of the night, with orders to hang upon the rear of the enemy, and by all possible means to retard their progress.

This service the cavalry performed with so much success, that at break of day the Spanish army, in consequence of the frequent interruptions they had received, were still to be seen from Cæsar's camp. The cavalry, as often as the enemy got in motion, were observed to attack them, but when the enemy halted, appeared to stop or retire, and were pursued in their turn. The army of Cæsar being spectators of this scene became extremely impatient, and with the greatest ardor pressed to be led against the enemy. Even officers crowded to their general, and begged they might be allowed to try the ford; they observed of what consequence it was, that an enemy who had been driven with so much labor from one

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post, should not be suffered to retire in safety to another situation, from which they might renew the war.

Cæsar, affecting to be moved by these representations, and to be prevailed upon to do what it is probable he earnestly desired, instantly made his dispositions to pass the river. He selected the least firm and vigorous men of every cohort for the guard of the camp; placed lines of horse in the river above and below the ford, to break the force of the stream, and to save those who might be overpowered by the strength of the current; in this manner he passed his infantry between the double lines of cavalry without the loss of a man. They had a circuit of six miles to make, in order to avoid the town of Ilerda; but notwithstanding this delay, and the advantage which Afranius and Petreius had gained by beginning their march at midnight, and by their not being discovered until it was day, such were the interruptions given by the cavalry, and the speed with which the legions of Cæsar advanced, that they overtook the enemy's rear about three in the afternoon, and occasioned at once a general halt in every part of their column.

Petreius and Afranius, stunned by the unexpected arrival of Cæsar at the head of his whole army, formed on a rising ground to receive him; and both armies seemed to prepare for immediate action. But Cæsar, knowing the necessity which the enemy were under of pursuing their retreat, and the prospect he had of increasing his

advantage on the march, did not think it necessary to attack them when in order of battle; he took his ground, however, so near them⁵, that he could profit by every advantage they gave him, and in every attempt they should make to change their situation, could push them into all the disorders of a general rout.

In this position of the two armies, the Spaniards having some time remained in order of battle, again attempted to resume their march; but having soon experienced the difficulties of that attempt with an enemy so near them, and being faint with hunger and the fatigue of so many tedious and fruitless operations, they determined to halt and wait for the return of night. They had now no more than five miles to pass on the plain, and hoped, by a rapid motion in the night, to traverse this space before Cæsar could overtake them, or before he could oblige them to halt any where short of the mountains where they looked for a perfect security.

Both parties appeared to be fixed on their ground for the night, when some prisoners that were brought to Cæsar gave information that the enemy were in motion, and must in a little time be so far advanced as to reach the hills before he could give them an effectual trouble. On this sudden emergence, although his army was by no

⁵ The want of cannon or fire-arms enabled a superior army to remain almost in contact with that it intended to harass.

BOOK means ready to march, he ordered every trumpet
IV. to sound, as if he were actually in motion. This
 feint, however slight, had its effect; the enemy
 believed that they were to be instantly attacked,
 or closely pursued on the march, when disordered
 and incumbered with baggage; they desisted from
 their intention, and gave the signal to halt.

Afranius and Petreius, thus baffled in the execution of the first part of their plan, which had been so reasonably formed, began to lose courage and remained on this ground all night, and the following day perplexed with irresolution and various counsels. So far, however, they determined, that before so vigilant an enemy it was safer to march by day than by night; and in this mind they remained yet a second night in the present position.

In this interval Cæsar, having leisure to visit the country over which they were to pass, found it practicable to turn their flank and get to the hills before them. He accordingly moved in the night, and at break of day, before the enemy judged it safe to decamp, he appeared on their right; but seeming to retire, and to leave them at liberty to continue their retreat. So long as his march had this appearance, they were pleased to think that he had moved for want of provisions and applauded themselves for having patiently waited so joyful an event. But as soon as he had got a sufficient way to his left, he changed his direction, and marched with all possible speed to reach the mountains. They were no longer at a loss to

perceive his design, or the danger with which they themselves were threatened. And they instantly, without striking their tents or packing their baggage, moved in the greatest haste to prevent him.

In this operation, Cæsar was now become certain of one or other of two great advantages; either that he should reach the pass of the mountains before the enemy, and so cut off their retreat; or, if they got there before him, that he should be left in possession of their camp and their baggage. He prevailed, however, in the trial of speed, got the first of these advantages by being before them at the ascent of the mountains, where he found a ledge or terrace that was sufficiently capacious to receive his army, and which gave him entire command of the pass.

Afranius, on seeing Cæsar in possession of this ground, sent a considerable party to try the ascent of the mountains at a different place, and to gain the summit behind him; in hopes that, if this way was practicable, he might follow with his whole army, and descend from thence to the Ebro. But the party he employed on this service was, in presence of both armies, surrounded by Cæsar's horse, and put to the sword. The rest of the army, without making any attempt to rescue their friends, beheld this scene with a kind of torpid dejection. They dropped their arms, and staggered in their ranks. The troops of Cæsar, who well understood these signs of extreme terror, became to a degree of mutiny impatient for action; and he

B O O K himself was sensible that the enemy might in that
IV. moment be attacked with the greatest advantage; but as he now thought himself sure of being able to reduce them without a blow, he was unwilling to give them an opportunity, however unlikely, to avail them of making their escape by the chance of a battle. While he endeavoured accordingly to restrain the unseasonable ardor of his own men, the leaders of the Spanish army had time to retire with theirs, and led them back to the camp which they had left in the morning, and to the melancholy possession of tents and of baggage, which they had been willing to abandon, in order to effect their escape.

Cæsar having left proper guards to secure the passes of the mountains, followed the enemy, and took post as before, so near them, that they could not move without being exposed to his insults.

In this position of the two armies, the centinels and advanced guards had an opportunity to talk together; they mutually regretted the unhappy quarrel in which they were engaged, and both officers and men becoming by degrees more familiar, met between the lines, and even exchanged visits in their opposite camps. Officers of the Spanish army proceeded so far as to talk of an accommodation, and got over their scruples in treating without proper authority from their generals, by proposing to stipulate some honorable terms for them in the peace which they proposed to conclude.

Cæsar was apprized of this correspondence,

and, however irregular, connived at a circumstance which he hoped his superior popularity and the splendor of his fortune, would turn to his own account. He flattered himself, that as he had been able to seduce the troops of Pompey in Italy, so he might now deprive his antagonists of the army they had formed in the field to oppose him.

The Spanish generals, being intent on a work they were executing to secure their access to water, remained for some time unapprized of the disorderly correspondence subsisting between the two armies; and Afranius, when he came to the knowledge of what was passing, seemed to observe it with great indifference; but Petreius was greatly alarmed, ran with the officers and the guard who usually attended his person to the space between the lines, dispersed all those who were found in conference together, and put all the soldiers of Cæsar's army who fell in his way to the sword. From thence he went through the camp, and with tears exacted from every legion apart fresh oaths of fidelity to Pompey. He afterwards assembled the whole at the usual place of audience, before the general's tent; and in a speech, composed of insinuation and reproach, endeavoured to confirm them in their duty; and, to the end that he might effectually cut off all hopes of conciliation, ordered all the soldiers of Cæsar's army that could be found within his intrenchments to be brought before him and slain.

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Cæsar, at the same time, having many officers and men of the Spanish army in his camp, might have retaliated these acts of severity; but he chose rather to contrast the character of clemency he himself had assumed, with the austere and merciless policy of his enemies; and for this purpose gave their freedom to such officers or men as chose to return to their own party, and rewarded with preferments and honors such of them as were inclined to remain in his service.

Afranius and Petreius, by the timely discovery of these irregular practices, having escaped the disgrace of being delivered up to the enemy, to be treated at his discretion, or to be spared only as objects of pity at the intercession of their own army, continued their plan of operations; but by persevering in their resistance, they only enabled their adversary to give still more evident proofs of his superior skill and address. They were sensible that their present post could not be long maintained; it had been taken, in their haste to reach the mountains, from necessity, as an immediate respite from the attacks of an enemy who annoyed their march; and besides other inconveniencies, had a difficult access to water, the brook or river from which they were to be supplied being exposed to the discharge of arrows, darts, and other missiles from the enemy. Their bread, which they had calculated to serve them on the whole route to the Ebro was near exhausted, and they had no immediate prospect of supply. They entered therefore

into anxious deliberation on the choice of a retreat, by which they might soonest get beyond the reach of an enemy who pressed them with such unremitted alarms. They hesitated whether they should return to Ilerda, where they still had some magazines, or should attempt to reach Tarraco¹ on their left, at the distance of about fifty miles. The length and difficulty of the way, in which they would be exposed to Cæsar's attacks, determined them against the last; and they chose the first, as promising the nearest and most immediate relief from their present distresses. They accordingly, without any precaution, decamped, and directed their march to Ilerda.

The Spanish infantry were now more exposed than they had been on any of their former marches; for their cavalry had been so often discomfited, and had lost courage so much, that they could not be kept to their place in the column, and were now actually received for safety into the centre of the infantry, the rear was therefore cruelly annoyed by Cæsar's horse, supported by the whole force of his legions. In ascending the heights, which were frequent in their way, they had the better of the enemy, by throwing their javelins and darts on those who attempted to pursue them from below; and with this superiority they made a stand on every ascent, to force their pursuers back to some distance; but in descending the hills, the same

¹ Tarragona.

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advantage being taken against themselves, they generally ran in great disorder to the plains. And in this manner, the ground being uneven, their march consisted of alternate stops and precipitate flights, extremely fatiguing, and likely to end in a general rout.

The leaders of the retiring army, to prevent this fatal consequence, thought proper again to form upon a rising ground, and attempted a stratagem to amuse the enemy, and to gain some advance on the march before him. For this purpose, affecting to make some permanent lodgement in the place where they halted, they threw up a breast-work, but neither pitched their tents nor unloaded their baggage, and were ready to depart the moment their pursuer gave them an opportunity, by quitting the order of march. Cæsar, trusting to the effects of his late attack, and to the appearances which the enemy presented, had no suspicion of their purpose, gave orders to pitch, and even suffered his cavalry to separate in parties to forage. This was no sooner observed from the Spanish army, than they instantly resumed their march. It was then about noon, and they made some way undisturbed.

Cæsar seeing himself over-reached, instantly put his legions in motion, without striking their tents or packing their baggage, and leaving orders for the cavalry to follow him as soon as they could be assembled, endeavoured to keep close to the enemy's rear. He was in this situation when
the

the cavalry rejoined him, and, by renewing with double ardor their former operations, obliged the Spanish army again to suspend their march, and, in despair, to take some respite from the continual attacks with which they were harassed, by halting again in a field, which they had no time to examine, and in which they were accordingly very much exposed.

On this ground Cæsar had again a fair opportunity to attack them, and, with little doubt of the event, to terminate the war by a battle; but he persisted in his purpose of forcing this unfortunate army to surrender without any loss or hazard to himself. In this mind he continued to observe them with a degree of insulting indifference. They soon became sensible of the great disadvantage of the position in which they had halted, and endeavoured to change it, without exposing themselves to the enemy, who was so near as to be able to disturb them in every motion they attempted to make; for this purpose they broke ground for a new intrenchment in their rear, and retiring, as besiegers advance in the attack of a fortress, changed their situation under the cover of works which they had successively raised^{ss}.

In these slow and toilsome operations they persisted all the night and the following day, and got a new position, in which they were less exposed to the enemy; but subject to fresh inconveniency,

^{ss} Cæsar de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 81.

BOOK till then unobserved, in the great distance to
IV. which they were removed from water.

As soon as this defect was perceived, which was probably not till after the soldier had consumed what he commonly carried in his flask, they discontinued their fatiguing operations; but no man ventured abroad for water, and they remained all night under dreadful apprehensions of what they might suffer from this distress.

On the following day the Spanish army advanced in array to the watering-place, and, at the hazard of a general action, proceeded to supply themselves with this necessary article. They were suffered to avail themselves of this temporary relief; but none attempted to procure any food, and they soon after, in order to supply their own immediate wants, and to lessen their consumption of water and forage, killed all the beasts of burden in their camp. While they endeavoured, by means of these temporary expedients, to await the event of any change that might offer in their favor, Cæsar formed a design to cut off all their hopes at once by a line of circumvallation. In conducting or covering this work, his legions were commonly under arms. And the enemy, sensible of the extremity to which they were soon likely to be reduced, advanced in front of their camp to interrupt him; and there might have decided their fate by an action upon equal terms. But they had no courage left; the habit of acting upon the defensive had impressed them with a sense of inferiority, and their frequent miscarriages had

made them distrust the conduct of their officers. Though now in a state of suffering, from which nothing but victory could extricate them, or which nothing but the blood of their enemies could avenge, they, without making any effort for either purpose, retired again within their intrenchments.

In that situation, however, their distresses in a little time became entirely insufferable. After four days had passed in their camp without water or sustenance of any sort, their leaders desired an interview with Cæsar; and, not to expose themselves in so humbling a state to the troops of either army, begged that their meeting might be held apart from both. The conference was accepted; but Cæsar would not allow it to be held in any private place: he insisted that Afranius and Petreius should meet him in the space between the two armies; and having previously demanded, as an acknowledgment of his victory, that the son of Afranius should be delivered up as an hostage, he came to the place of meeting, surrounded by multitudes who crowded from both armies to witness the scene.

Afranius pleaded in behalf of the troops he commanded, that they had done no more than their duty to Pompey, and no more than the service of the province in which they had been stationed required; but acknowledged the distresses to which they were reduced, and implored the victor's clemency.

Cæsar, in return, upbraided the leaders of that

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army with their obstinate animosity to himself,
 and with their late cruelty to innocent men, who
 had committed no other offence than that of hav-
 ing embraced their fellow-citizens as friends, and
 that of being desirous to terminate this unnatural
 quarrel in an amicable manner. "That army," he
 said, "had been raised and kept on foot for the
 " sole purpose of making war upon him. For this
 " purpose numerous fleets had been equipped in
 " times of profound peace, and seven entire legions,
 " under able and experienced officers, had been
 " kept in this peaceable province, where there was
 " not the least pretence of a war; that every
 " measure was concerted for his destruction; that
 " in order to raise one citizen to uncommon
 " honors and powers, a new species of arrange-
 " ment had taken place, by which a person
 " remaining at the gates of Rome, governing in
 " the city and in every district of Italy, might
 " likewise have the command in two warlike
 " provinces, and be allowed a great military
 " establishment in time of profound peace; that,
 " on the contrary, in order to distress himself,
 " the ordinary rules of the service had been set
 " aside; and that to him alone had been denied,
 " what had always been granted to every citizen
 " who faithfully served the republic, the privilege
 " of retiring, if not distinguished with honors,
 " at least without being loaded with injuries and
 " affronts; that he had borne these indignities,
 " however, with patience, and mentioned them
 " now, not as a prelude to any severities which

“ he meant to inflict, nor as an excuse for any
 “ singular advantage he meant to take of their
 “ present distresses; that he demanded no more
 “ than peace; his antagonists should go unhurt,
 “ provided they left the province, and became
 “ bound not to serve his enemies for the future
 “ against him; that no one should be forced to
 “ take an active part on his side; that all who
 “ committed no injury against him should be con-
 “ sidered as his friends; and that every man now
 “ in his power should be at liberty, without any
 “ other conditions than these.”

It is difficult to determine whether the sword
 or the tongue of this singular man were most
 dangerous to the state he attacked. It is probable
 that many of his present audience were as much
 convinced by his eloquence, as they had been
 subdued by his military skill, and thought him a
 person no less forced to his present extremities by
 the wrongs he had suffered, than able to do him-
 self justice by the force of his arms. His speech
 was received by the late partisans of his rival
 with evident signs of pleasure. To be discharged
 after a certain period of the most faithful services
 was all that a Roman soldier, in the ordinary
 times of the republic, could claim. To receive
 this favor at the hands of a victorious enemy, by
 whom they expected to be treated as captives,
 gave sudden and unexpected joy.

After the material articles were adjusted in this
 manner, some questions arose with respect to the
 time and place in which the vanquished army

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should be dismissed from their colors. Numbers of them, though Roman citizens, had been enlisted in Spain, and were natives or settlers in that province; others had been transported from Italy, and wished to return to their country. It was determined, therefore, that the first should be disbanded immediately, the others march to the Var, and there be set free, and not be subject to be pressed into any service whatever. Cæsar undertook to supply them with provisions on their march. He ordered their effects, if any were found in his camp, to be restored to them. He paid his own soldiers a high price for what they were in this manner desired to restore. By this measure he gained several advantages; he lightened his baggage; he made a gratification to his own men, without the imputation of bribery; and he gained his late enemies by an act of generosity. The vanquished army accordingly came to Cæsar with all their complaints, and appealed to him even from their own officers. It was impossible for mankind to resist so much ability, insinuation, and courage.

About a third of the captive army were dismissed from their colors in Spain; the remainder passed the Pyrenees, preceded by one part of Cæsar's army, and followed by the other; who, being thus separated to the van and the rear, and always encamping close to their prisoners, led them, in terms of the capitulation, to the frontiers of Cisalpine Gaul⁵⁶.

⁵⁶ Cæsar de Bell. Civ. lib. i.

While the main body of Cæsar's army thus conducted the remains of the Spanish legions to the place of their destination, Varro yet remained in the western province of Spain; and Cæsar, in order either to effect a conjunction which had been concerted between them, or to force him to surrender, sent Quintus Cassius with two legions to that quarter, and himself followed with an escort of six hundred horse. Upon the report of his approach, the natives, as usual, having taken their resolution in favor of the successful party, declared for the victor. One of the legions of Varro that lay at Gades⁵⁷ advancing in form with their colors, came forward to Hispales to receive him, and made offer of their services. Varro himself agreed to surrender the forces he commanded, both by sea and by land, and was received at Corduba. Here Cæsar held a general convention of the province; and having thanked the people for the favors they had shown to his cause, he remitted the contributions, and withdrew all the burdens which Varro, acting under the authority of Pompey, had imposed upon them. In this, as in other examples, he endeavoured to dispel the fears which his enterprize at first occasioned, and secured the attachment of the provinces by a sense of the ease and the freedom which his success had procured them. The fleets and armies which joined him upon every conquest he made, enabled him to station troops for the security of

⁵⁷ Now Cadiz.

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every new acquisition, without dividing the forces on which he was to rely for the future operations of the war. He accordingly, in the present instance, left, under the command of Quintus Cassius, five legions, consisting chiefly of the troops which had been levied by Varro; and he himself embarking on board a fleet which had been fitted out for his enemies, went by sea to Tarraco, now Tarragona, and from that place by land to Narbonne and Marfeilles.

C H A P. V I.

The Siege of Marseilles continued. — Its surrender — Caesar named Dictator. — Return to Rome. — Mutiny at Placentia. — Caesar with Servilius Isauricus Consuls. — Forces and Disposition of Pompey. — Departure of Caesar to Brundisium. — Transports the first Divisions of his Army to Acroceraunus — Message to Pompey, and their several Operations. — The Lines of Dyrrachium. — Caesar baffled in his attempt to invest Pompey. — Action and defeat of Caesar. — His Retreat. — March of both Armies into Thessaly. — Battle of Pharsalia.

THE city of Marseilles had not surrendered to the forces which Cæsar had left under the command of Trebonius and Decimus Brutus to besiege it. Brutus, according to the disposition which had been made to block up the place by sea, as well as by land, was stationed under the island at the mouth of the bay. His squadron consisted of twelve ships, but so hastily built, that no more than thirty days had elapsed from the felling of the timber to the launching of the vessels. They were manned, however, with the choice of Cæsar's legions; and, in order to frustrate any advantage which their antagonists

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BOOK might have in the construction or management
IV. of their ships, they were furnished with contrivances to grapple and make fast their gunwales to those of the enemy, in order to decide the contest with their swords.

The Marseillians had equipped ten gallies, of which the greater number, though not all, were decked. These they joined under the command of Domitius, who had been named by the Senate to succeed Cæsar in Gaul, with the seven ships which this officer had brought into their harbour; and having manned them with mariners from the neighbouring coasts, they came abroad into the bay, in order to force Brutus from his station, and to open their communication with the sea. In the beginning of the action, the Marseillians being superior to Cæsar's fleet in the number of their ships, and in the skill of their mariners, had a considerable advantage. But as soon as they suffered themselves to be entangled by the grapple, the Gaulish sailors, though of a very hardy race, could not withstand the arms and discipline of the legionary soldiers, and were defeated with the loss of nine of their ships.

This was the victory already mentioned, and which contributed so much to the reputation of Cæsar's arms, while he lay before Ilerda; and which, joined to the other circumstances of his good fortune, procured him the alliance of so many nations in Spain.

While Brutus thus kept his station in the bay of Marseilles, Trebonius practised all the usual

methods of attack to reduce the city. This place being covered on three sides by water, and on the fourth only accessible by an isthmus or neck of land, which was defended by walls and towers of a great height; he opened two separate attacks, probably on the right and the left of the isthmus, and at each of these attacks, appears to have employed the sloping mound or terrace ¹, which, in the sieges of the ancients, where the defence depended on the height of the battlements, corresponded to the sap of the moderns, and was calculated to conduct the besiegers, by a gradual ascent, to the top, as the other conducts them to the foot of the walls. This work was supported on the sides chiefly with timber, and built up with fascines, hurdles, and the earth, rising in the present case to an elevation of eighty feet, and in breadth, as was formerly observed in that employed against the Bituriges ², probably no less than three hundred and fifty feet, so as to receive a proper column of infantry in front, and to embrace a proper extent in the walls. The workmen employed in the front of this laborious approach were covered with screens, mantlets, and penthouses of great length; and such was the consumption of timber in the construction of the whole, that the neighbouring country is said to have been cleared of its woods.

A mere trading city, long refused to war, or

¹ Agger.

² Bourges.

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accustomed to rely on foreign protection, we may suppose to have been ill provided, either in the state of its arsenals, or in the spirit of its citizens, for such an attack. But this little republic, still bearing the character of an independent state, being in the neighbourhood of mountains inhabited by fierce nations, who looked upon its wealth as a tempting prize, and owing its safety to the strength of its walls, and the state of its arsenals, was still suitably provided for its own defence; and the people, although long inured to peace, still kept in mind the duties which the necessities of war might oblige them to render to their country. They were now supported by the presence of the Roman Proconsul, and had hopes of a speedy relief from Pompey, whom, in opposition to Cæsar, who was in rebellion against the legal government of his country, they considered as head of the commonwealth. They accordingly exerted great perseverance and valor in defence of their walls; and by a continual discharge from the battlements, and by frequent sallies, in which they set fire to the works of the besiegers, greatly retarded the progress of the siege. They had engines of a peculiar force, from which they darted arrows of a monstrous size and weight, being beams twelve feet long, and proportionally thick, and pointed with iron, which none of the screens or covering, usually employed in making approaches, could resist; and Trebonius was accordingly obliged to proportion the strength

of his timbers and penthouses, and the thickness of his parapets, fascines, and earth on his terrace, to the weight of these enormous weapons.

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While such efforts were made on both sides at this memorable siege, Pompey had detached Nasidius with sixteen galleys from the coast of Macedonia to endeavour the relief of Marseilles. This squadron had entered the straits of Messina by surprise, and, having cut out of the harbour a ship which belonged to Curio's fleet, proceeded on their destination to the coast of Gaul. Being arrived in the bay of Tauroentum, now La Ciotat, in the neighbourhood of Toulon, they sent intimation of their coming, in order to concert operations with those in the harbour of Marseilles.

The besieged were greatly animated with these hopes of relief; and having already drawn from their docks as many ships as supplied the place of those they had lost in the late engagement, they now manned them with the choice of their citizens, and determined once more to try their fortune at sea. When this fleet was about to depart, numbers of women and many citizens, who, on account of their age, could not take part in the service, crowded to the shore, and with tears exhorted the soldiers and mariners to be mindful of their own and their country's honor, on the eve of becoming a prey to their enemies. Multitudes of people, at the same time, drew forth in procession, and crowded the temples with prayers and supplications

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for the success of this last effort they were to make in defence of their commonwealth.

This bustle in the streets of Marseilles, with the motion of the shipping in the harbour, being observed from the camp of Trebonius, which was situated upon a height, and which had a view into the town, gave sufficient intimation of what was intended; and Brutus was warned to be upon his guard: but the Marseillians, having found a favorable wind, had the good fortune to clear the bay, and, without any interruption from his squadron, joined Nasidius at Tauroentum. Here an action soon after ensued, in which the Marseillians made great efforts of valor; but were ill supported by Nasidius, who, unworthy of the command with which he had been intrusted, withdrew at the beginning of the action, and fled to the coast of Spain. The Marseillians, being left to sustain the contest alone, lost nine of their ships, of which five were sunk, and four were taken.

These tidings were received at Marseilles with inexpressible sorrow; but did not alter the resolution of the inhabitants to persevere in their defence, and in the use of every possible method that could be employed to protract the siege, and to give Pompey time to devise more effectual means for their safety. They accordingly, with great vigor and success, counteracted the ordinary operations of the siege, burning and demolishing a considerable part of the works which were raised up against them, and

obliging the besiegers frequently to renew their labors. CHAP.
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The first attack, against which the besieged were not able to find an adequate defence, came from a work which had not been a part in the original plan of the siege, but had been devised by the soldiers who had succeeded each other on the guard of the agger, or mound of approach, as a lodgement or cover to secure themselves from surprise. It was at first no more than a square of ten yards, inclosed with a brick wall five feet thick; but so situated, that if it were raised to a proper height, it might cope with the battlements, and greatly annoy the besieged. To give it this consequence, masons were employed to raise it, and great efforts of ingenuity were made to protect them in their work. A moveable penthouse of great thickness in the roof, and screened on the front and sides with network made of cables, or the strongest ropes, was raised on beams or rafters of a proportional strength, and contrived to be hoisted up by machinery, to keep pace with the building, and to cover the workmen as they rose on the successive courses of masonry which they laid. With these precautions, a tower was gradually raised on the foundation of the original brick wall, to the height of six stories; and being furnished with ports or embrasures on every floor, gave the besiegers, by means of their missiles, the command of all the space from thence to the ramparts. They accordingly, under the cover of engines,

BOOK IV. that made a continual discharge from this tower, filled up the ditch, and pushed up a gallery to the foot of the wall. In this position, notwithstanding all the efforts of the besieged, by a continual discharge of heavy stones from the battlements, to destroy or overwhelm the supports of their gallery, they undermined the foundation of the rampart, and brought some part of it in ruin to the ground.

The inhabitants, greatly alarmed at the sight of a breach, which might soon be enlarged to admit of being stormed, made some signals of truce, and sent to beseech Trebonius that he would suspend his operations, and wait for the arrival of Cæsar, in whose clemency they hoped to find some protection against the fury of troops, who had already threatened the inhabitants with a massacre.

Trebonius, accordingly, moved by these entreaties, and by the instructions he had received from Cæsar, not to deliver up the town, in case it fell into his hands, to the rage of the soldiers, suspended his operations, and supposing the petition of the inhabitants equal to an offer of surrender on their part, intrusted his works to slender guards, who, in their turn, relying on the submissive professions of the people, were proportionally remiss in their duty. The citizens, tempted by the opportunity which was thus offered them to strike an important blow, and to throw back to a great distance all the posts of the enemy, made a vigorous sally from the town, and

and being favored by a high wind, which blew directly on the works of the besiegers, set the whole on fire, and reduced to ashes, in a few hours, what had been the labor of many months to erect.

As Trebonius had already exhausted the greater part of the materials which the country around him could furnish, it appeared difficult for him to resume the attack. But he himself, as well as the troops under his command, being greatly exasperated by the late breach of faith in the town, made every effort of ingenuity and courage to repair their losses. They substituted brick-work for timber in supporting the sides and galleries of their terrace; and advanced with so rapid a progress in their new approach, that the besieged now greatly spent with toil, and disappointed in their hopes of relief, were struck with fresh and more alarming apprehensions of what they might expect from the resentment of troops whom they had incensed with a recent and just provocation; and they returned to their suit for mercy, with more humble and more sincere intentions of submission.

While messages were passing to this effect, Domitius Ahenobarbus, sensible that he could no longer serve the cause of his party at this place, embarked with his attendants and friends on board of three galleys which still waited his orders in the harbour. Having the opportunity of a high and favorable wind, which made it unsafe for the squadron of Brutus to weigh, or

B O O K to quit their anchors in pursuit of him, he endeavoured to escape from the bay. In this attempt
IV. two of his vessels were taken, the third, with himself on board, got off, and reserved him to take that share which yet remained for him in the growing misfortunes of his party throughout this disastrous war.

Such was the state of affairs when Cæsar arrived from Spain, and expecting, in the present contest for empire, to profit as much by the reputation of his clemency, as by the terror of his arms, listened to the supplications of the people of Marseilles, and took possession of the town without any act of resentment or severity whatever. While he was yet at this place, he had accounts from Rome, that his party in the city had procured an act of the People to vest him with the power of Dictator. The ceremony of his nomination had, in the absence of both Consuls, been performed by Marcus Æmilius Lepidus, then Prætor in office, who, though a person of mean capacity, was by the chance of his situation involved in many of the greatest affairs that followed; and though but a single accomplice in the crimes of this guilty age, escaped its violences to become almost the only example of an ignominy and disgrace, which so many others had merited no less than himself.

Cæsar being thus raised, though by an irregular step, to a legal place in the commonwealth, hastened to Rome, in order to be invested, for the first time, with the character of Dictator. In

his way he was stopped at Placentia by some disorders which threatened a mutiny among the troops who were assembled at that place. The legions, elated by victory, and filled with a sense of their own importance in a contest for the sovereignty of the empire, were become impatient of discipline, and in haste to avail themselves of that military government they were employed to establish. In entering Italy they treated Roman citizens as their subjects, and the country as their property. Being restrained, they resented the severities which were practised against them, entered into cabals, and even talked of abandoning Cæsar, and of declaring for Pompey. Here, however, the usual courage and ability of this singular man supported him. He brought the mutinous troops, under arms, before him, and put them in mind how much he had ever coveted, and been anxious to obtain the affections of the soldiers; but assured them, that it was no part of his intention to earn those affections by making himself an accomplice in their crimes. “ Shall we,” he said, “ who profess to be the deliverers of our country from oppression, become ourselves the greatest oppressors? Shall I, who am intrusted with the command of a Roman army, become the patron of licentiousness, and, in order to indulge for a moment the passions of my soldiers, suffer them to ruin their own fortunes for ever? What should induce me? — The fear of violence to my person, or the danger to which my life

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“ may be exposed? — If my life were attacked,
 “ there are enow to defend it. But what is life
 “ compared to the honor of a Roman officer,
 “ which I am concerned to maintain? There
 “ are persons who have said, That they will de-
 “ sert my cause, and go over to Pompey. Let
 “ them. They shall soon have an opportunity
 “ to do so. If Pompey be my enemy, what is
 “ there I should more earnestly wish than to find
 “ his cause intrusted with such men? men who
 “ make war on their friends, and disobey their
 “ officers. He had been slow,” he said, “in
 “ proceeding to the fatal extremes which were
 “ now become necessary. The guilty,” he con-
 “ tinued, “had been long known to him; but he
 “ had endeavoured to conceal their offences, in
 “ hopes that remorse and shame, or the fear of
 “ justice, would have made the actual applica-
 “ tion of punishment unnecessary; but that he
 “ must now, though with the greatest reluctance,
 “ proceed to the last of remedies.”

In order that he might not involve the whole
 of those who were present in the same desperate
 cause, he affected, in this harangue, to treat
 the offence he was to punish as the crime of a
 few. They were now to be set apart, he said,
 and their punishment should purge the army,
 and retrieve its honor. In pursuance of this
 plan, he affected to believe, that the ninth le-
 gion were the principal authors of this mutiny.
 He ordered a few of them for immediate execu-
 tion, and boldly dismissed the whole of the

legion from his service. The remainder of the army, having thus obtained an implied exculpation, in token of their own innocence, vied with each other in applauding the justice of their general. Even the legion, which was dismissed from the service, detesting as a punishment on themselves, what they had threatened to execute as an act of resentment against their commander, beset him with humble and earnest entreaties, that he might be pleased to receive them again into his service. He affected great difficulty in granting this request; but, after much solicitation, suffered himself to be gained by their professions of penitence³.

With a considerable accession of authority, acquired by his success in quelling this mutiny, Cæsar proceeded to Rome, where he assumed the title and ensigns of Dictator; being the first example of any person, since the abdication of Sylla, intrusted with this alarming power. It was said to be conferred upon him, however, merely in compliance with form; and that there might be a proper officer, in the absence of both the Consuls, to preside at the elections. His own object, at the same time, being to gain to his party the authority of legal government, and, in his conduct, to give proofs of clemency and moderation, without any intention, for the

³ Dio Cass. lib. xli. c. 27—35. Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. ii. p. 547. Sueton. in Cæs. c. 69. Lucan. lib. v. 244.

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present to perpetuate or even to exercise any of the high powers of Dictator, he proceeded to hold the elections, and was himself, together with Servilius Isauricus, chosen Consul for the following year. In the interval that followed, before their installation, he continued to assemble the People in the character of Dictator, and obtained some laws respecting the times, and the distracted state of the public affairs. Credit and trade were at an alarming stand; he procured an act to facilitate the recovery of debts, by delivering the effects of the debtor to be divided among his creditors, upon an estimate of what the different subjects might have been sold for at the time that the war broke out.

Many being supposed to hoard great sums of money, as the only means of preserving it from the violence of the times, or being unwilling to lend on such securities as were then to be had, Cæsar procured another act, by which any person was forbid to have in his possession, at once, above sixty thousand Roman money^{*}.

He attained a general act of indemnity, from which Milo alone was excepted, restoring persons of every denomination, who, at the breaking out of the war, lay under the censure of the law, and were in exile for corrupt practices in the State; and, in pursuance of this measure, procured a pardon for all the disorders which had been committed in opposition to the late

^{*} About 500l.

government ; but for none of the irregular efforts that had been made in support of it. He opened the city at once to all the inhabitants of the Cisalpine Gaul, and by a single vote gave them a title to be enrolled with the People of Rome as members of the republic'. In these, and in other affairs of less moment, while his troops were in motion through Italy, he employed a few days in the city, and being ready to depart, resigned the power of Dictator. This resignation, made by a person possessed of a military force, and hitherto victorious, was considered as an evidence of his moderation, and served to dispel the fears of those who expected to see the immediate establishment of a military government. He was now about to assume the office of legal magistrate, and to appear in the character of Roman Consul against those who, lately trusting to the name and authority of the republic with which they were vested, had treated himself and his adherents as rebels ; but now, in their turn, might appear to incur all the disadvantages of that imputation which he was about to retort upon them ; and with the additional charge of an attempt to dismember the empire, and to arm so many of the provinces against the sovereignty of the State.

The competitors in this famous contest were in or but a little past the prime of life : Pompey

' Dio Cass. lib. xli. c. 36, 37, 38. Cæsar. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

BOOK IV. was fifty-seven, and Cæsar, fifty. The first had been early distinguished as an officer, and for many years had enjoyed a degree of consideration, with which that of any other Roman citizen was not allowed to compare. His reputation, however, in some measure, had sunk, and that of Cæsar rose on the first shocks of the present war; but the balance was not yet absolutely settled, and the minds of many were held in anxious suspense. Cæsar, wherever he acted in person, had always prevailed; but where he was not present, his affairs wore a less promising aspect.

His forces under Curio had acquired an easy possession of Sicily; and this officer, encouraged by his first success, transported two legions into Africa, found Varus encamped near Utica, obliged him to retire into the town, and was preparing to besiege it, when he received intelligence that Juba, king of Numidia, was advancing to its relief with all the powers of his kingdom. This prince had been induced to take part in the war by his attachment to Pompey, and by his personal animosity to Curio, who, in his Tribuneate, had moved for an act to deprive him of his kingdom.

Curio, upon this intelligence, wisely withdrew from Utica to a strong post in the neighbourhood, and sent orders into Sicily to hasten the junction of the troops he had left behind him in that island. While he waited their coming, some Numidian deserters arrived at his camp,

and brought accounts that Juba, with the main body of his army, had been recalled to defend his own dominions; and that only Sabura, one of his generals, with a small division, was come to give what support he could to the party of Pompey in Africa.

Upon this information, Curio formed a design to intercept the Numidian general before he could be joined by Varus, and for this purpose, leaving a guard in his camp, he marched in the night to attack the enemy, where he was informed that they lay on the banks of the Bagrada. His cavalry being advanced, fell in with the Numidian horse, and put them to flight. Encouraged by this advantage, he hastened his march to complete the victory; and Sabura, by whose art the last intelligence had been conveyed to him, likewise, after a little resistance, fled before him. By this means, Curio was gradually insnared into the midst of Juba's forces, was surrounded, and attacked on every side. He attempted, in vain, to take refuge on a height which he had in view, and, with the greater part of his army, was put to the sword. The few who escaped, with those who had been left in the camp, endeavoured to find a passage into Sicily, and, being disappointed, surrendered themselves to Varus, by whom they were treated with clemency; but being observed, and distinguished by Juba, who arrived at Utica on the following day, were claimed as his captives, and put to death.

BOOK IV. About the same time, Dolabella, to whom Cæsar had given the command both of his sea and land forces on the coast of Illyricum, was, by Marcus Octavius and Scribonius Libo, expelled from thence; and Caius Antonius, attempting to support Dolabella, was shut up in a small island, and, with his party, made prisoners⁶.

The principal storm, however, with which the new government was threatened, appeared on the side of Macedonia. In this country, Pompey himself was now at the head of a great force. He had transported five legions from Italy; and, since the middle of March, when his last division sailed from Brundisium, he had been in the quiet possession of Greece, Macedonia and all the eastern part of the empire. He had sent his father-in-law, Cornelius Scipio Metellus, into the provinces of Asia and Syria, to collect the forces and the revenues of those opulent countries; and dispatched his own son Cneus with instructions to assemble all the shipping that could be found on that coast. He likewise sent general orders to all the Roman officers in different parts of the empire, and the allies or dependants of the Roman People, to join him with every power they could raise. Seven thousand citizens of rank had followed him from Italy⁷. Numbers of veterans, who had been settled in Thessaly, repaired to

⁶ Dio Cass. lib. xii. c. 41 & 42.

⁷ Plutarch, in Pompeio.

his standard. He was joined by one legion from Sicily, another from Crete, and two from Asia. He had two legions under Scipio in Syria, had assembled three thousand archers, and as many slingers; had hired, in the neighbourhood of Macedonia, two thousand foot and seven thousand cavalry. Dejotarus sent him six hundred horse; Ariobarzanes five hundred; Cotus, a Thracian prince, five hundred; the Macedonians furnished two hundred; five hundred being the remains of Gabinius' army, had joined him; his son brought eight hundred from his own estates; Tarcundarius three hundred; Antiochus Commagenes two hundred: amounting to fifty-five thousand legionary troops, eight thousand irregular infantry, and ten thousand six hundred horse. In all seventy-three thousand six hundred *.

He had likewise assembled a numerous fleet; one squadron from Egypt, of which he gave the command to his son Cneus; another from Asia, under Lelius and Triarius; one from Syria under Caius Cassius; that of Rhodes, under Caius Marcellus and Coponius; that of Achaia and Liburnia, under Scribonius Libo and M. Octavius: the whole amounting to above eight hundred gallies, of which Bibulus had the chief command, with orders to guard the passage from Italy to Greece, and to obstruct the communications of the enemy by the Ionian Sea.

* Cæsar. de Bello Civili, lib. iii.

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Pompey had likewise formed large magazines, of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, and Cyrene. The principal resort of his land forces was at Berrhœa, on the fertile plains between the Axios and Haliacmon, that run into the bay of Thermæ. The Roman Senate was represented at Thessalonica by two hundred of that body, who, together with the two Consuls, held their assemblies, and assumed all the functions of the Roman State. The Roman People were likewise represented by the concourse of respectable citizens, who repaired to the army, or to this place*. But though so many members of the government, thus violently expelled from Rome, considered themselves as the real constituents of the commonwealth, they suffered the usual time of elections to elapse, and did not attempt to preserve in their retreat the succession of officers, in opposition to the elections that were made at Rome. Claudius Marcellus and L. Cornelius Lentulus, at the expiration of their year in office, took the several commands allotted to them, as usual, under the title of Proconsul.

The general had been extremely active in forming as well as in assembling this powerful armament. He intended, early in the spring, to take possession of Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and the other towns on the coast, probably with a view to fall upon Italy, with a weight which

* Dio Cass. lib. xli. c. 43.

now appeared sufficient to ensure the high reputation as a commander, which his successes, on other occasions, had procured him.

Cæsar, on his part, had drawn all his army to the coast in the neighbourhood of Brundisium; but it was not likely that he would attempt to pass a sea which was commanded by the enemy's fleet, or venture upon a coast where he had not a single port, and in the face of a superior army, now completely formed and appointed, under the command of an officer, whom no man was ever supposed to excel. The formality of entering on the office of Consul, to which he had been elected, it was supposed, might detain him at Rome till after the first of January; and Pompey accordingly made no haste in taking his intended station on the coast of Epirus, from which he might either act on the defensive, or invade Italy as the occasion might require¹⁰.

It was difficult, however, to foresee what such an enemy as Cæsar might attempt. Having staid no more than eleven days at Rome, while he acted in the character of Dictator, and obtained his election as Consul, without waiting for his admission into office, he set out in December for Brundisium. At this place twelve legions and all his cavalry were already, by his order, assembled. He found the numbers of his army considerably impaired by disease, being

¹⁰ Appian. de Bello Civili, lib. ii.

BOOK IV. come from the more healthy climates of Spain and Gaul to pass the sickly season of autumn in Apulia. In any other hands than his own, an army so reduced would have scarcely been fit for the defence of Italy against such forces as were assembled to invade it; and his march to Brundisium would have appeared altogether a defensive measure, and intended to counteract the operations of his enemy from beyond the seas. The season too appeared extremely unfavorable to any hostile attempts on Greece. Cæsar, however had determined to prevent the designs of his enemy, and to keep him involved in all the disadvantages of a defensive war.

No more transports were collected in the harbour of Brundisium than were sufficient to receive about twenty thousand foot and six hundred horse. Cæsar, nevertheless, immediately on his arrival, informed the troops of his intentions to embark, and of his resolution to fix the scene of the war in Greece. He cautioned them not to occupy the transports with unnecessary baggage and horses, and exhorted them to rely on the consequences of victory, and on his own generosity, for a full reparation of any loss they might sustain by leaving their effects behind them. He embarked seven legions in the first division, and with these he himself sailed on the fourth of February. He turned from the usual course, and steering unobserved to the right, arrived next day, where the enemy, if they had really

U. C. 705.
C. Julius
Cæsar,
P. Servilius
Isauricus.

been apprized of his embarkation, were least likely to expect him, on what was reputed a very dangerous part of the coast, under a high and rocky promontory, that was called the Acroce-raunus.

As soon as the fleet had come to an anchor, Cæsar having Vibullius Rufus, one of Pompey's officers who was taken in Spain, till now detained as a prisoner, he dismissed him with a message to his general in the following terms:
 " That both parties had already carried their ob-
 " stinacy too far, and might learn, from experi-
 " ence, to distrust their fortunes; that the one had
 " been expelled from Italy, had lost Sicily, Sar-
 " dinia, and Spain, with one hundred and thirty
 " cohorts (or thirteen legions) ¹¹; that the other
 " had sustained the loss of an army in Africa,
 " cut off with its general ¹², and had suffered no
 " less by the disasters of his party in Illyricum;
 " that their mutual disappointments might instruct
 " them how little they could rely on the events
 " of war; that it was time to consult their own
 " safety, and to spare the republic; that it was
 " prudent to treat of peace while the fortunes
 " and the hopes of both were nearly equal; if
 " that time were allowed to elapse, and either
 " should obtain a distinguished advantage,
 " who could answer, that the victor would

¹¹ The armies of Afranius, Petreius, and Varro, &c.

¹² The army of Curio and C. Antonius.

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“ be equally tractable as both were at present?

“ But since all former endeavours to procure a conference, or to bring on a treaty between the leaders themselves, had failed, he proposed, that all their differences should now be referred to the Senate and People; that, in the mean time, each of them should solemnly swear, at the head of their respective armies, That in three days, they should disband all their forces, in order that, being disarmed, they might severally be under a necessity to submit to the legal government of their country; that he himself, to remove all difficulties on the part of Pompey, should begin with dismissing all the troops that were under his command, whether in garrison or in the field.”

It appears that Cæsar, if these declarations had been accepted, might have been somewhat embarrassed for evasions; but equally bold in all his measures, he risked this event, or rather foresaw it could not happen, as he was sure that this offer of peace, like the former, would be rejected; and the rather, that it would be considered as an effect of his weakness, and of the danger into which he had fallen by his rash debarkation with so small a force. At any rate, there is no doubt that this message was intended, in the usual strain of his policy, to amuse his enemy, or to remove the blame of the war from

” Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

himself

himself. As he usually accompanied such overtures of peace with the most rapid movements and the boldest resolutions, the moment Vibullius set out, he disembarked his troops, and in the night dispatched the transports on their return to Brundisium to bring the remainder of his army.

His landing on the coast was the first intimation received by the enemy of his intention to pass a sea, which they supposed sufficiently guarded by their fleets, and of his purpose to carry the war into a country, in which they thought themselves secure by the superiority of their numbers, and of their other resources. Bibulus, upon this alarm, put to sea, and came in time to intercept about thirty of the empty transports on their return to Italy. These he burnt; and, sensible of his own remissness in suffering so great a body of the enemy to pass, he distributed his ships along the coast, and determined, for the future, to keep the sea in the face of every difficulty, and under every distress.

In the mean time, Cæsar marched directly to Oricum, where Lucius Torquatus, on the part of Pompey, was posted, with orders to defend himself to the last extremity. But Cæsar, as soon as he appeared in the character of Roman Consul, preceded by the ensigns of office, prevailed on the garrison to desert their commander, and to surrender the place. Without stopping here, he proceeded to Apollonia, was received in the same manner by the inhabitants, in opposition to

BOOK IV. the officer who commanded for Pompey. In consequence of these examples he was acknowledged by all the towns of Epirus, and continued his march with the greatest dispatch towards Dyrrachium, where Pompey had collected his stores, and formed his principal magazines. By his unexpected arrival he had hopes of being able to surprise that important place, and to make himself master of it, before a sufficient force could be assembled to cover it.

Pompey, in execution of the plan he had formed, was on his march from Macedonia towards the coast of Epirus, when he was met by Vibullius, and received from him the first intelligence of Cæsar's landing. He was not amused with the message which this officer brought him, nor did he attempt to retort the artifice, by affecting to be deceived. He even expressed himself in terms harsh and impolitic, "That he neither chose to return to his country, nor to hold his life by the concession of Cæsar;" and, without returning any answer, detached some parties towards the coast where the enemy was landed, with orders to lay waste the country, break down the bridges, destroy the woods, and block up the highways with the timber they felled¹⁴. He sent expresses to Scipio, with an account of Cæsar's arrival in Epirus, and with orders to hasten his passage into Europe, with all the forces he had been able to assemble in Asia. He himself advanced

¹⁴ Appian. lib. ii.

with great diligence; and being informed on the march, that Oricum and Apollonia had already fallen into the enemy's hands, he hastened to save his magazines and stores at Dyrrachium, and without stopping, night or day, marched in such disorder, that many deserted as from a cause already ruined or desperate. He arrived, however, in time to prevent the designs of Cæsar on Dyrrachium; encamped under the walls, sent a squadron of ships immediately to retake or block up the harbour at Oricum, and ordered such a disposition of the fleet as was most likely to prevent the passage of a second embarkation from Italy.

Cæsar, finding himself prevented at Dyrrachium, halted on the Apfus; and, in order to cover Epirus and wait for the second division of his troops from Italy, prepared to intrench himself on the banks of that river. Having accordingly secured the main body of his army in this post, he himself returned with a single legion to receive the submission of the towns in his rear, and to provide for the supply of his camp.

In the mean time Bibulus, on the part of Pompey, blocked up the harbour at Oricum, and commanded the passage from Italy with his fleet.

Calenus, on the part of Cæsar, who had orders to lose no opportunity of transporting his army from Brundisium, actually embarked and put to sea; but being met by a packet from Cæsar, with intelligence of the dispositions which had been

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made by the enemy to intercept him, he returned, suffering one of the vessels that had accompanied his fleet to keep on her way, in order to carry an account of his motions; but she was taken by the enemy and destroyed.

Bibulus, who commanded the fleet which lay before Oricum, being precluded from the land by the parties which Cæsar had posted along the shore, forced to bring his daily supplies of wood water, and other necessaries at a great disadvantage from Corcyra, and reduced to great distress, endeavoured, under pretence of a negociation, to obtain a cessation of arms. But Cæsar, who came in person to Oricum, on hearing of this proposition, supposing that the design of Bibulus was to find an opportunity, under cover of the truce, to procure some supply of provisions and water, rejected the offer, and returned to his camp on the Apfus.

Pompey had advanced from Dyrrachium, and took post on the opposite bank of that river. Dio Cassius and Appian agree that he made some attempt to pass the Apfus, and to force Cæsar in this post; but that he was prevented by the breaking of a bridge, or by the difficulties of a ford. According to Cæsar's own account, the armies continued to observe each other, and the troops, separated only by a narrow river, had frequent conferences from the opposite banks. It was understood that in these interviews no hostilities should be offered. Of the two parties; that of Cæsar was the more engaging to soldiers;

notwithstanding his own affectation of regard to the civil constitution of the republic, his military retainers still hoped to remain in possession of the government. He therefore encouraged the communication of his men with those of the opposite party. On this occasion Vatinius, by his direction, went forward to the bank of the river, and raising his voice, complained of the harsh treatment lately offered to Cæsar, in the contempt shown to all his overtures and advances to peace. May not one citizen, he said, send a message to another, when he means only to prevent the shedding of innocent blood? He proceeded to lament the fate of so many brave men as were likely to perish in this quarrel; and was listened to with profound silence by many of both armies, who crowded to the place.

These remonstrances on the part of Cæsar, delivered by an officer of high rank, and appearing to make so deep an impression on both armies, when reported at Pompey's quarters, seemed to be too serious to be flighted. An answer, therefore, was given by the direction of Pompey, that on the following day A. Varro should be sent to any place that should be agreed upon as safe between the two armies, and there receive the propositions that should be made to him. The parties accordingly met at a place appointed, and multitudes from both armies crowded around them. Pompey considering the whole as an artifice to gain time, or to find an opportunity to debauch his men, probably gave instructions to

BOOK break up the conference, in a way that for the
 IV. future should keep the troops at a greater distance from each other. Soon after the officers met, some darts, probably by his directions, were thrown from the crowd. Both sides being alarmed by this circumstance, they instantly parted, and withdrew under a shower of missiles, in which numbers were wounded.

The fate of the war seemed to depend on the vigilance of the fleet, and on the difficulties with which Cæsar had to contend in bringing any reinforcements or supplies from Italy. Bibulus, from the effect of fatigue, was taken dangerously ill; but could not, upon any account, be persuaded to leave his station, and died on ship-board. There being nobody appointed to succeed him in the command at sea, the leader of each of the separate squadrons acted for himself without any concert. Scribonius Libo, with fifty gallies, set sail from the coast of Epirus, steered towards Brundisium, where he surprised and burnt some trading vessels, one in particular laden with corn for Cæsar's camp. Encouraged by these successes, he anchored under the island which covered the mouth of the harbour: from thence he kept the town in continual alarm, landed, in the night, parties of archers and slingers, with which he dispersed or carried off the patrols which the enemy employed on the shore; and thus, master of the port of Brundisium, expected fully to obstruct that outlet from Italy, and to awe the neighbouring coast. To this

purpose he wrote to Pompey, that the other divisions of the fleet might go into harbour; that his squadron alone, in the post he had taken, was sufficient to cut off from Cæsar all reinforcements and further supplies. But in this he presumed too much on the first effects of his own operations. Antony, who commanded the troops of Cæsar in the town of Brundisium, by placing numerous guards at every landing-place on the contiguous shore, effectually excluded the squadron of Libo from any supply of wood or water, of which his ships, for want of stowage, could not have, at any one time, a considerable stock; and he reduced them to such distress, for want of these articles, that they were obliged to abandon their station, and to leave the harbour again open to the sea.

In the mean time, pressing orders arrived from Cæsar to hasten the embarkation of the troops. Dio Cassius and Appian relate, that he himself being impatient of delay, embarked alone in disguise on board of a barge, with intention to pass to Brundisium; that, after he had been some time at sea, the weather became so bad, as to determine the master of the vessel to put back; but that being prevailed upon by the entreaties of Cæsar, he continued to struggle with the storm for many hours. They farther relate, that the mariners being likely to faint, the passenger at last discovered himself, and encouraged them to persist, by telling them that they carried Cæsar and his fortunes; that nevertheless, he was

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forced to give way, and afterwards intrusted his orders to a messenger; but that he returned to the camp before it was known that he had been absent. He himself says, that some months being past, and the winter far advanced, he suspected that some opportunities of effecting the passage of his second division had been lost; that he was become highly impatient, and wrote to hasten the embarkation; informing his officers, that they might run ashore any where between Oricum and Apollonia; as the enemy's fleet, having no harbour in those parts, were frequently obliged, by stress of weather, to depart from the coast.

Upon these orders, the troops with great ardor began to embark. They consisted of four legions and eight hundred horse, under the command of Marc Antony and Calenus. The wind being at south, and no enemy appearing in the channel, they set sail, and steered for the coast of Epirus, but were drove to the northward; and on the second day passed Apollonia, and were discovered by the enemy from Dyrrachium. As they were far to the leeward of that part of the coast on which Cæsar had instructed them to land; and as it was vain for them, with this wind to attempt getting to the south, they chose to give way at once, and steer for some convenient harbour northward of all Pompey's stations. But in following this course, as they passed by Dyrrachium they were instantly chased by Quintus Coponius, who commanded Pompey's squadron at that place,

chiefly consisting of Rhodian gallies. The wind at first was moderate, and Coponius expected easily to weather the headlands that were to leeward of his post; and, though it rose considerably after he set sail, he still continued to struggle against it. As soon as Antony observed this enemy, he crowded sail, and made for the nearest harbour; being in the bay of Nymphæus, about three miles beyond Lissus²⁵, on the coast of Dalmatia. This bay opened to the south, and was very accessible, though not secure with the present wind. He chose, however, to risk the loss of some ships, rather than fall into the enemy's hands; and made directly for this place. Soon after he entered the harbour the wind shifted to the south-west, from which his ships were sufficiently covered, and he debarked without any loss. At the same time the wind, in consequence of this change, blowing more directly on the land, and more violently, bore hard on Coponius, forced him upon the shore, where the greater part of his gallies, being sixteen in number, were stranded and wrecked.

Such of Antony's transports as got safe into the bay of Nymphæus landed three veteran legions, with one of the new levies, and eight hundred horse. Two of his transports, one with two hundred and thirty of the new raised troops; the other with somewhat less than two hundred veterans, being heavy sailors, fell astern; and it

²⁵ Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii. c. 26.

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being night before they arrived, mistook their way, and, instead of the bay of Nympheus, came to an anchor before Lissus. Ottacilius Crassus, who was stationed with a body of horse in that place to observe the coast, manned some small boats, surrounded these transports, and offered the troops who were on board favorable terms if they would agree to surrender. Upon this summons the new levies accordingly struck; but the veterans ran their vessels ashore, and having landed, fought their way, with the loss of a few men, to Nympheus, where they joined the main body of their army that was landed with Antony.

The colony at Lissus had been settled by Cæsar, as a part of the province of Illyricum, and now appeared to favor his cause; Ottacilius, therefore thought proper to withdraw with his garrison; and Antony having stationed some of the transports at this place to enable Cæsar to embark his army for Italy, if, as was reported, Pompey should attempt to remove the scene of the war into that country; and having sent the remainder back for the troops which were still left at Brundisium, he dispatched messengers to Cæsar with the particulars of his voyage, and an account of the place at which he had landed.

The fleet, with this division of the army under Antony, had been seen on the coast, from the stations both of Pompey and of Cæsar, steering to the northward; but it was not known for

some days what was become of them. Upon the arrival of the intelligence, that they had effected a landing to the northward, both parties determined to move to that quarter. Pompey decamped in the night, and knowing the route which Antony was likely to take, placed himself in his way, giving orders that the army, without lighting fires or sounding their trumpets, should remain in profound silence. Antony, however, having intelligence of this disposition of the enemy, did not advance. Cæsar, in the mean time, to favor his junction, was obliged to make a considerable circuit, ascended on the banks of the river Apfus to a ford at which he passed; from thence continued his march to the northward, and seemed to advance on Pompey's right, while Antony remained in his front. In this situation, Pompey, apprehending that he might be attacked on different sides at once by Cæsar and by Antony, thought proper to quit his station; and leaving their armies to join, fell back to Asparagium, a strong post about a day's march from Dyr-rachium.

Cæsar having obtained this great reinforcement, was no longer so anxious as he had hitherto been for the preservation of his possessions upon the coast. His enemies, by the superiority of their fleets, could prevent his receiving any regular supply of provisions from the sea. It was necessary for him, therefore, in order that he might have some other resource, and be in condition to act on the offensive, to extend his

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quarters by land, and to cover some tract of country from which he could subsist his army. For this purpose he removed from Oricum the legion that was stationed at that place; taking such precautions as were necessary to secure his shipping in the port from any surprise by sea. He drew the greater part of the vessels on shore, sunk one in the mouth of the harbour, and placed another at anchor near it, mounted with a considerable tower, and manned with a proper force. Being thus secured on the coast, he sent numerous detachments in different directions: L. Cassius Longinus, with a legion of new levies, into Thessaly; C. Calvinus Sabinus, with five cohorts and a party of horse, into Ætolia; Cn Domitius Calvinus, with two legions, the eleventh and twelfth, into Macedonia; giving strict charge to each of these officers, that they should collect all the forage and provisions which those or the neighbouring countries could furnish.

As Pompey had relied much on the authority of government, with which he was vested at the beginning of the war, and which he believed gave his party a dispensation from the exercise of those popular arts, with which Cæsar thought proper to recommend his cause, he threatened to punish the refractory, more than he encouraged or rewarded the dutiful; and he often therefore extorted services from the provinces, neglecting the necessary attention to conciliate their affections; and such were the effects of this conduct, that the detachments which now appeared on the

part of Cæsar were every where favorably received. Sabinus made himself master of Ætolia. Longinus found the people of Theffaly divided, and was joined by one of the parties. Calvinus, upon his arrival in Macedonia, had deputations from many towns and districts of the province, with assurances of favor and submission; and by these means the possessions of Cæsar, even in those countries on which his antagonists had chiefly depended, began to be equal to theirs.

It was thought an unpardonable error in Pompey, thus to suffer his quarters to be over-run by an enemy who had but recently acquired a footing on the coast, and whose army was, in number of cavalry and light infantry, as well as of regular foot, greatly inferior to his own. Pompey, however, knowing the interest which Cæsar had in bringing the contest to a speedy decision, did not choose to divide his forces, and he relied for the security of the southern and inland provinces, on the legions which were soon expected to land from Asia on the eastern shores of Macedonia or Theffaly.

Scipio, being the father-in-law of Pompey, had been employed in assembling the forces of Asia, and had, by severe exactions, availed himself of the resources of that opulent province. He was still occupied in this service at Ephesus, when he received from Pompey an account of Cæsar's arrival in Epirus, and an order without delay to transport his army into Europe. He accordingly, soon after the arrival of Cæsar's

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detachments at their several places of destination, debarked in the bay of Thermé, or of Theſſalonica, and penetrated into Macedonia, directing his march towards the quarters of the two legions which Cæſar had ſent thither under the command of Domitius Calvinus, and gave a general alarm on his route; but being arrived within about twenty miles of Domitius, he turned on a ſudden into Theſſaly, as thinking Longinus, who was ſtationed in that country with one legion of raw troops, might be made an eaſier prey.

To lighten his march, he left his baggage under a guard of eight cohorts, commanded by Favonius on the Haliacmon, a river which ſeparates Macedonia from Theſſaly, and proceeded with great diſpatch towards the quarters of Longinus. This officer, greatly alarmed at his ſudden approach, and miſtaking, at the ſame time, for an enemy a body of Thracian horſe which were coming to his own aſſiſtance, haſtily withdrew by the mountains, and continued his retreat to Ambracia. Scipio was about to purſue Longinus on the route he had taken, when he was recalled by earneſt representations from Favonius, the officer he had left to guard his baggage; informing him, that his poſt was in the utmoſt danger of being forced by Calvinus, who was on his march through Macedonia for that purpoſe. Scipio accordingly returned with all poſſible diſpatch to the Haliacmon, and arrived at the poſt of Favonius, after the duſt which aroſe from the march of the enemy had appeared on the plain; and thus came

barely in time to sustain his party, and to rescue his baggage. C H A P.
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The armies continued to occupy the opposite banks of the Haliacmon; and as Scipio, by the flight of Longinus, was become master of all Thessaly, Calvinus continued in possession of Macedonia, and from thence secured a considerable source of supply to Cæsar's army.

It would have been of great moment to Pompey's affairs, and not inconsistent with the dilatory plan he had formed for the conduct of the war, to have risked an action between these separate bodies on the Haliacmon, rather than to have suffered his enemy to retain the command of so many posts of consequence; and Scipio accordingly passed the river with a view to bring on an engagement; but after some stay on the plain, finding no opportunity to attack the enemy with any hopes of success, he passed the river, and having occupied his former station, there passed some partial encounters between such as were advanced on the different sides, but without any considerable event.

While so many large bodies, detached from the principal armies, were thus contending in Thessaly for the possession of the country, Pompey remained to cover the ground, which was of greater importance to him, in the neighbourhood of the sea, and the port of Dyrrachium. Having, at the distance of about a day's march in his rear, this town and harbour as a place of arms, at which he had deposited his magazines and stores, and

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from which he received his ordinary supply of provisions, he had taken his measures to protract the war; and trusting to his own superior resources, both by sea and by land, did not doubt that by waiting until the countries which Cæsar had occupied should be exhausted, he might force him to retire from the contest without the risk of a battle. To hasten this event, he endeavoured every where to straiten his quarters in the country and to block up or destroy all the harbours he had on the coast.

Cneus, the eldest of Pompey's sons, commanding the Egyptian fleet, in execution of this plan which had been laid to harass the enemy, without exposing their cause to a general hazard, attacked Cæsar's principal naval station at Oricum, raised the vessel that had been sunk at the mouth of the harbour, forced the armed galley that was stationed before it, and carried off or destroyed all the ships that were laid up in the port. From thence he proceeded to Lissus, burnt thirty transports which Antony had left in the harbour; but having made an attempt on the town, was repulsed with loss.

Cæsar, on the opposite part, sensible of the interest which he had in bringing the war to a speedy decision, advanced upon Pompey, forced a place of some strength that covered his front, and encamped in his presence. The day after he arrived in this position, either to bring on a general action, or to gain the reputation of braving his antagonist, he formed his army on the plain
between

between the two camps; but as Pompey continued firm or unmoved by this insult, and as the recent losses which Cæsar had sustained in his shipping, and on the coast, rendered his prospect of future supplies or reinforcements every day less secure, he projected a movement, by which he proposed either to force an engagement, or to preclude the enemy from all his resources in the town and harbour of Dyrrachium.

For this purpose, and that Pompey might the less suspect any important design, he decamped in the day, and having a large circuit to make, directed his march at first from Dyrrachium, and was thought to retire for want of provisions; but in the night he changed his direction, and with great diligence advanced to the town. Pompey having intelligence of the change which Cæsar had made in his route during the night, perceived his design; and having a nearer way to Dyrrachium, still expected by a rapid march to arrive before him. But Cæsar having prevailed on his men, notwithstanding the great fatigues of the preceding day, to continue their march with little interruption all night, was in possession of the only avenue to the town, when the van of Pompey's army appeared on the hills.

Pompey thus shut out from Dyrrachium, where he had placed his magazines and stores, and from the only harbour he had on the coast, was obliged to take possession of the Petra, a small promontory which covered a little creek or bay not far from the town, and there endeavour to supply the

BOOK IV. loss of the harbour, by bringing ships of burden to unload, and by procuring supplies in boats from his magazines and stores in the town; and in this manner was still in condition to avoid any immediate risk of his fortunes in a single action.

Cæsar, on the other hand, being disappointed in the design he had formed to exclude the enemy from their magazines in the town of Dyrrachium, and seeing no likelihood of being able to bring the war to a speedy decision, his own communication with Italy being entirely cut off, and the fleets he had ordered from thence, from Sicily, and from Gaul, having met with unexpected delays, sent an officer, named L. Canuleius, into Epirus, with a commission to draw into magazines all the corn that could be found in that or the neighbouring districts, and to secure them at proper places for the use of his army. This, however, in a country that was mountainous and barren, itself commonly supplied with corn from abroad, and lately on purpose laid waste by the enemy, was not likely to furnish him with any considerable supply, or to enable him for any time to support a dilatory war. His genius was therefore at work by some speedier course to harass his enemy, and to hasten the end of the contest.

In these circumstances, however, he did not neglect his usual artifices to amuse and distract his antagonists with great professions of moderation, and with overtures of peace. On hearing of Scipio's arrival in Europe, affecting to have

despaired of obtaining peace by any farther direct applications to Pompey himself, and willing to appeal to the reason of the father-in-law against the obstinacy of the son, he sent Clodius, their common friend, with letters and instructions, to inform Scipio of the great pains he had taken to obtain an equitable accommodation, “all which, “he presumed, had hitherto failed, through “the unhappy timidity of those he intrusted “with his messages, and from their not having “courage to deliver them properly to their general. But subjoined that, through the mediation “of Scipio, who could deliver himself with so “much freedom; who could advise with so much “authority; and who, being at the head of a “great army attached to his person, could even “enforce what was just, he might expect a different issue to propositions so fair and so reasonable. “And that in this event Scipio would have the “honor of being the restorer of tranquillity and “good order to Italy, of peace to the provinces, and of prosperity to the whole empire.” Clodius was received with respect but on delivering his message, it appears that all farther communication was refused him as a person who came to insult or amuse with false pretensions. Cæsar, indeed, was himself, as usual, so far from trusting to the effect of these propositions, or so far from remitting his own operations in order to confirm his pacific professions, that he even redoubled his efforts in that very quarter which was intrusted to Scipio; and as he had already

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possessed himself of Epirus, Acarnania, and Ætolia, he carried his views still farther on that side, and sent Fufius Calenus to be joined by Longinus and Sabinus, and to endeavour, by the isthmus of Corinth, to penetrate into Achaia.

He himself at the same time engaged in a project, which to those who do not recollect the amazing works which were frequently executed by Roman armies, particularly by that of Cæsar himself, will appear so vast, and even romantic, as to exceed belief: this project was no less than to invest Pompey in his camp, though at the head of an army superior to his own, and oblige him to recede from the coast, or submit to be invested with lines, and completely shut out from the country. For this purpose he occupied several hills in the neighbourhood of Pompey's camp, strengthened them with forts, joined those forts by lines of communication across the vallies, and soon appeared to have projected a complete chain of redoubts, and a line of circumvallation.

Pompey, to counteract this daring project, took possession of some heights in his turn, fortified and joined them in the same manner, and while the one endeavoured to contract, the other endeavoured to enlarge, the compass of their works. The archers and slingers on both sides, as in the operations of a siege, were employed to annoy the workmen. The armies lay under arms, and fought in detail for the possession of advantageous grounds. When forced from

one height which they attempted to occupy, they seized upon another that was contiguous, and still continued their line, though obliged to change its direction.

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In these operations, a campaign, that began in January with the landing of Cæsar on the coast of Epirus, already drew on to the middle of summer, and both parties had undergone great labor, and were exposed to peculiar distress. Cæsar's army, already inured at the blockade of Alesia, and the sieges of Marseilles and of Avaricum, to toils like those in which they were now engaged, flattered themselves with a like glorious issue to their present labors. They were in want of bread, and obliged to substitute in its place a kind of root boiled up with milk; but were comforted under this hardship with the prospect of fields which were replenished with ripening corn, and which gave the hopes of a plentiful harvest. They not only continued their counter-vallations with incredible toil, but turned or interrupted all the rivulets or springs that formerly watered the grounds on which the enemy were now encamped.

Pompey's army, on their part, were less inured to such toilsome operations. They had plenty of bread, which came to them with every wind, from the different coasts that were still in their possession, but were in great distress for want of water and forage: many of their horses had died; the men, too long confined to the same ground, and to the same air, which was infected with filth,

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and the exhalation of putrid carcases, being reduced to the use of bad water, were become extremely sickly.

Pompey, nevertheless, held his enemy at some disadvantage by the superiority of his numbers, and by the extent of line which he obliged him to form and defend; and it appears that he availed himself of these advantages with all those abilities of a great officer, which he was justly supposed to possess. He not only forced Cæsar, without hazarding a general action, to recede from many of the heights which he attempted to occupy, and obliged him, with great labor, to widen the compass of his lines; but likewise alarmed him by various attacks on the works which he had already completed, and in some places forced open the bars which the enemy had placed in his way, and recovered his own communication anew with the country before him. But as Cæsar could present his whole army in many places to cover the works he was executing, it was impossible, without risking a general action, which Pompey avoided, entirely to stop his progress.

In the course of these operations it appears, from the text of Cæsar's Commentaries, though incomplete, that the armies changed the ground of their principal encampments as well as the disposition of some separate posts, and mutually harassed each other with frequent surprises and alarms. And Cæsar mentions no less than six capital actions which happened in one day at

the lines of circumvallation, or under the walls of Dyrrachium; and in most of them it is probable that Pompey had the advantage, as he acted on the string, or smaller circumference, while his antagonists moved on the bow, or the wider circle.

Pompey completed his own line of circumvallation to a circuit of fifteen miles, having a chain of four-and-twenty redoubts on the different hills over which it was carried. By this work he obliged Cæsar to recede half a mile beyond him, and to extend his compass to about seventeen miles in circumference.

The extremities of both their works terminated on the shore; and Cæsar having no boats or ships to oppose to the numerous craft of his enemy, ought, perhaps, by the consideration of this very circumstance, to have been diverted at first from his project. But as he fought merely for occasions of action, he was contented with the hopes of finding them even under such disadvantages. While he was obliged to remain with the strength of his army at that end of his line which was nearest the town of Dyrrachium, in order to prevent the access of Pompey to his magazines, he proposed to fortify the other extremity of it with double works, and had already thrown up, at the distance of two hundred yards from each other, two intrenchments, consisting of a parapet ten feet high, and of a ditch fifteen feet wide; one facing the lines of Pompey, the other turned to the field, in order to guard

B O O K against any surprise from parties which, coming
 IV. by water, might land in his rear. He was likewise about to join these intrenchments by a traverse or flank, to cover him from the sea.

Before this work was completed, Pompey made a disposition to force him at this extremity of his lines, and of consequence to open a way to his rear over the whole extent of his works. For this purpose he brought in the night six entire legions, or sixty cohorts, to that part of his own works which faced this place. He embarked a numerous body of archers, slingers, and other light troops, having their helmets and shields fortified, as it seems was the custom, with basket-work, to break the force of the stones which were likely to shower from the enemy's parapets, and furnished with great quantities of fascines and other materials proper to fill up the ditch. This embarkation was effected in the night; and the officer who commanded it had orders to land part of the troops in the rear of both Cæsar's intrenchments, and another part between them where the work was still incomplete. These separate divisions were to be supported by the whole force of the legions in front, who were to take advantage of any effect which the missiles from their boats might produce on the flank or the rear of the enemy.

These attacks were accordingly made at day-break, in three different places at once, and had all the consequences of a complete surprise. They fell with the greatest effect upon the

station of the ninth legion, of which the picquets and other guards being instantly routed, the whole legion was put under arms to support them; but soon infected with the panic, was carried off in the flight. Antony, who occupied the nearest station on the heights, appearing in that instant with twelve cohorts, and a better countenance, stopped for a while the pursuit of the enemy, and furnished a retreat to the troops that were routed.

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The alarm was conveyed to Cæsar himself, by fires lighted on all the hills, and he hastened to the ground with as many cohorts as could be spared from the posts in his way; but he came too late, Pompey had already forced the entrenchments, had burst from his confinement, and was beginning to encamp in a new position, where, without losing his communication with the sea, he rendered abortive for a long time Cæsar's purpose of excluding him from the supplies of necessaries or conveniencies which were to be derived from the land, and was now in a posture to command a free access to water and forage, from the want of which he had been chiefly distressed in his late situation.

Thus Cæsar, far from reaping the fruits which he expected from the labor of so many months, began to incur the censure of a visionary projector, who presumed to practise on the ablest captain of the age the arts with which he had succeeded against ignorant Barbarians, or, at most, against generals of mean capacity.

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These circumstances, however, probably made no impression on Cæsar himself, nor greatly altered the confidence of his army: he presented himself again before the enemy in their new position, and pitched his camp in their presence, still determined to act on the offensive, even in the sequel of attempts in which he had failed. An action accordingly followed, of which the result is evident, although it is difficult, from the imperfect text of his Commentaries, to ascertain the detail. It appears that both armies had changed the ground which they had taken immediately after the last action; that in this remove Pompey had taken possession of the camp which Cæsar had left; and as his army, being more numerous, occupied more ground than that of Cæsar had done, he made a second intrenchment, quite round that which had been formerly occupied by Cæsar. This camp was covered by a wood on one side, and by a river, at the distance of four hundred paces, on the other.

While Pompey lay in this position, he had thrown up a line of communication from the flank of his camp to the river, in order to cover his access to water. But after he had taken this precaution, he thought proper to change his ground, and had moved about the distance of half a mile on his march to occupy a new situation, when, for some purpose that is not explained, he thought proper to send back a legion, or large detachment of his army, to resume the possession of the camp he had so recently left.

Cæsar, on his part, being occupied in fortifying a camp in the last situation he had taken, and observing this detachment sent off from the enemy, thought it gave him a favorable opportunity, by cutting it off, to recover part of the credit he had lost in the late action. While, to amuse the enemy, he ordered his men to continue the work in which they were engaged, he himself marched with twenty-three cohorts, in two divisions, under cover of the wood, came to the ground unobserved, and with the division which was led by himself, mixed with the enemy who had already taken possession of the exterior lines, and drove them from thence to the interior intrenchment, with great slaughter. The other division being in the mean time to attack the same works at a different place, mistook the line of communication which covered the access from the camp to the river for the intrenchment of the camp itself, and before they perceived their mistake, had run along this line to a great distance in search of an entrance; when observing, at last, that the line along which they ran was not defended, the infantry went over it first, and were followed by all the cavalry: but the time which they had lost by their former mistake gave Pompey an opportunity to come to the relief of his detachment. As soon as he appeared, Cæsar's cavalry, finding themselves entangled between the line of communication, the intrenchment of the camp, and the river, began to retire with great

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precipitation, and were followed by the foot, who fell into great confusion. That part of Pompey's detachment, which, in the beginning of the action, had been defeated by Cæsar, seeing themselves likely to be supported, rallied in the rear-gate of the camp; and the party which Cæsar himself commanded against them, observing the precipitant retreat of the other division, saw dangers and difficulties accumulating on every side. Imagining that they were about to be surrounded, or shut up within the enemy's works, they betook themselves to flight, crowded back to the ditch, and, in attempting to repass it, were killed in such heaps, or were trodden under foot in such numbers, that the slain filled up the ditch, and made a passage for those that followed.

In this state of general confusion and terror, the presence and authority of Cæsar, which, on other occasions, used to be of so great effect, were entirely disregarded. The bearer of a standard, upon Cæsar's catching it, and endeavouring to stop him, quitted his hold, and continued to run without it; a rider, whose horse he had seized by the bridle, dismounted, and ran off on foot. The rout was complete; but the ditches and works, amongst which the action began, as they embarrassed the flight of the one party, so they retarded the pursuit of the other; and Pompey, who did not expect such a victory, remained in suspense. He mistook the flight of Cæsar's army for a feint, to draw him into some ambuscade. In this he was governed, probably, by

the high estimation for discipline and valor to which Cæsar's army was so justly entitled; but which no troops can uniformly support at all times: and if it be true, as is probable, that the flight of an army in actual rout may be always distinguished from a concerted retreat, he on this day committed an unpardonable error; and Cæsar, who may be inclined to exaggerate the oversights, though not the advantages, of his enemy, owns that he himself lost about a thousand men, with above thirty standards or colors, and owed the preservation of his army to the excessive caution or incapacity of Pompey. He himself acted indeed like a person defeated, instantly abandoned all his famous lines of Dyrrachium, and all his outposts; and to make head against the victor, brought all the scattered parts of his army together.

Pompey, in the mean time, lost the decisive moment, or was not sensible of his advantage till after the time for improving it was past. But this victory, although it had not been perceived in the precise moment in which a signal advantage could have been made of it, was presently afterwards greatly exaggerated. Pompey had from his own army the usual salutations of triumph, or received the title of Imperator, which he continued to assume, and sent his accounts of the action, by expresses, to every part of the empire; but had the moderation to abstain from the practice that was usual in the case of victories obtained over foreign enemies, that

BOOK of binding his fasces and his dispatches with
IV. laurel.

Cæsar, by carrying the war into Macedonia, had put himself in a very arduous situation. He had passed over a sea on which the enemy were masters, and had invaded a country of which they were in possession, with forces greatly superior to his own: but this daring adventure, which, even in its first successes, excited astonishment, now exposed him to censure, and his attempt to invest so great an officer as Pompey, at the head of an army superior to his own, appeared altogether wild and extravagant. The merit of all his former campaigns, as is common, began to be questioned by those who, after the event, can instruct and correct every general; and the glory he had gained in the former part of the war was entirely obscured. He was even said to have gained the Spanish army by corruption, and to have purchased with money the surrender which he pretended to have forced by his address and his sword. People returned to their first apprehensions, that Pompey was the greatest general which any age or nation had ever produced; that he had effectually put an end to the present contest, and had left nothing for his party to do but to reap the advantages of the victory he had obtained for them.

Some time before this event, and while the minds of men were yet in suspense, Cato, in one of the councils which had been summoned by Pompey, observed that Cæsar had acquired much

popular favor by his ostentation of mercy, and by the hopes of protection which he held out to every man who did not actually take arms against him; while Pompey and his followers, by publishing threats against all who did not actually espouse their cause, had rendered the army of the republic an object of terror; he therefore moved, that a proclamation should be issued, containing assurances, that every town not actually in arms should be protected, and that no blood should be shed but in the field of battle. A resolution to this purpose had been accordingly published¹⁶; but in the present exultation of victory was forgotten. The times were said to require exemplary justice, and to justify executions and forfeitures, not only of those who were actually in arms against their country, but of those likewise who had betrayed its cause by a mean and profligate neutrality. The favorites of Pompey already, in imagination, fated their revenge, gratified their avarice, at the expense of the opposite party and of its abettors¹⁷. Every one considered the use which he himself was to make of the victory, not how it might be secured or rendered complete.

The shock which Cæsar had received in so critical a time and situation, was, not without reason, supposed to be decisive; he had abandoned his lines, and called in all his out-posts. His

¹⁶ Plutarch, in Vita Pompeii, p. 494.

¹⁷ Cæsar, de Bell. Civ. lib. iii. c. 88.

B O O K IV. army appeared to sink under the weight of their misfortunes. Inferior to the enemy in numbers, greatly reduced by their losses, and fallen in their own estimation, they were not soon likely to recover courage enough to contend for the field again with so renowned and so superior an adversary.

Cæsar, however, was not overwhelmed by these appearances; he knew what was the force of an army which had been taught, by the experience of many years, to repose the utmost confidence in themselves and in their general, and which was not likely to sink, without hopes of recovery, under any single event. He considered their apparent dejection as a symptom of indignation, and of rage more than of fear or debasement; and, instead of blame or reproach, soothed them with consolation, and with the apologies which he industriously framed for their late miscarriage. He bid them recollect their former actions, and not be dismayed by a single accident which befel them in the midst of a career sustained with a spirit so much superior to that of every enemy they encountered: "If fortune has crossed us for once," he said, "we must retrieve our losses by diligence and resolution. Difficulties only excite the brave, and awaken their ardor; you have formerly experienced difficulties, and every soldier who was at Gergovia will remember the effects of perseverance and courage."

He was sensible, however, that some particular officers

officers had set a shameful example ; and he supposed, that by singling out these for punishment, he might seem to exculpate the soldiers, and reinstate them in their own esteem. For this reason he dismissed, with infamy, some bearers of standards, who, he alledged, had misled the troops, whose object it is never to part from their colors. By these means the sullen dejection of the legions was changed into rage, and an ardent impatience to retrieve their honor¹⁸. They did not presume to importune their general to be intrusted so soon again with his fortunes; but they imposed voluntary tasks, by way of penance, on themselves, saying, That they had deserved to be loaded with hardships. Many of the superior officers gave it as their opinion to Cæsar, that whatever resolution he might have taken for the future plan of the war, so favorable a disposition in the army, and so fair an opportunity of yet ending the contest with honor on the very ground on which they had incurred their late disgrace, should not be neglected, nor suffered to escape. Cæsar, however, did not choose to stake his fortunes on the chance of a feverish ardor which still had some mixture of consternation, nor to rely on a fury which had more of despair than of rational confidence, against the impetuosity of a superior army recently flushed with victory. Nor was he safe to remain in his present situation, without any posts in his rear to secure his

¹⁸ Cæf. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

BOOK communication with the country, and without
IV. any immediate prospect of supply for the subsistence of his army.

For these reasons, Cæsar determined, without loss of time, to decamp and to remove to some distance from the enemy¹⁹. In the first night after this resolution was taken, and as soon as it was dark, the sick and wounded, with all the baggage, under the escort of a legion, were sent off, with orders that they should not halt till they reached Apollonia, being a march of about thirty miles. At three in the morning the main body of the army, observing a profound silence, turned out of the camp by different gates, and took the same route. Two legions yet remained for the rear-guard. These, after a proper interval, being ready to depart, founded the usual march to make the enemy believe the van of the army was then only beginning to move, and the whole being thus already on their way, and without any incumbrance, they soon gained a considerable distance from the enemy, who was likely to pursue them.

Pompey, as soon as he was apprized of this retreat, drew forth his army, and followed with great expedition. After marching a few miles he overtook, with his cavalry, the rear of Cæsar's army at the passage of the river Genusus; but being received by the enemy's horse, interlined with infantry, could make no impression, and saw

¹⁹ Cæf. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

them effect the passage of the river without any considerable loss. CHAP. VI.

Cæsar, having completed an ordinary march, took possession of the lines which he had formerly occupied at Asparagium; but not intending to remain on this ground, gave orders to the legions to rest on their arms. He sent forth his cavalry by the front-gate in sight of the enemy, as if with intention to forage; but with orders to turn round the camp and enter it again by the rear. Pompey supposing, from these appearances, that Cæsar had concluded his march, and that the business of the day was over, followed his example, pitched in the same lines, which he likewise had formerly occupied at this place, and suffered his men to stray in search of forage and wood; many also who, in the hurry with which they decamped in the morning, had left their baggage behind them were now allowed to lay down their arms, and returned to Dyrrachium in search of it.

Cæsar, who waited only until the halt he had made should produce this effect in the camp of the enemy, again put his army in motion about noon, and without interruption, on the same day completed a second march of eight miles; while Pompey's army, having already laid aside their arms and encamped, were not in condition to follow. Cæsar continued his retreat during some of the subsequent days in the same order, having his baggage advanced some hours before him: and Pompey, having lost some ground by the delay

BOOK of the first day, and having harassed his army in
 IV. attempting to regain it, on the fourth day entirely discontinued the pursuit.

This respite gave both parties leisure to consider the plan of their future operations. Cæsar repaired to Apollonia to lodge his sick and wounded, to pay off the arrears of his army, and to make a proper disposition for the security of the places he held on the coast. And having already one cohort at Lissus, placing three at Oricum, and four at Apollonia, he continued his route from thence to the southward. He proposed without delay, to penetrate into Thessaly, and to occupy, for the subsistence of his army, as much as he could of that fertile country. He flattered himself, that if Pompey should follow him thither, to a distance from his magazines and his supplies by sea, the war might be continued between them upon equal terms. If he attempted to retake Oricum and the towns on the coast, he must expose Scipio and the body under his command, in the eastern parts of Macedonia, to be separately attacked; or, if he wished to preserve Scipio and his army, he would be obliged to quit his design upon Oricum in order to support them. If he should pass into Italy, it was proposed to follow him by the coasts of Dalmatia. And this last alternative of carrying the war into Italy, from the difficulties, the delays, and the discredit to which it might have exposed Cæsar's cause, appears to have been the preferable choice for Pompey. It

was accordingly debated in council, Whether, C H A P.
VI. being master of the sea, and having abundance of shipping, he should not transport his army, recover the possession of the seat of government, and strip his antagonist of that authority which he derived from this circumstance? or, whether he should not stay to finish the remains of the war in Macedonia? The advantages likely to result from his return to Rome in the capacity of victor, after he had left it with some degree of disgrace, were obvious. But the war appeared to be so near its conclusion, that it was reckoned improper to leave any part of it unfinished. It was argued, that, by quitting the present seat of the war, Cæsar would be left to recover his forces in a country yet full of resources, and would only exchange the western part of the empire for the east, from whence Sylla had been able, and from whence Pompey himself was now about to recover the city and the possession of Italy.

But, what weighed most of all in these deliberations, the safety of Scipio required the presence of Pompey in Macedonia. If he should remove his army from thence, this officer, with the forces recently arrived from Asia, would fall a sacrifice to the enemy.

Upon these motives both armies, having their several detachments in Thessaly, and separate bodies to support or to rescue from the dangers which threatened them; the generals determined to march into that country, and calculated their respective movements, so as to cut off the enemy's

BOOK parties, or to sustain their own. Cæsar, by his
IV. march to Apollonia, had been turned from his way; and having the discredit of a defeat, and being supposed on his flight, was harassed or ill received by the country as he passed. The messengers, whom he had dispatched to Domitius, were intercepted; and this officer, while both armies were advancing, having made some movements in Macedonia in search of provisions, and having, with the two legions he commanded, fallen into Pompey's route, narrowly escaped, and only by a few hours, being surprised and taken.

Cæsar, having arrived in time to rescue Domitius, and being joined by him as he passed the mountains into Thessaly, continued his march to Gomphi. The people of this place having refused to admit him he scaled the walls, gave the town to be pillaged; and intending, by this example, to deter others from retarding his march by fruitless resistance, he put all the inhabitants to the sword. When he arrived at Metropolis, the people, terrified by the fate of Gomphi, threw open their gates; and Cæsar, to contrast this with the former example, gave them protection. From hence to Larissa, where Scipio, having fallen back from the Aliacmon, then lay with a considerable army, the country was open, and Cæsar, or his parties, were every where received without opposition. Having passed all the lesser rivers which fall into the Penius, he took post on the Enipeus which runs through the district of Pharsalia. Here he commanded extensive plains, covered with

forage and with ripening corn; had a very fertile country to a great distance in his rear; and being joined not only by Domitius, but probably likewise by the legion which Longinus commanded in Ætolia, in all amounting to ten legions, he was in condition to renew his offensive operations.

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Pompey directed his motions likewise towards the same quarter; but although he had the more direct route, and was every where received as victor in the late action, was still on his march. Scipio advanced from Larissa to receive him; and being joined, they took post together on a height near Pharfalus, and in sight of Cæsar's station, at the distance of thirty stadia, or about three miles²⁰. The armies being some time fixed in this position, Cæsar drew forth, in the front of his intrenchment, to provoke his antagonist. It was evidently not Pompey's interest to give an enemy, whom he had brought into considerable straits, an opportunity of relief by the chance of a battle. But as this was a defiance, and had some effect on the minds of the soldiers, it was proper to return it; and both sides, during many days, continued to turn out in the front of their respective lines. Cæsar advanced, on each successive day, still nearer to Pompey's ground; but there were some difficulties in the way of his farther approach, in which he did not choose to engage himself in the presence of an enemy, nor did

²⁰ Appian, de Bello Civ. lib. ii.

B O O K Pompey choose to quit the eminence on which he
IV. had hitherto formed his line of battle.

The summer being far spent, and all the forage and corn of the neighbouring plains being consumed, Cæsar began again to suffer for want of provisions, and having no hopes of bringing the enemy to a battle on this ground, he determined to change it, for some situation in which he could more easily subsist his own army, or by moving about, harass the enemy with continual marches, and oblige them perhaps to give him an opportunity to fight them on equal terms. Having resolved on this plan, and having appointed a day on which the army should move, the tents being already struck, and the signal to march given, while the van was passing through the rear-gate of the camp, it was observed, that Pompey's army, being formed according to their daily practice, had advanced farther than usual before their lines. Cæsar immediately gave orders to halt, saying to those who were near him, "The time we have so earnestly wished for is come; let us see how we are to acquit ourselves." He immediately ordered, as a signal of battle, a purple ensign to be hoisted on a lance in the centre of the camp²¹. Appian says, That he likewise ordered the pales to be drawn, and the breast-work to be levelled in the front towards the enemy, that his army might not hope for a retreat, not even behind their intrenchments²².

²¹ Plutarch. in Vita Pompeji.

²² Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. ii.

It was evidently Pompey's interest to avoid a battle, and to wait for the effect of the distresses to which Cæsar's army must have been exposed on the approach of winter. But this is the most difficult part in war, requiring great ability in the general, together with tried courage and discipline in the troops. A general may be qualified to fight a battle, but not dextrously to avoid an enemy who presses him; an army may have that species of courage which impells them in action, but not that degree of constancy which is required to support them long unemployed in the presence of an enemy. In whatever degree Pompey himself was qualified for the part which the service required of him, he was attended by numbers of Senators and persons of high rank, who, thinking themselves in a civil or political capacity, equal with their general, bore the continuance of their military subordination with pain. They said, he was like Agamemnon among the kings, and protracted a war that might have been ended in a day, merely to enjoy his command. Nursed in luxury, and averse to business, petulant in safety, useless in danger, impatient to be at their villas in the country, and their amusements in the town; and anticipating the honors and successions to office which they imagined due to their high merits in the present service, they railed at the conduct of their general, affected courage by urging him to fight, whilst in reality they only wished to terminate the suspense and anxiety of a campaign, which they had not the resolution to endure. Many

BOOK IV. of the allies, then also present in the army, who were princes of high state in their own dominions, were impatient of longer delay; and the troops of every description, in imitation of so many respectable examples, were loud in their censures of so much caution in their general.

Pompey, urged by the clamors of his army, thought himself under a necessity to come to a speedy decision, and had prepared for battle on the morning of that very day on which Cæsar was about to decamp. Although he was sensible, that, in this conjuncture, it was not his interest to hazard a battle, it is probable, that he did not think the risk was great. He too, as well as others of his party, became elated and confident upon his late success²³. His numbers greatly surpassed those of Cæsar, especially in horse, archers, and slingers; and he trusted, that, by this part of his army, he should prevail on the wings, and carry his attack to the flank, and even to the rear of the enemy. Having the Enipeus, a small river with steep banks, on his right, which sufficiently covered that flank²⁴, he drew all the cavalry, amounting to seven thousand, with the archers and slingers to his left, expecting that the event of the battle would be determined on this wing. He himself, therefore, took post to second the operations of the cavalry, at the head of the two famous legions which he had called off from

²³ Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. vii. ep. iii.

²⁴ Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. iii.

Cæsar at the beginning of the war. Scipio was posted in the centre, with the legions from Syria, having the great body of the infantry divided on his right and his left. The right of the whole was covered by a Cilician legion, and the remains of the Spanish army which had joined Pompey under Afranius. The whole amounted to one hundred cohorts, or about forty-five thousand foot, drawn up in a line of ten men deep ²⁵.

Cæsar, observing this disposition, formed his army in three divisions; the left was commanded by Antony, the right by Sylla, and the centre by Cn. Domitius. The tenth legion was posted on the right, and the ninth on the left of the whole. He had eighty cohorts in the field; but these so incomplete, as not to exceed above twenty two thousand men. He saw the disparity of his horse and irregulars on the right, having no more than a thousand horse to oppose to seven thousand of the enemy. In order to reinforce and sustain them he draughted a cohort from each of the legions in the right to form a reserve, which he placed in the rear of his cavalry with orders to sustain them, or to repel the enemy's horse, when they should attempt, as he expected, to turn his flank. This body formed a fourth division of his army, not placed in the same line with the other divisions; but facing obliquely to the right, in order to receive the cavalry that was expected to turn the flank, and to fall obliquely on the rear. He

²⁵ Frontinus de Stratagemat.

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himself passed along the front of the right wing, and earnestly entreated them not to engage till they got the signal from himself. He reminded them of his continual attention to the welfare of the army, desiring them to recollect with what sollicitude he had endeavoured to bring on a treaty, in order to save both armies to the republic; and how far he had always been from any disposition wantonly to shed the soldiers blood. He was answered with shouts that expressed an impatience to begin the action. Pompey had directed the cavalry and archers assembled on his left to begin the attack; and instructed them, as soon as they had driven Cæsar's horse from the plain, to fall upon the flank and the rear of his infantry.

The dispositions being completed, a solemn pause and an interval of silence ensued. The same arms, and the same appearances presented themselves on the opposite sides. When the trumpets gave the signal to advance, the sounds were the same; many are said to have shed tears²⁶. Being so near, that they had only space enough in which to acquire that rapid motion with which they commonly shocked, Cæsar's army began to rush forward, while Pompey's, agreeable to the orders he had given them, remained in their places, expecting that the enemy, if they were made to run a double space in coming to the shock, would be disordered, or out of breath. But the veterans, in Cæsar's line, suspecting the

²⁶ Dio Cassius, lib. xli. c. 58.

intention of this unusual method of receiving an enemy, made a full stop; and, having drawn breath, came forward again with the usual rapidity. They were received with perfect order, but not with that resistance and equal force which motion alone could give. The action became general near about the same time over the whole front. Pompey's horse, as was expected, in the first charge, put Cæsar's cavalry to rout, and, together with the archers and slingers, were hastening to turn the flank of the enemy. But as soon as they opened their view to the rear, being surprised at the sight of a body of infantry which was drawn up to oppose them, and being, probably, from their confidence of victory, negligent of order; in their attempts to recover it they were thrown into the utmost confusion, and although there was not any enemy in condition to pursue them, fled to the heights. The archers and slingers, being thus deserted by the horse, were put to the sword. And Pompey's left, on which he expected the enemy could not resist him, being flanked by the cohorts who had defeated his cavalry, began to give way. Cæsar, in order to increase the impression he had made, brought forward fresh troops to the front of his own line; and while his reserve turned upon the flank, made a general charge, which the enemy no longer endeavoured to withstand.

Pompey, on seeing the flight of his cavalry, an event he so little expected, either thought himself betrayed, or despairing of the day, put spurs

BOOK IV. to his horse, and returned into camp. As he entered the Prætorian gate, he called to the guards to stand to their arms, and to provide for the worst. "I go the rounds," he said, "and visit the posts." It is likely that surprise and mortification had unsettled his mind. He retired to his tent in the greatest dejection, and yet he awaited the issue²⁷. His army, in the mean time, being routed, fled in confusion through the lanes of their own encampment. It was noon and the victors, as well as the vanquished, were greatly fatigued; but Cæsar seldom left any refuge to a flying enemy, not even behind their intrenchments. He ordered Pompey's lines to be stormed, met with some little resistance from the guards that were placed on the parapet, but soon prevailed. The rout and the carnage continued through the streets and the alleys of the camp, to the rear-gate and passages through which the vanquished crowded to recover the fields, and from which, without any attempt to rally, they continued their flight to the neighbouring hills.

When Pompey's army drew forth to battle, their tents were left standing, as in full confidence of victory; and the plate, furniture, and equipage of the officers were still displayed, as if intended for show. Notwithstanding this circumstance, Cæsar had authority enough to restrain

²⁷ Cæs. de Bello Civili, lib. iii. c. 94.

his troops ²⁸ from plunder, and continued the pursuit. Seeing crowds of the vanquished had occupied a hill in the rear of their camp, he made haste to surround them, and to cut off their farther retreat. But they themselves having observed, that the place was destitute of water, abandoned it before they could be surrounded, and took the road to Larissa. Cæsar having ordered part of the army to keep possession of the enemy's camp, another part to return to their own, he himself, with four legions, endeavoured to intercept the fugitives in their way to Larissa. He had the advantage of the ground; so that after a hasty march of six miles, he got before them; and, having thrown himself in their way, obliged them to halt. They took possession of a height over a stream of water, from which they hoped to be supplied. Night was fast approaching, and the pursuers were spent with fatigue; but Cæsar yet prevailed on his men to throw up some works to prevent the access of the enemy to the brook. When overwhelmed with fatigue and distress, these remains of the vanquished army offered to capitulate; and while the treaty was in dependance many among them, who were Senators and persons of rank, withdrew in the night, and made their escape; the rest surrendered at discretion. Persons of distinction, who had been formerly prisoners, and who had been set at liberty,

²⁸ The spoils of an enemy were commonly secured by the Romans in a regular manner, to be equally divided.

BOOK were now put to death. Some were spared at the
IV. intercession of their friends, to whom Cæsar permitted that each should save one of the prisoners²⁹. The private men took oaths of fidelity to the victor, and were enlisted in his army. Cæsar, having ordered such of his men, as had been on service all night, to be relieved from the camp, he himself marched with a fresh body the same day to Larissa.

²⁹ Dio Cass. lib. xli. c. 62.

C H A P. VII.

Comparative Loss on the different Sides in the late Action. — Pompey's Flight. — His Death. — Arrival of Cæsar at Alexandria. — Cato, with the Fleet and Remains of the army from Pharsalia, steers for Africa. — State of Italy and of the Republican Party. — Adventures of Cæsar in Egypt. — Victory over Pharnaces. — Arrival in Italy. — Mutiny of the Legions. — Cæsar passes into Africa. — His Operations and Action with the Horse and Irregulars of the Enemy. — Post at Ruspina. — Siege of Uzita. — Battle of Thapsus. — Death of Cato.

IN the famous battle of Pharsalia, Cæsar, by his own account, lost no more than two hundred men, among whom were thirty Centurions, officers of distinguished merit. He killed of the enemy fifteen thousand, and took twenty-four thousand prisoners, with a hundred and eighty stand of colors, and nineteen Roman eagles and legionary standards; and on this occasion he cut off many Senators and many of the equestrian order¹, the flower of the Roman Nobility,

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¹ Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.
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Pompey, when he was told that Cæsar's troops had already forced his intrenchments, changed his dress, mounted on horseback, and having passed through the rear-gate of the camp, made his escape to Larissa. On the road he fell in with about thirty horsemen who joined him. At the gates of Larissa he received what he wanted for his journey, but declined entering the town, saying, That he would do nothing to make a breach betwixt the inhabitants of that place and the victor². From thence he passed by the valley of Tempe to the coast, and rested only one night in a fisherman's cottage. Next morning he put off from the shore in a small boat, with a few of his attendants, and coming in sight of a trading vessel, made signals, and was taken on board. In this ship he steered to Amphipolis, came to an anchor before that place, and probably to conceal his farther intentions, issued a proclamation addressed to all the districts of Macedonia, and requiring new levies to be made, and all the youth of the province to assemble forthwith at this place. But having received some supplies of money, he remained only one night at Amphipolis. His wife Cornelia, and Sextus the youngest of his sons, were at Mitylene, in the island of Lesbos; thither he proposed to sail, and, without having settled his plan any

² Dio Cass. lib. xlii. c. 2.

farther, was anxious to save this part of his family from falling ³ into the hands of his enemies. Having taken them on board; and being joined by some gallies of the fleet, after a delay of some days, occasioned by contrary winds, he set sail, continued his voyage to the coast of Cilicia, and from thence to Cyprus. He meant to have landed in Syria; but being informed that the people of Antioch, upon the news of his defeat, had published a resolution to admit none of his party, he dropt that intention, and contented himself with what aids and reinforcements he obtained on the coasts of Cilicia and Cyprus. He seized the money which was found in the coffers of the farmers of the revenue; and having borrowed, or otherwise procured, considerable sums, he armed two thousand men, and having shipping sufficient to transport them, continued his voyage to Egypt.

The late king, Ptolomy Auletes, had been indebted to the Romans and the patronage of Pompey; and the kingdom being now on a respectable footing, having a considerable military force in the field; this Roman leader, though of the vanquished party, flattered himself, that in the gratitude of the Egyptian court he might find some means to reinstate his affairs.

On the death of that Ptolomy, who had been restored to his throne by Gabinius, two factions had arisen in Egypt. The king leaving four

³ Cæsar, Appian, Plutarch.

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children, Ptolomy the elder, Cleopatra, Arsinoë, and Ptolomy the younger, and by his will bequeathed his crown to Ptolomy the eldest of his sons, together with Cleopatra the eldest daughter. This brother and sister being by the laws permitted to marry, were in the capacity of husband and wife associated on the throne. But the council of the young king proposed to set aside the will by excluding Cleopatra. In execution of this design, having obliged her to leave the kingdom, and to fly for protection into Syria, they had taken post with a great army at Pelusium to prevent her return, she being said to have assembled a numerous force in Asia for that purpose *. Pompey observing this army upon the shore, concluded that the king was present, came to an anchor, and sent a message with intimation of his arrival, and of his desire to join his forces with those of Egypt.

The council of Ptolomy consisted of three persons, Achilles, who commanded the army; Photius, an eunuch, who had the care of the finances; and Theodotus of Samos, who was the preceptor or literary tutor of the young king. The counsellors, knowing that the Romans had been named executors of the late king's will †, and in this capacity might restore Cleopatra to her share in the throne, and that Pompey, in name of the republic, might assume the supreme

* Cæsar de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

† Ibid.

direction in Egypt, were greatly alarmed upon receiving this message, and came to a resolution to put him to death. By this atrocious action they expected to rid themselves of one dangerous intruder, and to merit the favor of his rival, who by this decisive stroke was to become the sovereign of the empire, and fully able to reward those who took a seasonable part in his quarrel.

With this intention Achilles, with a few of his attendants came on board in a small boat, delivered a message from Ptolomy, inviting Pompey to land. In the mean time some Egyptian gallies, with an intention to secure him, drew near to his ship; and the whole army, with the king at their head, were drawn out on the shore to receive him. The size of the boat, and the appearance of the equipage which came on this errand, seemed disproportioned to the rank of Pompey; and Achilles made an apology, alledging, that deeper vessels could not go near enough to land him on that part of the coast. Pompey's friends endeavoured to dissuade him from accepting of an invitation so improperly delivered; but he answered by quoting two lines from Sophocles, which imply, that *whoever visits a king, though he arrive a free man, must become his slave*. Two of his servants went before him into the boat to receive their master; and with this attendance he put off from the ship. His wife Cornelia, and Sextus the youngest of his sons, with some other friends, remained upon deck, sufficiently humbled by the preceding strokes of fortune, anxious

B O O K for the future, and trembling under the expectations of a scene which was acting before them.
IV. Soon after the barge had left the ship, Pompey, looking behind him, observed among the Egyptian soldiers a person whose countenance he recollected, and said to him, Surely, fellow soldier, you and I have somewhere served together. While he turned to speak these words, Achilles beckoned to the other soldiers, who understanding the signal to put the Roman general to death, struck him with their swords. Pompey was so much prepared for this event, that he perceived the whole of his situation at once, and sunk without making any struggle, or uttering one word *. This was done in the presence of the king of Egypt and of his army, who were ranged on a kind of amphitheatre formed by the shore. The vessel in which the unhappy Cornelia with her family was left, and the little squadron which attended it, as if they had received a signal to depart, cut their cables and fled.

Thus died Pompey, who for above thirty years enjoyed the reputation of the first captain of his age. The title of *Great*, originally no more than a casual expression of regard from Sylla, continued, in the manner of the Romans, to be given him as a mark of esteem, and a name of distinction. He attained to more consideration, and enjoyed it longer than any other Roman

* App. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii. Plut. in Pomp. Livii Epitome, lib. xii.

citizen; and was supplanted at last, because, for many years of his life, he thought himself too high to be rivaled, and too secure to be shaken in his place. His last defeat, and the total ruin which ensued upon it, was the consequence of an overweening confidence, which left him altogether unprepared for the first untoward event. The impression of his character, even after that event, was still so strong in the minds of his enemies, that Cæsar overlooked all the other remains of the vanquished party to pursue their leader.

The accounts which Cæsar received at Larissa made him believe that Pompey must have passed into Asia; and he accordingly, on the third day after the battle of Pharsalia, set out in pursuit of him with a body of horse, ordering a legion to follow. In passing the Hellespont, he was saluted by some gallies which guarded the Straits, under Lucius Cassius. These surrendered themselves, and, with their leader, made offer of their service to the victor. From thence he continued his march by the coast of Ionia, receiving the submission of towns in his way. And being come into Asia, he had intelligence of Pompey's operations in Cyprus, of his departure from thence, and of his continuing to steer for the coasts of Egypt. In order to be in condition to follow him thither, he put into the island of Rhodes, where he provided transports sufficient to embark the legion which he had ordered to follow him from Thessaly, and

BOOK another from Achaia, with eight hundred horse.
IV. To these he joined a convoy of ten armed gallies of this island, and some Asiatic ships⁷.

With this force Cæsar set sail for Alexandria, and arrived, after a passage of three days⁸. Here he learned the catastrophe of Pompey's life; and had presented to him by the courtiers of Ptolomy, who were impatient to commend their services, the head of the deceased, severed from the body, with his seal, which was known throughout the empire, being that with which his signature was put to all letters, acts and public writings: but Cæsar either really was, or affected to be, seized with a momentary compunction; is said to have turned away from the sight, and to have wept⁹. This able actor probably had tears, as well as words, at command; and could sanctify, under the most specious appearances, the evils which his ambition had produced. From this event, however, which he thus affected to regret, and no sooner, he became secure, and seems to have dated the termination of the war. He accordingly landed without precaution, and being detained at first by the usual periodical winds of the season,

⁷ Cæf. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

⁸ App. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii. The two legions which he led in this service amounted only to three thousand two hundred men; so much had the army in general suffered in their late campaigns.

⁹ App. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.

became entangled in difficulties, or engaged in pleasures, which occasioned a very unaccountable stay, suspended the expectations of the whole empire, and gave to those of the opposite party leisure to consult their safety in different ways. CHAP. VII.

Cato, upon the march of Pompey into Thesfaly, had been left to command on the coast of Epirus; and his quarters after the battle of Pharsalia, became a place of retreat to many who escaped from the field, or who, at the action, had been detached on different services. He assembled great part of the fleet at Corcyra; and, his sea and land forces united, still preserved the aspect of a vigorous party. Cicero, Cneus the eldest son of Pompey, Afranius, Labienus, and other persons of distinction had joined him. Among these Cicero, as being the first in rank, was offered the command; and having declined it, narrowly escaped with his life from the fury of young Pompey, who considered his refusal as a desertion of the cause, and as an act of perfidy to his father, whose fate was yet unknown¹⁰. Cicero, being protected by Cato and others, who were present, escaped into Italy; and declining the command of an army, reserved for scenes in which he was better qualified to act, talents which had been, on former occasions, of so much use to his fellow-citizens. It appeared that Cato had

¹⁰ Plut. in Vita Ciceronis. Dio Cass. lib. xii. c. 10—12.

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even disapproved of his having joined either party in this war, and wished to have devoted his life and his abilities entirely to those services which he was better qualified to render to his country, in the Senate, and in the popular assemblies, than in the field.

It is probable that Cato had already taken his own resolution not to submit to Cæsar, nor to survive the fall of the commonwealth; but he treated with great candor such as chose to make their peace, and to retire from the storm. Having staid a sufficient time at Corcyra, to receive on board such of the vanquished army as chose to take refuge in the fleet; and having afterwards put into Patræ, near the mouth of the Gulph of Corinth, for the same purpose, he still gave every one his option to continue in arms, or to retire. He seems to have supposed that Pompey was gone into Egypt, and he determined to follow him; hoping, that after the junction of this great reinforcement, he might, either there or in the province of Africa, renew the war with advantage. Being, in pursuance of this design, arrived in the African seas, but west of the frontier of Egypt, he met the unhappy Cornelia, with the young Sextus Pompeius, who had recently beheld the death of the husband and the father near the shore at Pelusium. The account which he received of this event determined him not to continue his voyage any farther to the eastward; but to return towards the Roman province of Africa, where the friends of the republic under

Varus, in consequence of the defeat of Curio, and the alliance of Juba, still kept the ascendant, and lately received an accession of strength by the junction of Scipio and of Labienus, who had escaped from Pharfalia. But the periodical winds which about that time began to detain Cæsar at Alexandria, made it impossible, or at least dangerous, for him to continue his voyage along a coast that was covered to a great extent by the famous shoals and sand-banks of the Syrtes. For these, perhaps, and other reasons which are not mentioned, Cato landed at Berenicé, and from thence conducting his army, then consisting of ten thousand men, in small divisions, through the deserts of Barca, and round the bay of the Syrtes; and having, during thirty days, encountered with many difficulties from the depth of the sands and the scarcity of water, he effected his march to the frontier of the Roman province¹¹.

Cæsar, when he passed into Macedonia, had left Italy and the western provinces in a state not likely, in his absence, to create any trouble. But the uncertain, and even unfavorable aspect of his affairs, for some time after his landing in Epirus, had encouraged those who were discontented to question the validity of his acts, and to disregard his arrangement. The army in Spain having mutinied, deserted from Q. Cassius, and put themselves under the command of M. Marcellus Æfernius, who, however, did not

¹¹ Strabo, lib. xvii. p. 836.

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openly declare himself for either party, till after the event was decided in favor of Cæsar.

At Rome it is probable that few had remained besides those who were inclined to Cæsar's party, or at least such as were indifferent to both; and that some persons, even of the last description, thought they had an interest in his success, as being their only safety against the menacing declarations of his adversary, who, in all his proclamations, treated neutrality between the parties as treason to the commonwealth. But the uncertain state of his fortunes, while the event of the war remained in suspense, and still more after his defeat at Dyrrachium, encouraged or tempted numbers, even in the city of Rome, to declare for Pompey. Marcus Cœlius, who, in the preceding year, had, upon disgust, or hopes of promoting his own fortune, gone with Antony and Curio to join Cæsar, and who was now, by the influence of the prevailing party, elected one of the Prætors; being moved by a fresh disgust from the party he had joined, or by its apparent decline in the field, openly declared himself against Cæsar's measures, offered protection to debtors against the execution of his laws relating to bankrupts, drove his own colleague Trebonius by force from the Prætor's tribunal, and gave such an alarm, that the Senate thought themselves under the necessity of giving the Consul Isauricus the usual charge to guard the commonwealth as in times of extreme

danger. Upon this decree the Consul took arms to preserve the peace, and Cœlius was obliged to leave the city. About the same time Milo, who still lay under sentence of banishment, ventured, at the head of an armed force, to land on the coast, and attempted to make himself master of Capua. While he was engaged in this enterprise he was joined by Cœlius; but both were soon after surrounded and cut off by the forces which Cæsar had left for the protection of Italy¹².

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These disturbances, and every appearance of opposition to the party of Cæsar, were again easily suppressed upon the news of his victory at Pharsalia. The populace, who generally range themselves on the victorious side, and who are equally outrageous in every cause they espouse, celebrated the occasion, by pulling down the statues of Pompey and of Sylla. There was either no Senate, and no assembly of the People to resist the torrent with which fortune now ran on the side of military government; or the names of Senate and People were, without debate or difference of opinion, put to decrees, by which the supreme power of life and death over the supposed adherents of the vanquished party was committed to the victor. By these decrees, the power of making war or peace, and of naming commanders and governors in all

¹² Liv. Epitome, lib. xci. Dio Cass. lib. xlii. c. 22. 26.

BOOK the provinces, was committed to Cæsar. He
IV. was, by a new and unheard-of resolution, made Consul for five years, Dictator for twelve months, and vested with the sacred character of Tribune for life. He alone was appointed to preside in all public assemblies, except those of the Tribes, in which the other Tribunes bore an equal part with himself.

When these decrees were presented to Cæsar, then in Egypt, he assumed the ensigns and power of Dictator, and appointed Antony, who commanded in Italy, general of the horse, or second to himself in the empire. The reputation of Cæsar's clemency had encouraged many, who had recently opposed him, to lay down their arms, and to return to their habitations, trusting to this character of the victor, or to other considerations more particularly applicable to themselves. Cicero returned to Italy, and waited for Cæsar in the neighbourhood of Brundisium. Caius Cassius, who had commanded the fleet which had been assembled for Pompey from the coasts of Syria and Cilicia, having failed to Sicily, while the army yet lay in Pharsalia, surprised and burnt the shipping, amounting to thirty-five vessels, of which twenty were decked, which Cæsar had assembled at Messina, and was about to have forced the town to surrender, when he was informed of the defeat of Pompey in Thessaly, and set sail for the coast of Asia. Here he waited for Cæsar at the mouth of the Cydnus, without being determined, whether he should

attempt to destroy or submit to the victor. From the correspondence of Cassius with Cicero, it appears that, like this distinguished senator, he was about to withdraw from the ruins of a party which he could no longer support. Cicero, nevertheless, afterwards ascribes to him a design of killing Cæsar at this place, if the prey had not escaped him by going to a different side of the river from where he was expected to land. Upon this disappointment Cassius made his submission, and delivered up his fleet¹¹. Quintus Cicero went to Asia to make his peace with Cæsar; and many expecting him in Italy, resorted thither on the same errand. In this number, it was reported that Cato and L. Metellus meant to present themselves as persons who had done no wrong, and who came openly to resume their station in the commonwealth. Cæsar foresaw the difficulties that might arise to himself from the presence of such men; that they would greatly embarrass his government by opposing it, or, in order to rid himself of such troublesome guests, reduce him to the necessity of pulling off the mask of moderation and clemency, which he had hitherto assumed. For these reasons, he chose rather to prevent their coming, than to contend with them after they were come; and sent positive orders to Antony, to forbid Cato, Metellus, and every other person, to

¹¹ Cæsar de Bello Civil. lib. iii.

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C. Julius
Cæsar Dict.
iterum, M.
Antonius
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whom he had not given express permission, to set their foot in Italy ¹⁴.

Such was the state of affairs at the end of the year of Rome 705, and the beginning of the following year, which is dated in the Dictatorship of Caius Cæsar. While he himself still remained in Egypt, the government of Italy continued in the hands of Antony. All orders of men vied, in demonstrations of joy, for the success of the victor, and for the ascendant which his party had gained. They still probably hoped to have the form of the republic preserved, while no more than the administration of it should pass from the ruined party to those who were now in power: but in the first steps of the present government they found themselves disappointed. The usual election of magistrates, which, even in the height of the war had never been omitted, now at the end of it, and when no enemy any where appeared to alarm the party, were all of them, except that of the Tribunes, entirely suspended or laid aside. All government centred in the person of Antony, and the administration was altogether military. He himself, immersed in debauch, past the greatest part of his time in the company of buffoons and prostitutes; frequently shifted the scene of his frolics from the town to the country, and travelled through Italy with a field-equipage, and a numerous train of carriages, filled

¹⁴ Cæsar de Bello Civili.

filled with courtesans and their retinue. In these processions he himself is said to have sometimes appeared in a carriage that was drawn by lions¹⁵. In this tide of success, as he was ungracious and arrogant to citizens of the highest rank, so he was indulgent to the troops, and deaf to all the complaints that were made of their violence and rapine. Being equally apt to set the example of disorder and licence in his own practice, as he was to indulge them in others, his retainers frequently alarmed the city with rapes, robberies, and murders, and made the pacific inhabitants of Italy expect, with the arrival of Cæsar, a continual increase of such disorderly masters to sport on the ruins of the Commonwealth.

The worst men, as usual, were the most forward in paying their court to the party in power. The nearest relations became spies or informers against each other. Fears or complaints uttered were reported as crimes. A general silence and distrust ensued, and all parties wished or dreaded the arrival of Cæsar, according as they expected to lose or gain by the fall of the Commonwealth. In this interval of expectation, men discovered their gloomy apprehensions, by propagating strange fictions of ominous appearances, or by magnifying things natural into alarming presages and prodigies¹⁶.

¹⁵ Plut. in Vita Antonii, p. 74, 75.

¹⁶ Dio Cass. lib. xlii. c. 26.

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The daily expectation of Cæsar's arrival, for some time, suspended all the usual factions in the city, and suppressed the hopes and designs of his opponents in all parts of the empire: but his unexpected stay at Alexandria, and the unfavorable reports of his situation, which were sometimes brought from thence, began to turn the tide of popularity at Rome, and encouraged the remains of the late republican party, now forced to take refuge in Africa, again to lift up its head¹⁷.

Dolabella, a young man of Patrician extraction, observing the road which others had taken, by becoming Tribunes of the People, to arrive at power in the commonwealth, procured himself, in imitation of Clodius, to be adopted into a plebeian family, to the end that he might be legally qualified to hold this office; and having accordingly succeeded in this design, revived the wild projects by which the worst of his predecessors had endeavoured to debauch the lower ranks of the People. He proposed an abolition of debts, and a reduction of house-rents. Being opposed by Tribellius, one of his colleagues, their several retainers frequently, as usual, proceeded to violence in the streets; and although the Senate passed a decree to suspend every question or subject of debate until the arrival of Cæsar, these Tribunes continued to assemble the People, kept them in a ferment by opposite

¹⁷ Cicero ad Attic. lib. xi. ep. 16.

motions, and filled the public places with tumult and bloodshed¹⁸. Marc Antony, second in command to Cæsar, under pretence that such disorders could not be restrained without a military force, took possession of the city with an army; and while he sometimes favored one party, and sometimes the other, continued to govern the whole at discretion¹⁹.

The troops about the same time became mutinous in their quarters; and these disorders rose or fell according to the reports that were propagated from Asia or Egypt relating to the state of Cæsar's affairs. The spirits and hopes of the late Republican party, which yet had some footing in Africa and Spain, likewise fluctuated in the same manner. It is highly probable, that if Cæsar had pursued the other remains of this party with the same ardor with which he pursued Pompey in person, or if he could have returned to the capital immediately on the death of his rival, they never would have attempted, or would have been able to renew the contest; but the leisure which he left them, and the ill aspect of his own affairs, for some time encouraged and enabled them to recover a strength, with which they were yet in condition to dispute the dominion to which he aspired.

Cato, who, with the remains of the Republican party from Epirus, had arrived on the coast

¹⁸ Eight hundred citizens were killed in these frays.

¹⁹ Dio Cass. lib. xlii. c. 29.

[BOOK IV. of Africa, being informed that Varus still held the Roman province on this continent in the name of the Republic, that Scipio was there, and that the king of Numidia persisted in his alliance against Cæsar, determined to join them. At his arrival, Scipio and Varus being on bad terms, he received an offer of the command from the general voice of the army : but his acceptance being likely to increase, rather than to appease animosities, and the preference being constitutionally due to Scipio as of consular rank, Cato had no doubts in declining it. Neither Pompey nor Scipio ever considered him as their personal friend ; his services they knew were intended to the Republic, and would turn against them whenever they came to make that use of their advantages to which it is likely they were both inclined. Pompey was accordingly ever jealous of Cato, and in the last part of the campaign in Theffaly chose to leave him behind on the coast. Scipio adopted the same conduct with respect to this partisan of the commonwealth, and joined to the motives of jealousy, which actuated Pompey, a distrust of the inclination recently shown by the army to prefer him in the command. In order that he might not interfere in his counsels, he assigned or suffered him to take a separate station at Utica, where he continued to be the principal support of the cause. The inhabitants of this place were obnoxious to Pompey's party ; and having formerly received Curio with the forces of Cæsar, and ever favored his interest,

were now doomed to destruction, but saved at the intercession of Cato, who, in this extremity of political evils, wished not to increase the sufferings of mankind by unnecessary acts of revenge and cruelty.

The spirit of the Republic thus reviving in Africa, and the party being in condition to receive all who fled to them for protection, and having the alliance of Juba, the most powerful prince of that continent, soon became formidable both by sea and by land; and if they had chosen to invade Italy in the absence of Cæsar, were in condition to have regained the capital of the empire. Young Pompey having, at the same time, passed into Spain, was favorably received by his father's adherents and clients in that province, and profiting by the misconduct of Quintus Cassius in those parts, was likely to assemble a considerable force.

Gabinus, who commanded for Cæsar on the coast of Illyricum, attempting to penetrate by land into Macedonia, was cut off by Octavius, who had assembled a remnant of Pompey's army on the confines of that kingdom. Domitius Calvinus, whom Cæsar had appointed to command in Bithynia, had received a defeat from Pharnaces the son of Mithridates; and in general, the state of his affairs in other parts of the empire was such, while he himself continued unheard of in Egypt, as to raise a suspicion of some misfortune, supposed to be the only way of accounting for his long stay in that country, and for the seeming

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neglect of all the advantages he had gained by a conduct hitherto in every instance decisive and rapid. Pompey had fallen by treachery in Egypt, and so might Cæsar. It was now the middle of June, and there was no intimation received in Italy of the time at which he might be expected to return. He had written no letters since the middle of December, nor had any one come from him at Alexandria since the middle of March²⁰.

The imperfect accounts which remain of what passed in Egypt during this interval, are as follows: Cæsar, at his arrival, had found the young king under the direction of Pothinus; and Arsinoë, the sister of the king, in the keeping of Ganimedes, two eunuchs, who had the care of their education. From his manner of receiving the present of Pompey's head, these officers conjectured they had gained nothing by the murder of one of the rivals, that they were engaged in this contest for the Roman empire, and that this action, although it freed Cæsar of an enemy whom he respected and feared, was not to be publicly avowed or rewarded by him. They dreaded the interposition of this dangerous man in their affairs, more than they had dreaded even that of Pompey.

The troops now in Egypt, were the remains of that army with which Gabinius had restored the late king, and which he left to secure his

²⁰ Cicer. ad Att. lib. xi. ep. 16 & 17.

establishment. They were recruited by deserters from the Roman provinces, and by banditti from Syria and Cilicia. They retained the form of the Roman legion; but had precluded themselves from any prospect of return to the Roman service by a mutiny, in which they had murdered the two sons of Bibulus, then Proconsul of Syria. Numbers of the men were married, and had families in Egypt; they were in the practice of disposing of the lives and properties of the people, of the offices at court, and of the crown itself at their pleasure. A party of this insolent rabble, then in garrison at Alexandria, and in the character of guards to the person of the king, took offence at the parade with which Cæsar landed, and were offended with the number and show of his Lictors, by which he seemed to encroach on the majesty of their sovereign. Frequent tumults arose on this account, and numbers of Cæsar's attendants were murdered in the streets. The westerly winds were then set in, and he, finding himself detained in a place where he was exposed to so much insult, ordered a reinforcement of troops from Asia, and employed Mithridates of Pergamus to bring all the forces he could assemble there to his relief. The party of Cleopatra applied to him for his protection; she herself, being still in Syria, ventured to pass into Egypt, came to Alexandria by sea, and is said to have been carried, wrapped up in a package of carpet, to the presence of Cæsar.

In this manner, it is pretended that Cæsar

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became acquainted with the person of this celebrated woman, then in the bloom of youth, and possessed of those allurements by which she made different conquerors of the world, in their turns, for a while renounce the pursuits of ambition for those of pleasure. She is supposed at this time to have become the mistress of Cæsar, and to have made him, though turned of fifty years, to forget the empire, the republic, the factions at Rome, and the armies which in Africa and Spain were assembling against him. Under the dominion of his passion for Cleopatra, he took a resolution to carry into execution the destination made by the late king, and in the quality of Roman Consul and representative of the Roman People, to whom this office had been intrusted by the will, he commanded both parties to lay down their arms, and to submit their claims to his own arbitration.

Pothinus, fearing the total exclusion of the young king, his pupil, in favor of Cleopatra, called Achillas with the army to Alexandria, in order to defeat Cæsar's purpose, and oblige him to leave the kingdom. This army consisted of twenty thousand men inured to bloodshed and violence, though long divested of the order and discipline of Roman troops. Cæsar hearing of their approach, and not being in a condition to meet them in the field, seized and fortified a quarter of the town, in which he proposed to defend himself. The young Ptolomy being in his

power, was prevailed on to dispatch two persons of distinction with a message to Achilles, signifying the king's pleasure that he should not advance; but the bearers of this message, as being supposed to betray the interest of their master, in whose name they appeared, were by the orders of Achilles seized and slain. Cæsar, however, being still in possession of Ptolomy's person, represented Achilles as a rebel and an outlaw, and still, in name of the king, issued repeated orders and proclamations against him.

Achillas being arrived at Alexandria, entered the city, and endeavoured to force Cæsar's quarters; but being repulsed, took possession of that part of the town which was open to him, and blocked up the remainder both by sea and land. The city being thus divided, the Egyptians and Romans fought in the streets, and from the houses which they severally occupied. Cæsar, as he despaired of being able to receive any succours by land, endeavoured to keep open his communication by sea, and sent pressing orders to Syria, Cilicia, Rhodes, and Crete, for reinforcements of men and of ships. Having early discovered that Pothinus, who was still in his power, corresponded with the enemy, he ordered him to be put to death, continued to strengthen his division of the town by additional barriers; and in order to prevent surprise, demolished and cleared away many of the buildings adjoining to his works. Achilles, finding so much unexpected resistance, sent for reinforcements, and a supply

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of stores and warlike engines, from every part of the kingdom. He traversed, with breast-works, the streets leading to Cæsar's quarters, and demolishing the houses in his way, effected a chain of works parallel to those of Cæsar, consisting of a parapet and frequent towers. He exhorted the Egyptians to exert themselves for the independency of their kingdom; represented to them, "That the Romans were gradually assuming the sovereignty of Egypt, that Gabinius had come as an auxiliary, but acted as a master; that Pompey, on being defeated in Thessaly, came into Egypt²¹, as to a property which he had a right to employ in repairing his ruined fortunes; that Pompey had fallen in vain, if Cæsar were tamely suffered to succeed him; that if this intruder were allowed to keep possession of the city, until his succours should arrive from Asia, all Egypt for the future must expect to be the slaves of the Romans."

The danger to which Cæsar was exposed, arose no less from the remains of the republican party now assembling against him in Africa, than it did from the forces with which he was actually assailed in Egypt. If Scipio had been apprized of his condition in that country, he might in a few days have sailed to Alexandria, and in conjunction with the Egyptians, who would now have accepted of any assistance against Cæsar, have recovered the fall of their party at Pharsalia; but

²¹ Hirtius de Bello Alexandrino.

the best opportunities are sometimes lost, because it is not supposed that an enemy could be so rash as to furnish them. C H A P. VII.

The scene in Egypt was frequently changing by the intrigues and the treachery of different parties in the court. Ganimedes, who had the charge of the young princess, Arsinoë, being hitherto lodged in the quarters of Cæsar, found means to make his escape, together with his ward; and finding the troops disposed to lay hold of Arsinoë as a branch of the royal family, employed assassins to put Achilles to death; and, in name of the princess, took on himself the command of the army. His abilities as an officer, which were very considerable, and his bounty, secured to him the affection of the soldiers. He continued the attack on Cæsar's quarters in all the ways which were already begun by his predecessor. The town being furnished with water by subterraneous passages from the neighbouring heights, he uncovered the conduits which led to Cæsar's division of the town; and, to render these conduits unserviceable, forced into them great quantities of brine from the sea. The loss however was soon supplied from wells, in which, at a moderate depth, the besieged found plenty of fresh water.

While Cæsar thus counteracted the arts which were employed to distress him, the eighteenth legion, with a considerable supply of provisions, military stores, and engines of war, being arrived on the coast, but unable to reach

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Alexandria on account of the winds, he thought proper to embark and put to sea, in order to cover this reinforcement, while they made for the port. On this occasion, he was attacked by the Egyptian fleet; but gained a victory, destroyed a great part of the enemy's ships, and brought his own reinforcement safe into harbour. The Egyptians, with great ardor, set to work in all the docks on the Nile, to repair the loss they had now sustained, and were soon masters of a fleet, consisting of twenty-two vessels of four tier of oars, five of five tier, and many of smaller dimensions. Cæsar had to oppose them, nine gallies from Rhodes, eight from Pontus, five from Lycia, and twelve from the coast of Asia. Five were of five tier of oars, and ten of four tier. The remainder were of smaller dimensions, and most of them open. With these forces, having once more engaged off the mouth of the harbour, the Egyptians were again defeated, with the loss of one galley of five tier of oars, another of two tier taken, and three sunk. The remainder retired under cover of the mole, and of the towers of the Pharos.

Soon after this action at sea, Cæsar attacked the Pharos, forced the enemy to fly from thence, most of them swimming across the harbour, killed many, and took six hundred prisoners. He forced them at the same time to abandon the tower, which commanded the entrance of the mole on that side. As he pursued them in their flight, and as the mole itself became crowded with his

soldiers, who advanced to push the attack, or who came unarmed from the ships, and all the stations around, to witness the scene; the Egyptians seeing these crowds, laid hold of the opportunity, mounted the mole, threw those who were upon it into confusion, forced them over the quay into the water, or into their boats. Cæsar himself endeavouring to escape in this manner, and finding that the boat into which he went, being aground and overloaded, could not be got off, he threw himself into the water, and swam to a ship. In this tumult, he lost four hundred men of the legions, and an equal number of the fleet. The Egyptians recovered all the ground they had lost, got possession again of the tower at the head of the mole, and of the island which secured their ships.

In such operations, with various events, the parties in Egypt past the winter and spring. Cæsar still retained the person of Ptolomy in his possession, and made use of his name to countenance his own cause, or to discredit that of his enemies; but the king being extremely averse to this use being made of his authority, and desirous to recover his liberty, entered into a concert with some officers of his army, to find a pretence for his release. In pursuit of their design, they conveyed secret intimation to Cæsar's quarters, that the troops were greatly disgusted with Ganimedes, and that if Ptolomy should make his appearance in person, they would certainly submit to his orders, and commit the whole settlement

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IV. king was instructed to affect a great dislike to this proposal, and with tears entreated that he might be allowed to remain in the palace. Cæsar, either being deceived by these professions, or believing the name of the king to be of little consequence, consented to let him depart; but this artful boy, as soon as he was at liberty, laid aside his disguise, laughed at the supposed credulity of those he had deceived, and urged the attack on the Roman quarters with great animosity.

While affairs at Alexandria were in this situation accounts were brought that Mithridates of Pergamus, whom Cæsar had sent to procure succours from Asia, was actually arrived at Pelusium with a considerable force; that he had reduced that place, and only waited for instructions from Cæsar how to proceed. These accounts were brought to both parties about the same time, and both determined to put their forces in motion. Ptolomy leaving a proper guard on his works, embarked his army on the Nile, having a considerable navigation to make by the different branches of that river. Cæsar, at the same time, put his army on board in the harbour, and having an open course by the coast, arrived at Pelusium before the king; and being joined by Mithridates, was in condition to take the field against the Egyptian army. Ptolomy, to prevent the return of Cæsar by land to Alexandria, had taken a strong post on one of the branches of the Nile; but here, after a few skirmishes, he was attacked, defeated,

and driven from his station. Endeavouring to make his escape by water, the barge ²² which carried him being overloaded, it sunk, and himself, with all his attendants, perished.

Immediately after this action, in which the Egyptian army was routed and dispersed, Cæsar, escorted by a small party of horse, returned to Alexandria, and having received the submission of the inhabitants, made such arrangements as he thought proper in the succession to the kingdom.

He placed Cleopatra on the throne, in conjunction with her younger brother; and, to remove any farther occasion of disturbance to this settlement, he ordered her sister Arsinoë to be transported to Rome. He left great part of the army to support this new establishment in Egypt, and he himself, after this singular interlude, in the midst of the conquest of the Roman empire, marched with the sixth legion by land into Syria. At Antioch, he received such reports of the state of affairs, as required his presence in different quarters. Nine months were elapsed, since any orders or directions had been received from him. During this time, the factions of the city, the relaxation of discipline in the army, and the threats of invasion from Africa, had placed his affairs in such a state of hazard, as to urge his immediate appearance in Italy and at Rome; but he thought it of consequence to his authority to leave no enemy behind him in the field ²³, nor to suffer the

²² Hirt. de Bello Alex.

²³ Ibid.

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remains of disorder in any of the provinces through which he was to pass. Pharnaces, the son of Mithridates, to whom Pompey had assigned the kingdom of the Bosphorus, imagining that the civil wars, in which the Romans were engaged, made a favorable opportunity for the recovery of his father's dominions, had passed with an army into Pontus, and from thence invaded the lesser Armenia and Cappadocia, which had been separately allowed by the Romans to Dejotarus and to Ariobarzanes. At the instances of these princes, Domitius Calvinus, who had been dispatched by Cæsar after the battle of Pharsalia with three legions to receive the submission of the Asiatic provinces, hitherto in the interest of Pompey, dispatched to Pharnaces a messenger, requiring him instantly to withdraw his troops from Armenia and Cappadocia; and, in order to give the more weight to this message, he himself at the same time took the field with one Roman legion, together with two legions that had been formed by Dejotarus in the Roman manner, and two hundred Asiatic horse. He at the same time ordered Publius Sextius and C. Prætorius to bring up a legion which had been lately raised in Pontus, and Q. Patifius to join him with some light troops from Cilicia.

These forces being assembled at Camana in Cappadocia, the messenger, who had been sent to Pharnaces, returned with an answer, that the king was willing to evacuate Cappadocia; but that, having a just claim to Armenia, in right of
his

his father, he would keep possession of that province until the arrival of Cæsar, to whose decision he was willing to submit his pretensions. Domitius, not being satisfied with this answer, put his army in motion towards Armenia. While he advanced, Pharnaces endeavoured to amuse him with negotiations, and to put him off his guard, by permitting the country to receive him with all the appearances of peace and security. Being arrived at Nicopolis, the capital of Armenia, he there received orders from Cæsar to march into Egypt; but being unwilling to quit his supposed prey, risked a battle with the forces of Pharnaces, was defeated, and obliged to fly with the remains of his army, by the route of the mountains which separated Armenia from the Roman province.

Elated with this victory, Pharnaces, at the time of Cæsar's departure from Egypt, had returned into Pontus, had taken possession of the principal towns, and with great severity exercised the sovereignty of the kingdom. About the middle of July, Cæsar, having dispatched Trebonius from Antioch with an account of his own operations, and with instructions to those who commanded in Italy ²⁴, went himself by sea to Tarsus, where he received, as has been mentioned, the submission of Caius Cassius, who waited for his coming; and who, according to the account of Cicero, till then was undetermined, whether he should make his peace with the victor, or attempt to assassinate him.

²⁴ Cicer. ad Attic. lib. xi. ep. 23.

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At Tarsus, Cæsar held a convention of the principal inhabitants of Cilicia, and from thence marched into Cappadocia, stopped at Comana to make the necessary arrangements in that province, and continued his route to the frontiers of Galatia and Pontus. Hither Dejotarus, who had espoused the cause of Pompey, who had fought under his banners in Pharsalia, and who, by the gift of that unfortunate officer, still retained the sovereignty of Galatia, came to make his submission. He laid down his diadem, and the ensigns of royalty; and, presenting himself in the habit of a suppliant, pleaded, that, in the late war, the eastern part of the empire, being subject to Pompey, the princes of that quarter had not been free to choose their party; that he was himself not qualified to decide in a question on which the Roman People was divided; that he thought it his duty to follow the Roman standard wherever it was erected, without considering by whom it was carried. Cæsar, rejecting the plea of ignorance or incapacity, insisted, that any prince in alliance with the Romans could not be ignorant who were Consuls in the year that succeeded the Consulate of Lentulus and Marcellus, and who were actually in the administration of the state at Rome; that they could not be ignorant who was at the head of the republic, and in possession of the capital, and of the seat of empire; and who of consequence was vested with the authority of the commonwealth. But that he himself, in the capacity of a private man, was willing, in

consideration of this prince's age, his character, and the intercession of his friends, to forgive the part which he had taken against him. He desired him, therefore, to resume the crown and other ensigns of royalty, and to keep possession of this kingdom, reserving the discussion of the title, by which he held any particular territory, to a future day.

Being joined by a legion which Dejotarus had lately formed in the Roman manner, Cæsar's force now consisted of this, together with the remains of the two legions that escaped with Domitius from Nicopolis, and of the sixth, which had accompanied himself from Egypt, now reduced by the sword, and by the fatigues of service, to no more than a thousand men. With this army he advanced towards Pontus. Upon his approach Pharnaces sent forward a messenger to present him, in honor of late victories, with a crown of gold, and made offers of submission, expecting to appease him, or to fill up the time until Cæsar should be obliged, by the necessity of his affairs, to give his presence elsewhere. "Come not against me," he said, "as an enemy: I never took part with Pompey, nor declared war against Cæsar. Let me not be treated with more severity than Dejotarus, who did both." Cæsar replied, That he would listen to Pharnaces when he had acted up to his professions; that he had forgiven Dejotarus, and many others, with pleasure, the injury done to himself; but that he could not so easily overlook insults which were offered to the Roman State; and that he did not pardon

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wrongs done in the provinces of the Roman empire, even by those of his own party. "Your
"not having joined with Pompey," he said,
"has saved you from being a partner in his de-
"feat, but was not the cause of my victory."
With this reply to the messages of Pharnaces, Cæsar demanded the instant surrender of the kingdom of Pontus, and full reparation of all the damages sustained by any Roman citizens settled in that province. Pharnaces professed an intention to comply with these demands; but under various pretences delayed the performance of his promise. He had fixed on a hill in the neighbourhood of Ziecla, a place that became famous by the victory which his father Mithridates had there obtained over a Roman army under the command of Triarius: and in order to secure himself, repaired his father's lines, and seemed to be determined to maintain this post.

Cæsar, having lain for some days within five miles of the enemy, advanced to an eminence separated from the camp of Pharnaces only by a narrow valley sunk between steep banks. He came upon this ground in the night, and began to intrench himself as usual, having a party under arms to cover the workmen. As at break of day the greater part of his army appeared to be at work, this seemed to be a favorable opportunity to attack them; and Pharnaces began to form for this purpose. Cæsar, imagining that he only meant to give an alarm, and to interrupt his workmen; even after he was in motion, did not

order the legions to desist from their work, nor to arm: but seeing him descend into the valley, and attempt to pass it in the face of his advanced guard, he founded to arms, and was scarcely formed when the enemy had passed both banks of the vale to attack him.

The troops of Pharnaces began the action with an ardor that was suited to the boldness with which they had advanced; and Cæsar's contempt of their designs had nearly exposed him to a defeat. But the action, which was doubtful every where else, was decided by the veterans of the sixth legion, before whom the enemy began to give way, hurried with precipitation down the declivity, and fell into a general rout. Pharnaces fled with a few attendants, and narrowly escaped being taken²⁵. This victory gave Cæsar an opportunity to compare his own glories with those of Sylla, of Lucullus, and of Pompey; and was on this account, probably, regarded by him with singular pleasure. "How cheap is fame," he said, "when obtained by fighting against such an enemy²⁶?" And in the triumphs which he afterwards led in the sequel of these wars, the trophies of this particular victory were distinguished by labels, containing these words, "I came, I saw, I vanquished²⁷."

²⁵ Hirtius de Bello Alex. Velleius. Florus. Liv. Epitome, &c.

²⁶ Appian. de Bello Civil. lib. ii. p. 185.

²⁷ The famous words, *Veni, vidi, vici.*

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From the peculiar ostentation of the ease with which this victory was obtained, appearing to Cæsar as a measure of his own superiority to Sylla and Pompey, we may suspect that vanity, not less than ambition, was the spring of that emulation from which he had raised such a flame in the empire²⁸. Having by this defeat, extinguished the hopes and pretensions of Pharnaces, he restored Domitius Calvinus to his command in that quarter, and to a general inspection of affairs in Asia. This province, which had furnished a principal supply to the public revenue of the State, as as well as to the private fortune of Roman adventurers, was now made to pay large contributions in name of arrears of what had been promised to Pompey, or of forfeiture for offences committed against the victorious party.

Cæsar, having issued his orders for the contributions to be levied in Asia, set out by Galatia and Bithynia towards Greece, in his way to Italy; he landed at Tarentum, having been near two years absent from Rome. Many citizens had waited near twelve months at Brundisium in anxious expectation of his coming, and under great uncertainty of the reception they were to meet with. Cicero, being of this number, set out for Tarentum as soon as he heard of Cæsar's arrival, and met him on the road. When he presented himself, Cæsar alighted from his carriage, received him with marks of respect, and continued to

²⁸ Sueton. in Vit. Cæsaris, c. 37.

walk and to discourse with him aside for some time. There is no particular account of what passed between them in this conversation. On the part of Cicero, probably, were stated the reasons which he assigns, in a letter to Atticus, for his conduct before the battle of Pharsalia, bearing, that he had been averse to the war, that he thought the republic had nothing to gain by the victory of either party, and that he joined Pompey, more influenced by the opinion of others than decided in his own²⁹. Under these impressions, though courted by Cæsar, who wished to have the credit of his name in support of the measures now to be taken at Rome, he chose to withdraw to a life of retirement, and devoted his time to literary amusements and studies. At this time he probably composed most of his writings on the subject of eloquence, as he did some time afterwards those which are termed his philosophical works³⁰.

Cæsar arrived at Rome in the end of the year seven hundred and six of the Roman æra, in which he had been named a second time Dictator. This year, as has been related, he had passed chiefly in Egypt. Being elected, together with M. Emilius, Consul for the following year, he applied himself, for a little time, in the capacity of civil magistrate to the affairs of State; endeavoured to restore the tranquillity of the city, which

U. C. 706.
C. Jul. Cæsar
M. Emilius
Lepidus.

²⁹ Cicer. ad Att. lib. xi. ep. 11.

³⁰ Cicer. ad Attic. lib. xv. ep. 13.

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had been disturbed in his absence, and to wipe away the reproach which the levities of Antony had brought on his party. He stifled the unreasonable hopes of a general abolition of debts, with which Dolabella had flattered the more profligate part of the community. He told the people, on this occasion, that he himself was a debtor; that he had expended his fortune in the public service, and was still obliged to borrow money for the same purposes. With respect to the general policy of the city, and the case of insolvent debtors, he received the laws which he himself had procured, about two years before, in his way from Spain to Epirus. But while he appeared to be intent on these particulars, his thoughts were chiefly occupied in preparing to meet the war which the remains of the ancient Senate and of the republican party were resuming against him in Africa.

This province, in which Varus, supported by the king of Numidia, had been hitherto able to keep his station as an officer of the commonwealth was now become the sole or the principal refuge of the republican party. Three hundred citizens, many of them Senators, and exiles from Italy, as well as settlers in that province, had assembled at Utica, and considering every other part of the empire as under the influence of a violent usurpation, stated themselves as the only free remains of the Roman republic; held their meetings in the capacity of Senate and People; authorized, under these titles, the levies that were made in the

province, and contributed largely to supply the expense of the war. Many officers of name and of rank, Labienus, Afranius, Petreius, as well as Scipio and Cato, with all the remains they had saved from the wreck at Pharsalia, were now ready to renew the war on this ground. The name of Scipio who was reckoned ominous of success in Africa, and that of Cato, even if the origin or occasion of the present contest were unknown, was held a sufficient mark to distinguish the side of justice, and the cause of the republic.

These leaders of the republican party, having a considerable force at sea, and having access to all the ports, not only of Africa, but likewise of Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, had furnished themselves plentifully with all the necessaries for war³¹. They had mustered ten legions, which, according to the establishment of that time, may have amounted to fifty thousand Roman foot. They had twenty thousand African horse, a great body of archers and slingers, with a hundred and twenty elephants. They expected to be joined by the king of Numidia, who, to the established character of his countrymen for stratagem and valor, joined the glory of his late victory over Curio; and was supposed to muster, at this time, besides numerous bodies of horse, of archers, of slingers, and a great troop of elephants; thirty thousand foot, armed and marshalled

³¹ Dio Cass. lib. xlii. c. 5.

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IV. legion³².

The army already in Africa, as well as the remains of the sea and land forces of Pompey, who were lately arrived from Macedonia, were willing, as has been mentioned, to have placed Cato at their head. But the established order of the commonwealth, for which all the party contended, requiring that Scipio, who was of consular rank, should have the preference, Cato, who had no more than the rank of Prætor, and who could not be accessory to the infringement of any established or constitutional form, declined the command. By this circumstance we are deprived of an opportunity to judge how far the military abilities of this great man kept pace with his integrity, judgment, and courage in civil and political affairs.

Scipio being the officer of highest rank in the republican party, and having the supreme command of their forces, notwithstanding that the coasts of Italy were exposed to his attempts, and notwithstanding that the condition of Cæsar himself, if his situation at Alexandria had been known, gave sufficient opportunities for enterprise, took all his measures for a defensive war.

Such was the state of affairs in Africa when Cæsar, who, with all his military character and authority, frequently experienced the difficulty of commanding mere soldiers of fortune, taught to

³² App. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii. Hirt. de Bell. African.

divest themselves of civil principle, or regard to public duty, was likely to perish in a mutiny of his own army, and to end his career by the swords which he himself had whetted against the republic.

The legions, which after the defeat of Pompey had been ordered into Italy, becoming insolent in the possession of a military power which they saw was to be formed on the ruins of the commonwealth, and feeling their own importance, especially in the absence of their leader, would not be commanded by subordinate officers; nor did they, on the return of Cæsar himself, discontinue habits of disorder and licence which they had some time indulged. Being stationed in the neighbourhood of Capua, from whence it was expected they should embark for Africa, they decamped without orders, and marched towards Rome; paid no regard to the authority of Sallust, who, in the capacity of Prætor, with which he had been vested by Cæsar, endeavoured to stop them, killed many officers and persons of rank who ventured to oppose them, and threw the city into great consternation. On the approach of this formidable body, Cæsar himself is said to have wavered in his resolution. He had some troops attending his person, and there was a legion which Antony had stationed in the city on occasion of the late commotions. With these he at first proposed to meet and resist the mutiny; but he recollected, that even these troops might be infected with the same spirit of disobedience,

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and that if he were not able to command by his authority, and were forced to draw the sword against his own army, the whole foundations of the power he had erected must fail. While he was agitated by these reflections, he sent an officer with orders to inquire for what purpose the mutinous legions advanced? This officer was told, "That they would explain themselves to Cæsar." Having this answer, and expecting their arrival at the gates, he chose that they should appear to do by his permission, what they were likely to do without it; he therefore sent them another message, informing them that they had his leave to enter the city with their arms. They accordingly came in a body, and took possession of the field of Mars. There, contrary to the advice of his friends, they were received by Cæsar himself in person. Being raised on a conspicuous place, they crowded around him; and, from many different quarters at once, complained of the scanty rewards which they had received³³, enumerated their services and the hardships they had suffered, and with one voice demanded their instant discharge. Cæsar knowing that they only meant to extort some concessions, which they hoped the consideration of the war, which was still impending in Africa, would oblige him to make; that they were far from wishing to be dismissed, or to resign those arms to which they owed their own consequence, and on which they

³³ Dio Cassius, c. 51—55.

grounded their present presumption, affected to comply with their request, owned that their demand was highly reasonable; adding, that the service for which they had been hitherto retained was now at an end, and that he was sensible they were worn out, and unfit to contend with new fatigues.

Cæsar, in concluding a speech which he made to this purpose, employed the appellation of *Quirites*, or fellow-citizens; and observed how proper it was that all, who had served out the legal time, should receive the accustomed dismissal. In speaking these words, he was interrupted by a general cry, that they were no *Quirites*, but soldiers, willing to serve. It is alledged, that the name of Roman citizens³⁴, though the most respectable form of address in the political assemblies of the People, carried contempt to these military adventurers, and insinuated a state of degradation from that in which they affected to stand. An officer who was prepared for the occasion, or who wished to improve this sentiment in favor of Cæsar, desired to be heard; made an apology for what was past, and offered to pledge himself for the duty and future obedience of the troops. He was answered by Cæsar, That the services of this army were now of little moment to him; that as they desired their dismissal, while by their own confession they were yet in condition to serve, he had taken his resolution,

³⁴ *Quirites*, Roman citizens.

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and should instantly dismiss them with the usual rewards. "No man," he said, "shall complain that in time of need I employed him, and now at my ease forget the reward that is due to him. Such as continue in the service until the public tranquillity is fully restored shall have settlements in land; such as have received promises of money at any time during the war, shall be paid now, or in a little time hereafter, with interest." He concluded, however, with saying, "That as he asked no man to remain in the service, so he should not reject the duty of those who were willing to abide by their colors; that he owed this indulgence to their present requests, and to their merit on former occasions." The whole with one voice desired to be comprehended in this act of indulgence, and went headlong into all the extremes of submission, as they had lately gone into every excess of disorder and insolence; Cæsar was thus again in full possession of his power; but he did not venture to punish the authors of the mutiny. It was safer to reward such as were conspicuous in any particular merit; he therefore selected a few to be distinguished by immediate effects of his bounty, and put the remainder in motion towards Africa, where they might have an opportunity of earning future rewards and the pardon of past offences; and where they might spend against enemies that fury which, at every interval of leisure to recollect their pretensions

and their consequence, they were so likely to turn against their leader ³⁵. C H A P.
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The year was now, according to the vulgar computation at Rome, and in consequence of the usual intercalations being neglected, nominally advanced to the middle of December, but was in reality little past the autumnal equinox ³⁶, or was in the end of September, when Cæsar, having made the proper arrangements in the city, and in the manner related, appeased the mutiny which threatened to deprive him of his army, was again in motion to carry the war into Africa. The season, which was thought unfit for operations at sea, and which had actually forced his antagonist's ships into port, gave him the opportunity he wished for to effect his passage into that province. He knew that the enemy's fleet could not continue to cruise for any time to observe his motions; and that he might escape them with the advantage of a favorable wind, he had chosen the same opportunity, and in the same season, two years before, to transport his army into Macedonia against Pompey, who, trusting to the numbers and vigilance of his fleet, suffered himself to be surprised, and to be dispossessed of a country which he occupied with so superior a force. Cæsar having gained so much on that occasion, by the rapidity of his motions, now made war with many accumulated advantages of

³⁵ Dio Cass. lib. xlii. c. 51—55.

³⁶ Plut. in Vita Cæsaris, p. 154.

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reputation and power, which increased his boldness, and facilitated his success.

Having ordered troops and shipping from different quarters of Italy to assemble at Lillybæum, from whence he had the shortest passage to Africa, he himself arrived there on what was nominally the seventeenth of December, but in reality no more than the thirtieth of September; and although he found no more of his army arrived than one legion, or five thousand men, of the new levies, and six hundred horse, he ordered these, notwithstanding, to embark on board such ships as were then in the harbour; and if the wind had served, would have instantly sailed, even with this small force, trusting that he might be able to surprise some port on the opposite shore, and prepare a safe landing-place for the troops that were to follow. But while he continued wind-bound at Lillybæum, he was joined successively by a number of legions, which he ordered to embark as fast as they arrived; and, that they might be ready to put to sea with the first fair wind that served, sent the transports to lie under an island near the mouth of the harbour.

Being in this state of readiness with six legions, or about thirty thousand foot, together with two thousand horse; and the wind coming fair on the twenty-eighth of December, or, as it is computed, on the twelfth of October, he himself went on board, and leaving orders for the troops that were still in motion towards Lilly-

Lillybæum to follow him without delay, he set sail for the nearest land in Africa. Not knowing of any port to which he might securely repair, he could not, as usual, assign a place of general resort in case of separation, and only gave orders to the fleet to keep close together; and deferred the choice of a landing-place till after he should have observed the coast, and seen in what part of it the enemy were least guarded against a descent. Soon after he got to sea a storm arose, which dispersed the fleet; he himself, with the ships that still kept him company, after being tossed four days in a passage of no more than twenty leagues, got under the land of the promontory of Mercury, and from thence, to avoid the forces of the enemy, which were stationed near Utica and round the bay of Carthage, steered to the southward.

The coast of Africa, from this cape or promontory to the bottom of the great Syrtes, over three degrees of latitude, or about two hundred miles, extends directly to the south. It abounds with considerable towns, which, on account of their commerce, were anciently called the *Emporiæ*; and by their wealth, tempting the rapacity both of the Numidians and of the Carthaginians, were long a subject of contention between these powers. Adrumetum lay on one side of a spacious bay, bounded by the head of Clupea on the north, and that of Vada on the south. The southern coast of this bay contained, besides Adrumetum, the following sea-ports:

B O O K Ruspina , Leptis , and Thapsus ; the bay itself
 IV. extending from the first of these places to the last
 about thirty-six miles. Scipio had secured Adru-
 metum and Thapsus , being the extremity of this
 line , with considerable forces. In order to ren-
 der the province unfit for the reception of an
 enemy , he had laid waste the country , and had
 collected all the provisions and forage into these
 and other places of strength for the use of his
 own army.

Confidius being stationed at Adrumetum with
 two legions , and Vergilius with a proper force at
 Thapsus , the ports of Ruspina and Leptis , as well
 as many of the inland towns , were intrusted to
 the keeping of their own inhabitants. But these ,
 on account of the general devastations lately
 committed by order of Scipio , were extremely
 disaffected to his party , and inclined to favor any
 enemy against him.

Cato was stationed at Utica as the last
 retreat of the Roman Senate , the centre of all
 their resources , and the seat of their councils.

Scipio had collected the main body of his army
 near to the same place , supposed to be the
 principal object of any attempt that might be
 made from Italy.

Labienus and Petreius had separate bodies , at
 proper stations , to guard the inlets of the coast
 round the bay of Carthage ; and were so disposed
 of , that they could easily join and cross over land
 to the bay of Adrumetum upon any alarm of an
 enemy , from that side.

Varus had the direction of the fleet. He had kept the sea during summer and on the approach of autumn, but had then withdrawn to Utica, and laid up his ships for the stormy season.

Cæsar, however, according to his custom of taking opportunities when his enemies were likely to be off their guard, venturing to sea, even in this season, seems to have had no information to direct him on his approach to the coast, besides the general report that the enemy were strongest and most to be avoided in the bay of Carthage. In this belief he passed the headlands of Clupea and Neapolis, and stood in to the bay of Adrumetum. Being seen from the shore, he was followed by Cn. Piso from Clupea, with three thousand Numidian horse, and was received at Adrumetum by Confidius, with a force greatly superior to that which he himself had brought to the coast. But so little had he attended to the strength of the enemy, or so much was he determined to brave it, that he landed near Adrumetum on the nominal first of January, or about the middle of October, with three thousand foot and a hundred and fifty horse. This hazardous step his high reputation seemed to require or to justify. The enemy might not be apprized of his present weakness, it being occasioned by the accidental separation of his fleet. They were likely to be awed by his name, and to remain at a distance long enough to let him be joined by the remainder

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U. C. 707.
Jul. Cæsar
Dictat. 3tio
M. Emil.
Lepidus,
M. Eq.

BOOK of his army. In the mean time he supported
IV, the courage of his own people, by proceeding against the enemy with his usual confidence.

The garrison of Adrumetum, upon this sudden appearance of force which came to attack them, were thrown into some confusion, and Confidius, instead of taking measures to crush so inferior an enemy before he should receive any reinforcement, thought of nothing but how to secure himself from surprise; shut his gates, manned his walls, and placed all the troops under his command at their posts of alarm. Cæsar, to confirm him in this disposition, sent him a summons to surrender at discretion; and afterwards, at the suggestion of Plancus, who had been in habits of intimacy with Confidius, endeavoured to corrupt or to gain him by an insinuating message; but this officer, being more a man of integrity than he had shown himself to be an able general, ordered the bearer of the message to be put to death, and sent the letter unopened to Scipio.

Cæsar having received no return to his message and suspecting that his attempt to corrupt the commander of the forces at Adrumetum might betray his weakness, after only one night's stay in this dangerous situation, determined, on the day after he landed, to remove to some place of greater security. With this view he marched to the southward, and though harassed in his rear by the enemy's horse, continued his march without any considerable interruption or loss. As he advanced

to Ruspina, a deputation from the inhabitants of that place came forward to meet him, with offers of every accommodation it was in their power to supply, and of an immediate reception into their town. He encamped one night under their walls; but being inclined to see more of the coast, and not being in condition to divide his little force, he proceeded with the whole to Leptis. Here he was received with equal favor; and having entered the town, took measures to protect the inhabitants from the licentiousness of his own people.

This was a convenient post for the reception of his transports; and a few of them accordingly, having some cohorts of foot and troops of horse on board, it being now the third day after he himself had debarked, or about the twentieth of October, put in to the harbour of Leptis. By the report of persons who came in these ships he learned that numbers of the fleet, after they had parted company, appeared to be steering for Utica; a course by which they must either run into the hands of the enemy, or lose much time before they could correct their mistake, or recover their way to the southward.

In a state of anxious suspense, occasioned by these circumstances, Cæsar seems to have deliberated, whether it were not proper for him again to embark; and in consequence of his doubts, probably, though under pretence of the want of forage, he still kept his cavalry on board, and with great difficulty continued to supply them

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with fresh water from the land. But as soon as he determined to keep his footing in Africa, he landed his cavalry, and took the necessary measures to procure supplies of provisions by sea. He sent back the empty transports to receive any troops that might be arrived at Lillybæum, and ordered ten gallies from the harbour at Leptis to cruise for the missing ships of his last embarkation. He dispatched expresses to Sardinia and other maritime provinces, with orders to hasten the reinforcements of troops and the supplies of provisions which were expected from thence; and having intelligence that the enemy had some magazines in the island of Cercina, near the coast of Africa, he sent thither Crispus Sallustius, the celebrated historian, now serving in his army, to endeavour to secure those magazines for his use.

Being determined to keep both the ports of Ruspina and Leptis, which the enemy seemed to have abandoned to him, he was now, by the arrival of the cohorts which joined him at Leptis, in condition to garrison the town with three thousand men, while he himself returned with the remainder of those who were landed, to keep his possession, at the same time, of Ruspina. This place being unprovided of every necessary for the support of a garrison, he determined to try what provisions could be found in the neighbourhood to subsist his troops till they could be otherwise supplied, or enabled to penetrate farther into the country. For this purpose he advanced with the

whole of his little army to forage, followed by all the carriages that could be assembled, and had them loaded with corn, wood, and other necessities, to form some species of magazine for the troops he intended to place in the town. As soon as he had effected this service, it appeared that he had taken the resolution to go in person in search of the transports, on board of which the greater part of his army was dispersed. And with this view having posted ten cohorts at Ruspina, he himself, with the seven others, that made the whole of his strength now on shore, went down to the harbour, which was about two miles from the town, and embarked in the night.

The troops that were to be left at Ruspina, without the leader, in whom their confidence was chiefly reposed, were aware of their danger; so few, surrounded with numerous armies who were likely to assemble against them. They had now been three days on shore, and the enemy had full time to be apprized of their situation and of their weakness. The presence of their general had hitherto supported their courage; they relied on his abilities to repair the effects whether of mistake or temerity; but in his absence they lost all hopes and expected to become an easy prey to their enemies.

Cæsar, however, fully determined to put to sea, having past the night on board, still continued at anchor, when at break of day being about to weigh, some vessels came in sight, and were

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known to be a part of the fleet which he so anxiously looked for. These were soon followed by other ships which appeared successively, and brought him the greater part of the six legions with which he had originally sailed from Lillybæum. Being thus prevented in his intended excursion, he returned to Ruspina, and took post between the town and the shore.

In the mean time it appears, that Labienus and Petreius, commanding the horse and light troops of Scipio's army, in the angle that is formed by the promontory of Clupea, between the bays of Carthage and Hadrumetum, having intelligence that Cæsar was landed, with the utmost diligence assembled their forces, and marched towards the coast from which they had received the alarm.

Cæsar had taken a defensive station behind the town of Ruspina, the place which he chose for the resort and safe reception of his convoys and reinforcements by sea; but he was far from limiting his plan of operations to the defence of this place. On the fourth or fifth day after his landing, although by his own account he had yet no intelligence of the enemy's motions, he thought proper to continue the alarm he had given, and marched from Ruspina with a body of thirty cohorts, or about fifteen thousand foot, and four hundred horse, to penetrate into the country to observe its situation, or to extend the source of his supplies. After he had begun his march for this purpose, and was about three miles from his camp, the parties that were advanced before him

fell back on the main body, and informed him that they had been in sight of an enemy. Soon after this report clouds of dust began to rise from the plain, and about noon an army appeared in order of battle. To observe them more nearly, Cæsar after he had made the signal for the cohorts to form, and to be covered with their helmets, went forward with a small party to view the enemy. He saw bodies of cavalry in every part of the field; and from the imperfect view which could be had of them, as the air was clouded with dust, he supposed their line to consist entirely of horse. He thought himself secure against such an enemy, provided he could sufficiently extend, his front and cover his flanks; and for this purpose he divided his small body of horse to the right and the left; and that he might not be outlined, diminished the depth to increase the length of his ordinary column. In making this disposition, however, he had mistaken the enemy's force; it did not consist, as he supposed, entirely of cavalry, but of troops of horse interspersed at intervals with bodies of foot, and he had not observed that considerable detachments were sent under cover of the hills to turn his flanks, and fall upon his rear.

Under these disadvantages on the part of Cæsar, the action began in front by a scattered charge of the Numidian horse, who came in squadrons from the intervals at which they were placed among the infantry, and advancing at full gallop, threw their javelins and darts, and presently retired to their former situation. In this retreat, under

B O O K cover of the infantry whose intervals they occu-
IV. pied, they instantly rallied, and prepared to repeat the charge.

While Cæsar's infantry was occupied in front with this unexpected mode of attack, his horse were defeated on the wings; and the enemy, in consequence of the disposition they had made, were already on his right and left, even began to close on his rear, and, by the superiority of their numbers, were enabled to continue the impression they made on every side; his men giving way, to shun the arrows and darts of the enemy, were pressed from the flanks to the centre; so that they were forced into a circle, without any distinction of front or rear, and were galled with a continual discharge of missiles, which did great execution³⁷.

Cæsar, who so far had suffered himself to be surprised and over-reached, in this difficult situation, took the benefit of that confidence which his known ability and presence of mind ever procured him from his troops. Recollecting that the enemy must have weakened their line in every part, by attempting to stretch it over so great a circumference, he prevailed on his legions again to extend their ranks, ordered the cohorts to face alternately to the right and the left, and making a front in both directions, charged the enemy on the opposite sides, and drove them in both ways to a distance from the ground. Without attempting,

³⁷ Cæsar's copiis in orbem compulsis, intra cancellos omnes coniecti pugnare cogeantur.

however, to improve his advantage, or to urge the pursuit, he took the opportunity of the enemy's flight to effect his own retreat, and fell back to the camp behind Ruspina, from which he had moved in the morning.

The speedy march of Labienus and Petreius, from a distance which could not be less than eighty or a hundred miles, accomplished by the fourth or fifth day after the arrival of Cæsar, and their disposition on the day of battle, to avail themselves of their numbers and manner of fighting, was able and spirited. But the event is sufficient to show that the use of mere missile weapons in the open plain against troops who are armed and disciplined for close fight, although it may harass and distress an enemy, cannot have any decisive effect.

In about three days after this encounter, Cæsar had intelligence that Scipio himself was advancing with the whole force of his infantry, consisting of eight legions, or about forty thousand men, and four thousand regular horse: an army which he was not in condition to oppose in the field, and which obliged him, contrary to his usual practice to adopt a plan of defence. Ruspina lay along the coast, and at the distance of two miles from the shore. As his army lay behind the town, covering part of the space between it and the sea with the fortifications of his camp, he drew up an intrenchment from his camp on one side, and from the end of the town on the other, quite to the shore; so that, by means of the town in front the fortifi-

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cations of his camp and these lines in flank, the whole space between Ruspina and the sea was covered with works. And the harbour was thus secured from any attempts of the enemy. In order to man and defend these fortifications, he landed his engines from the galleys, and brought the mariners to serve them on shore.

The choice of this situation, cooped up in a narrow place, exposed to be deprived of any communication with the country, might, in case the reinforcements which Cæsar had expected from the sea, had by any accident been long delayed, have exposed him to the greatest calamities. He himself would not have neglected to hem in an enemy so posted with a line of circumvallation; but the undertaking was too vast for those who were opposed to him, and he was suffered in safety to wait the arrival of his reinforcements, and to collect some immediate supply of provisions from the neighbouring country, as well as to receive convoys which he had ordered from every maritime province.

While Cæsar remained in this post, Scipio arrived at Adrumetum, and having halted there a few days, joined Labienus and Petreius in the station they had chosen, about three miles from the town of Ruspina. Their cavalry immediately over-ran the country, and interrupted the supplies which Cæsar derived from thence. The space he had inclosed within his intrenchments being about six square miles, was soon exhausted even of forage or pasture, and his horses reduced to feed on sea weed, which was steeped in fresh

water, in order to purge it as much as possible of its salt. CHAP.
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To encourage the hopes which Scipio entertained from all these circumstances, the king of Numidia, with a powerful army, was on the march, and likely to join him before Cæsar could receive any considerable addition to his present force; but whatever might have been the consequence of this junction, if it had really taken place, it was delayed for some time by one of those strokes of fortune to which human foresight cannot extend. Publius Sittius, a Roman citizen, who had been an accomplice with Cataline in his designs against the republic, and who, on this account, had fled beyond reach of the Roman power, had assembled a band of warriors or lawless banditti, at the head of which he made himself of consequence on the coasts of Africa, and was admitted successively to join the forces of different princes in that quarter. Being now in the service of Bogud, king of Mauritania, and being disposed to court the favor of Cæsar, or hoping to make his peace at Rome by means of a person so likely to be at the head of the Roman state, he persuaded the king of Mauritania to take advantage of Juba's absence, and with such troops, as he had then on foot, to invade the kingdom of Numidia. Juba being about to join Scipio near Ruspina, when the news of this invasion of his own country overtook him, found himself obliged not only to return on his march, but to call off from his allies great part of the Numi-

BOOK IV. dian light troops, who were already in their camp.

Scipio, though thus disappointed of the great accession of force which he expected to receive by the junction of Juba, and though even somewhat reduced in his former numbers, still continued to act on the offensive; and in order to brave his enemy, and to receive some species of triumph from supposed offers of battle, repeatedly formed his army on the plain between the two camps. In repeating these operations, he advanced still nearer and nearer to Cæsar's intrenchments, and seemed to threaten his camp with an attack. In return to this insult, or to take off its effects, Cæsar knowing the strength of his works, affected to hear of the enemy's approach with indifference; and without moving from his tent, gave orders for the ordinary guards, which lay without the intrenchments, not to be discomposed, but as soon as the enemy approached them, to retire behind the parapet with the utmost deliberation; and Scipio, upon this reception, when seemingly most bent on assaulting the lines, being satisfied as usual with this display of his superiority, returned to his camp.

During these operations, and while Juba was still detained in Numidia by the diversion which Sitius had occasioned in his kingdom, Cæsar had frequent deserters from the African army, and received deputations from different parts of the country, with professions of attachment to himself as the relation of Marius, whose memory was still recent and popular in that province. Among these

advances, which were made to him by the natives of the country, he had a message from the inhabitants of Acilla, a place situated about ten miles from the coast, and equally distant from Adrumetum and from Ruspina, offering to come under his protection, and inviting him to take possession of their town. The people of this place, like most other towns of the province, were extremely disaffected to Scipio, on account of the severities which he exercised, by laying waste their possessions on the approach of Cæsar; and as they dreaded a repetition of the same measure, they were desirous to put themselves in a posture of defence against him. Cæsar accepted of their offer, and sent a detachment of his army, who turning round the enemy's flank, after a long night's march entered the town without opposition. Confidius having intelligence of what was in agitation at Acilla, sent a detachment at the same time from Adrumetum to secure the place; but coming too late, and finding that the enemy had already entered the town, brought forward some more forces on the following day, and endeavoured, but in vain, to dislodge them.

While Cæsar was thus endeavouring to extend his quarters in Africa, and to enlarge the source of his subsistence, Crispus Sallustius succeeded in the design upon which he had been sent to the island of Cercina, and was able to furnish a considerable supply of provisions from thence. There arrived at the same time from Alienus, at Lillybæum, a large convoy and fleet of transports, having on board two entire legions, the thirteenth

BOOK and fourteenth, together with eight hundred
IV. Gaulish cavalry, a thousand archers and slingers, and a large supply of provisions. As soon as these troops were landed, the transports were sent back to Lillybæum, in order to receive the remainder of the army which was still expected from thence. These supplies and reinforcements at once relieved Cæsar's army from the distress which they suffered; and by so great an accession of strength, amounting to twelve thousand men, put him in condition to break from the confinement in which he had some time remained, and to act on the offensive.

The first object upon this change in his affairs, was to seize upon some rising grounds in the neighbourhood of Ruspina, which Scipio had neglected to occupy, and from thence to pursue such advantage as he might find against the enemy. For this purpose, he decamped after it was dark, on the supposed twenty-sixth of January or tenth of November, and turning by the shore round the town of Ruspina, arrived in the night on the ground which he intended to occupy. This part of a ridge runs parallel to the coast, at a few miles distance from the shore, and, on the north of Ruspina, turns in the form of an amphitheatre round a plain of about fifteen miles extent. Near the middle of this plain stood the town of Uzita, on the brink of a deep marshy tract, which is formed by the water of some rivulets that fall from the mountains, and spread upon the plain in that place. Scipio had

had posted a garrison in the town , and had occupied the ridge on one side of the amphitheatre beyond the marsh , but had neglected the heights , of which Cæsar now took possession. It seems , that on these heights there remained a number of towers , or a species of castles constructed by the natives in the course of their own wars. In these Cæsar was furnished with a number of separate lodgements , which he joined by lines , in order to continue his communication with the camp he had left , and with the port of Ruspina.

He had , in one night , made a considerable progress in these works , and being observed at day-break , Scipio , in order to interrupt him , advanced into the plain , and formed in order of battle , about a mile in the front of his own encampment. Cæsar notwithstanding this movement of the enemy , did not at first think it necessary to interrupt his works ; but Scipio seeming to come forward with intention to attack him , while so great a part of his army was at work , he ordered the whole under arms , still keeping the advantage of his ground on the heights. Some parties of cavalry and light troops came near enough to skirmish between the two armies , and Labienus being advanced on the right beyond the main body of Scipio's forces , Cæsar sent a detachment round a village to attack him , and obliged him to fly in great disorder , after having narrowly escaped being entirely cut off. This flight of Labienus spread so great an alarm over Scipio's army , that the

BOOK whole, with precipitation, retired to their camp.

IV. Cæsar returned to his post, and without any farther interruption, continued to execute the works he had already begun. As soon as these were finished on the following day, he again formed in order of battle, to return the defiance which the enemy had so often given him, while he lay in the lines of Ruspina; and observing that Scipio remained in his camp, he marched on to the town of Uzita, which lay between the two armies. Scipio being alarmed for the safety of this place, at which he had deposited some part of his magazines, advanced to sustain the troops he had posted in the town; and Cæsar, believing that an action was likely to follow, made a halt, with the town of Uzita before his centre, having both his wings extended beyond it to the right and the left. Scipio, not to extend his front beyond the walls of the town, drew up his army in four lines, consisting of many separate bodies interspersed with elephants; but as Cæsar did not choose to attack the town, supported as it was by Scipio's army, neither did Scipio choose to expose any part of his line by advancing beyond it. Both armies having remained in this posture till sun-set, returned at night to their respective camps.

Cæsar still persisting in his design to oblige the enemy to hazard a battle in defence of Uzita, projected double lines of approach from his present camp to the town. As the place was accessible to the enemy, and when their army

should be drawn in order of battle, might be made a part of the line, it was impossible for Cæsar to invest the town, or even to approach the walls without hazard of being attacked on his flanks from the field, as well as in the centre from the town itself. In order to cover the approach which he intended to make to the walls, he carried on from his camp on the hills two intrenchments on the right and the left, forming a lane of sufficient breadth to embrace the town. Between these parrallel lines his troops advanced to the walls with perfect security, and under cover from any attacks that might be made on their flanks. As soon as this lane was effected to within the necessary distance of the walls, he threw up in front a breast-work opposite to the ramparts of the town, and from thence began to construct the works that were usually employed in the reduction of fortified places.

During the dependance of this siege, both parties received great reinforcements. Scipio was joined by the king of Numidia, who having repelled the enemy who attempted to invade his own kingdom, now came with three bodies of regular infantry, formed in the manner of the Roman legion, eight hundred heavy armed or bridled cavalry, with a great multitude of light or irregular troops. Cæsar's army, on the appearance of this new enemy, were much discouraged; but on seeing that Scipio, even after he was joined by the king of Numidia, still remained on the defensive, they resumed their former confidence, and were themselves soon after

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reinforced by the arrival of two more legions, the ninth and the tenth, who on their first approach to the coast, mistook for an enemy some gallies which Cæsar had stationed off the harbour of Thapsus, and under this mistake stood off again to sea, where they suffered many days from sickness, want of provisions, and of water.

These legions having been the principal authors of the late mutiny in Italy, are said to have now come without orders, intending to evince their zeal, and to court their general's favor, at a time when their service might be not only acceptable, but necessary to his safety. The principal historian of this war³⁸, however, relates only, that Cæsar having observed Tribunes and Centurions of these legions to have occupied entire transports with their own equipage, to the exclusion of the troops which were then so much wanted for the service, he took this opportunity to execute a piece of justice, which he had thought proper to remit, or to defer on a former occasion. That he dismissed several officers of these legions from the service, with the following terms of reproach: "For you, who have
" incited the troops of the Roman people to
" mutiny against the republic, who have plundered the allies, and been useless to the state;
" who, in place of soldiers, have filled transports with your servants and horses; who,
" without courage in the field, or modesty in

³⁸ Hirtius.

“ your quarters, have been more formidable to
 “ your country than to her enemies, I judge you
 “ unworthy of any trust in the service of the re-
 “ public, and therefore order you forthwith to
 “ be gone from the province, and to keep at a
 “ distance from all the stations of the Roman army.”

The other incidents, which are dated by historians during the dependance of the siege of Uzita, do not serve to make us acquainted with its progress, or with the detail of its operations. The season we are told was stormy, and Cæsar's army, in order to crowd the more easily on board of the transports, had left great part of their equipage behind them in Sicily, and were now without any covering, besides their shields, exposed to heavy rains and hail, accompanied with thunder and appearances of fire, which, to their great amazement, instead of the ordinary flashes of lightning, became stationary, and for a sensible time continued to flame on the points of their spears. While this storm continued, the ground upon which they lay was overflowed with water, or washed with continual torrents from the hills. Cæsar, nevertheless, persisted in the attack of Uzita, and seemed still to flatter himself that the defence of this place would lay the enemy under some disadvantage, which might furnish him with an opportunity to decide the war. The armies were accordingly often drawn out in order of battle, and were present at partial engagements of their cavalry or irregular troops, but without any general action.

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In the midst of the great expectations which must have attended the operations of this siege, Cæsar had one of the many occasions, on which he was ever so ready to commit his genius, his reputation, and his life, in acts of seeming temerity, which persons of inferior ability may admire, but never can safely imitate. Varus, with a fleet of fifty gallies, had surprised and burnt the greater part of his shipping at Leptis, and was in chase of Aquila, who, with an inferior squadron, was flying before him to the southward. Cæsar apprehended that the enemy, in consequence of this advantage, if not speedily checked, must soon be masters of the sea, so as to cut off all his supplies and reinforcements from the coasts. He knew that reputation gained or lost on small occasions, often decides of the greatest affairs; and that adverse circumstances, which if suffered to accumulate, may obscure the brightest fortune, can, if seasonably encountered, by daring efforts of resolution and courage, be actually turned to advantage. He instantly therefore went in person to Leptis, from whence he put off in a barge, and having overtaken his own squadron, which was flying before the enemy, he ordered them to put about, and to steer directly against their pursuers. Varus was struck with this unaccountable change in the conduct of his enemy, and supposing them to have come in sight of some powerful support, he fled in his turn, and crowding sail, steered for the port he had left. Cæsar gave chase, overtook some of the heaviest sailors that

fell astern, and forced the remainder to take refuge in the harbour of Adrumetum. Here he presented himself with an air of defiance; and having given this turn to the state of his affairs at sea, and left peremptory orders to his fleet not to resign the advantage which they had gained by the enemy's flight, he returned to the attack of Uzita. In such actions the fortunate often succeed, because the attempt seems to be impossible; and men of great ability may no doubt venture into the midst of difficulties, with which persons of inferior capacity are by no means fit to contend.

Cæsar, notwithstanding that by this stroke of fortune he preserved his communication with the sea, and received considerable supplies from thence, as well as from the country around him, in which he was favored by the natives; yet being greatly circumscribed by the superiority of the enemy's light troops, he suffered considerably in his camp from scarcity of provisions; and being, in his present operations against Uzita, to fight with a numerous army in detail, behind the walls of a fortified town, without being able to engage them upon equal terms in any decisive action, he took his resolution to discontinue the siege, and remove to a more advantageous station; or to undertake some enterprize, in which he was more likely to succeed. He accordingly decamped in the night, set fire to the wood and straw that was amassed upon the ground, left the lanes he had fortified with so much labor, and marching by the shore, placed his baggage

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between the column of the army and the sea, and thus covered it from the enemy, who he expected were to follow him by the ridge of hills which overlooked the line of his march.

The retreat of Cæsar was sufficient to confirm the leaders of the republican party, in the hopes they had formed of being able to wear him out by a dilatory war. They followed him accordingly by the heights, and having observed that he stopped at Agar, a town which he held by the affections of the natives, they took post on three several heights, at the distance of about six miles from his camp. In this position, they were not able to hinder him from making in the contiguous villages and fields a considerable acquisition of provisions and forage, which greatly relieved his army; but, to prevent his farther excursions into the country, and to secure its produce to their own use, they sent two legions, under the command of Caius Mutius Reginus, with orders to take possession of the town of Zeta, which lay about twenty miles from Agar, and on the right at some distance beyond their present camp. Cæsar had intelligence from the natives, that these troops were frequently employed in collecting provisions and forage, and that they might easily be cut off, and the town be surprised. He accordingly formed a design for this purpose; and with a view to the execution of it, removed from the plain of Agar, and fortified a strong camp on a height nearer to the enemy. Here leaving a sufficient guard for his lines, he put the remainder of the army in

motion in the night, passed by the enemy's stations, and surpris'd the town of Zeta, which he entered by break of day, while the greater part of the garrison had left the place in perfect security, and were scattered in foraging parties over the neighbouring country. Having placed a sufficient detachment to secure this new acquisition, he set out upon his return, making a disposition, not to pass the enemy unobserved, which was no longer practicable, but to force his way through any impediment they might oppose to his march. The night could no longer be of any advantage to him; he set out, therefore by day, leading the governor of Zeta, with P. Atrius, who belonged to the association of Utica, his prisoners, together with some part of Juba's equipage, and a train of camels, loaded with plunder which he had taken in the place.

The enemy were by this time apprized of his motions. Scipio was come out of his lines; and not far from Cæsar's route, had posted himself in order of battle. Labienus and Afranius, with a great power of cavalry and light infantry, had taken possession of some heights under which he was to pass, and were preparing to attack him on his flanks, and on his rear. Cæsar was aware of these difficulties; it was nevertheless necessary to encounter them. He trusted, that the head of his column must force its way; and he placed his whole cavalry to cover the rear of his march. When he came abreast of the enemy, being assailed, as usual, by the African cavalry with peculiar efforts of agility and cunning, he made a halt;

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and in order by some great exertion, if possible, to clear his way, and procure to his people some respite in pursuing the remainder of their march undisturbed, he ordered the legions to lay down the loads which they usually carried, and to charge the enemy. They accordingly put all the Africans to flight; but no sooner resumed their march, than they were again attacked, and repeatedly forced to renew the same operations. They had already been detained four hours in passing over a hundred paces, or less than half a quarter of a mile, from the place at which they were first attacked. The sun was setting, and the enemy were in hopes of being able to oblige them to halt for the night on a field, which was destitute of water. Scipio, for this purpose, still kept the position which he had taken in the morning, and from thence observed, and occasionally supported, the operations of the light troops.

Cæsar perceived the danger to which he must be exposed, if he should halt on this ground, and saw the necessity of continuing his march: but observing, that as often as the cavalry in his rear was engaged, whether they repulsed or gave way to the enemy, he was obliged to stop in order to support them, or to wait till they had recovered their station, he thought proper to change his disposition, brought forward the horse to the head of his column, and substituted a chosen body of foot in the rear, who, although under an incessant discharge from the enemy, continued to move, and enabled him, though slowly to effect his retreat with a regular and uninterrupted pace.

In this manner, notwithstanding the great danger to which he had been exposed, he regained his camp, near Agar, with a very inconsiderable loss. Having thus got possession of Zeta, a post on the flank or rear of the enemy, Cæsar formed successive designs on Vacca, Sarfura, and Tyfdra, places similarly situated round the scene of the war. His design on the first of these places was prevented by the Numidians, who, having intelligence of his coming, entered before him, and reduced the town to ashes. Both armies being in motion for some days, he forced Sarfura; but advancing to Tyfdra, with the same intention he thought proper, upon observing the strength of the place, not to make any attempt against it; and, on the fourth day, having returned to his station near Agar, the enemy likewise resumed their former position.

While Cæsar remained at this post, he received a reinforcement of four thousand men, consisting chiefly of the sick, who had been left behind the army in Italy, and who now joined their legions, together with a body of four hundred horse, and a thousand archers and slingers. With this accession of strength, he formed a design on Tegea, which was occupied by a detachment of the enemy supported by the whole of their army, encamped at the distance of a few miles behind the town; and having advanced, in hopes to force or surprise it, about eight miles on the plain, he was observed by Labienus and Scipio, who came forward, at the same time, about four miles beyond their own station, in order to sustain their detachment.

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These consisting of four hundred horse, divided themselves on the right and the left of the town; and the main armies being formed in order of battle, with this post between them, Cæsar gave orders, that the party of horse, which ventured to show themselves without the walls of Tegea, should be attacked. The events which followed this first encounter, brought into action several detached bodies, both of horse and of foot that were sent from the different sides to sustain the parties engaged, but did not lead to any general or decisive action; and both armies retired at night to their respective lines.

In many of these partial engagements which happened in this campaign, Cæsar's cavalry gave way to that of the Africans. In one of their flights Cæsar met an officer, who was running away with his party, and affecting to believe him under a mistake, took hold of his bridle, "You are wrong," he said, "for it is this way you must go to the enemy." Even the legions stood greatly in awe of the Numidian irregulars. by whom they were on many occasions, surprised with some new feat of agility or cunning; and they were considerably intimidated by the number and formidable appearance of the elephants, which they knew not how to withstand. To fortify the minds of his men, and to prepare them to meet such antagonists, Cæsar had a number of elephants brought to his camp, armed and harnessed like those of the enemy. He exercised his horses in presence of these animals, taught his men in what places to strike where the beast was vulnerable, and how to elude their fury. He likewise made

some change in the usual exercise of the legion, such as might the better qualify his men to baffle or repel the artful and desultory attacks of the Numidians; and as he frequently employed his regular troops in foraging parties, he inured them by degrees to depart from their usual forms, without losing their courage, and to recover from any casual disorder into which they might be thrown. To show his own confidence in the superiority of his men, he frequently made an offer of battle on equal ground; and, in the manner that was, in their turns, common to both parties, drew a species of triumph from his enemy's declining to fight.

In these operations the campaign drew on to the middle of February, and had lasted about five months; during this time Cæsar had surmounted very great difficulties, arising from the dispersion of his fleet, the uncertainty of his communication with Italy, and the scarcity of provisions in a country laid waste or possessed by his enemies. He was now become master of many towns on the coast, and of a considerable extent of territory; but for the many objects which required his attention in different parts of the empire, he remained under great disadvantage in supporting a dilatory war, in which it appeared that Scipio and Labienus were resolved to persist. In order, if possible, to break their measures, he formed a design upon Thapsus, their principal garrison and sea-port on the southern boundaries of the province. With this view he decamped in the night from his station near Agar, and directing his

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march to the southward, arrived before Thapsus on the following day. As he had formerly, in order to secure his convoys against any attempts from thence, blocked up the harbour with his ships, he now seized all the avenues which led to the town, and invested it completely from the land.

Scipio and Juba, greatly interested to preserve a place of so much consequence, put their armies in motion, and, to counteract that of Cæsar, followed him by the route of the hills. Seeing him invest Thapsus, they took their first posts on two separate heights, about eight miles from the town. Cæsar, with his usual industry and dispatch, executed lines both of circumvallation and of countervallation. By these lines, which were in the form of a crescent, terminating at both ends in the sea, he embraced the town, and proposed to encamp his army between them. Scipio was sufficiently acquainted with the ground, to know, that there was near the harbour a narrow channel, or salt-pit, separated from the sea, by a second beach or sand-bank, which it was possible the enemy might not have observed, and by which he might still have an entry to the town, or be able to throw in his succours. He therefore advanced with his whole army; and while he made a feint to interrupt Cæsar in the works he was carrying on, sent a party to occupy the sandbank, or to throw themselves into the town of Thapsus by that communication. Cæsar, however, had already taken

possession of this passage , and shut it up with three several intrenchments or redoubts , so placed as to secure it at once against any sallies from the garrison, as well as attacks from the field.

The combined army, on being thus disappointed of any communication with the town of Thapsus, remained all the day under arms, and gave the enemy an opportunity, which he often affected to desire, of terminating the war by a battle. But Cæsar, either because he had not sufficiently fortified his intrenchments to secure his rear from the town, or because he would not choose that moment to fight, when the enemy was prepared to receive him, made no advances to engage on that day.

Scipio, remaining on the same ground all night, took his resolution to encamp, and at break of day appeared to be forming the usual intrenchments. Cæsar had then probably completed his own works; and thinking the opportunity fair, or being determined not to suffer the enemy to effect a lodgement in his presence, he made the usual signal to prepare for action; and leaving a proper force to man his intrenchments against the town, drew out the remainder of his army to the field, ordered part of his fleet to get under sail, to turn a head-land in the rear of the enemy; and as soon as the action began in front, to alarm them with shouts, or a feint, to land and to attack their rear. Having made these dispositions, he put his army in motion, and being come near enough to distinguish the posture of

B O O K the enemy, observed, that their main body was
IV. already in order of battle, with the elephants disposed on the wings; and that numerous parties were still at work on the lines, within which they meant to encamp. He halted, and made a disposition suitable to that of the enemy. His centre consisted of five legions, his wings of four; the tenth and second legions composed the right wing, the eighth and ninth composed the left. Five cohorts, together with the cavalry, were selected to support the archers and slingers that were to begin the attack on the enemy's elephants. Cæsar himself went round every division on foot, exhorted the veterans to be mindful of the high reputation which they had to support, and recommended to the new levies to take example from those who were already possessed of so much glory, and who were instructed by long experience, in the arts to be practised in the day of battle against an enemy.

While Cæsar was thus employed, the legions of Scipio appeared to reel; they at one time retired behind their imperfect works, again changed their purpose, and came back to their ground. Many of Cæsar's officers, and many of the veteran soldiers, well acquainted with this sign of distraction and irresolution, called aloud for the signal of battle. But he himself, possibly to whet their ardor, as well as to keep them in breath, again and again halted the whole line.

In this situation of the two armies, Cæsar is said to have been seized with a fit of epilepsy, to which

which he was subject; a disease which, although it attacks the seats of understanding and of sense, and suspends, for a time, all the exercises of them in the most alarming manner, does not appear from this example to impair the faculties, nor to be inconsistent with their highest measures, and their ablest exertions. The report, however, is not consistent with the narration of Hirtius. This historian, although he allows that the troops in the last part of their motion to engage, acted without any orders; and while Cæsar wished them to advance more deliberately, that they forced a trumpet on the right to sound the usual charge, and that the whole line, without any other signal, overwhelming by force all the officers, who ventured to oppose them, continued to rush on the enemy; yet he observes that Cæsar, instead of being out of condition to act, took his resolution to excite an ardor which he could not restrain; and, in order that he might bring his whole army at once with united force into action; commanded all his trumpets to sound, and himself, mounting on horseback, rode up with the foremost ranks. The battle began on the right, where the enemy's elephants being galled with a shower of arrows and stones, reeled back on the troops that were posted to sustain them, trod part of the infantry under foot, and broke over the unfinished intrenchments in their rear.

The left of Scipio's army being thus routed, the main body soon after gave way; and the whole fled to the camp which they had formerly occupied; but in their flight, being thrown into

B O O K the utmost confusion, and separated from their
 IV. officers, they arrived at the place to which they fled, without any person of rank to rally or command them. In this state of consternation they threw down their arms, and attempted to take refuge in the camp of their Numidian ally. But this being already in possession of the enemy, they continued their flight to the nearest heights; and being without arms, awaited their fate in a state of helpless despair. When they saw the troops that pursued them advance, they made signs of submission, and saluted the victors with a shout, but in vain. They were instantly attacked by the victorious army of Cæsar, who, though affecting clemency on former occasions, now seemed to be actuated with a paroxysm of rage and thirst of blood; contrary to the orders and entreaties of their general they put the whole of this unarmed and defenceless multitude to the sword. They are said, on this occasion, to have seized the opportunity of satiating their revenge on some of their own officers who had offended them. One was actually murdered, another, being wounded, fled to Cæsar for protection; and many persons of distinction, Senators and Roman Knights, observing their danger, thought proper to withdraw to some place of concealment, till the present fury of the troops should abate.

In the beginning of this memorable action, the garrison of Thapsus had sallied, but were repulsed with loss. When the contest was over, Cæsar, to induce the town to surrender, displayed

the trophies of victory; but had no answer. On the following day, he drew up his army under the wall of the town; and in that place pronounced his thanks to the legions for their behaviour, and, without any reproach for the disorder and cruelty of the preceding day, declared what were to be the rewards which he intended, at a proper time, for the veterans; and, by some immediate mark of his favor, distinguished a few who had signalized themselves. He appointed Caius Rubellius, with three legions, to continue the siege of Thapsus, and Cn. Domitius, with two others, to reduce Tyfdra; and having sent forward M. Messala, with a body of horse on the road to Utica, he himself followed with the remainder of the army ³⁹.

At Utica were assembled, from every part of the empire, all who were obnoxious to Cæsar, or who, from a zeal for the republic, had refused to submit to his power. On the third day after the battle, towards night, a person who had escaped from the field of battle coming to Utica, this unhappy convention of citizens was struck with the greatest alarm. Under the effects of their consternation, they met in the streets, ran to the gates, and again returned to their habitations. They crowded together in the public places, and separated by turns, and passed the night in extreme confusion. Cato represented to them, that the accounts they received might

³⁹ Hirt. de Bello Af.

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be exaggerated, and endeavoured to compose their fears. As soon as it was day he called them together, and laid before them a state of the place, the works, military stores, provisions, arms, and numbers of men; and having commended the zeal, which they had hitherto shown in defence of the republic, exhorted them now to make proper use of the means they still had of defending themselves, or at least of making their peace in a body: declared, that if they were inclined to submit to the victor, he should impute their conduct to necessity: but if they were determined to resist, he should reserve his sword for the last stake of the republic, and share with them in the consequences of a resolution, which he should love and admire. He contended, that they were now to consider themselves as assembled, not in Utica, but in Rome; “ That the
“ force of the republic was yet great, and might
“ still, as on former occasions, rise again from
“ its ruins; that the forces of Cæsar must still
“ be distracted or separate, to make head against
“ enemies who were appearing in different parts
“ of the empire; that in Spain his own army
“ had deserted from him, and the whole province had declared for the sons of Pompey;
“ that Rome, the head of the commonwealth,
“ was yet erect, and would not bend under the
“ yoke of a tyrant; that his enemies were multiplying while he seemed to destroy them;
“ that his own example should instruct them; or
“ rather that the courage which he exerted in

“ the paths of guilt and of infamy, should animate
“ those who were about him, to die with ho-
“ nor, to secure for their country blessings in
“ which they themselves were to share.” At this
assembly a resolution was accordingly taken to
defend the city of Utica, and numbers of slaves,
who were set free by their masters for this purpose,
were armed and enrolled. But it soon appeared, that
the assembly consisted of persons unable to persist
in this resolution, and who were preparing separately
to merit the favor of the conqueror by an entire
and early submission. They soon made a general
profession of this design, expressed their veneration
of Cato, but confessed, that they were not quali-
fied to act with him in so arduous a scene; assured
him, that if they were permitted to send a message
to Cæsar, the first object of it should be to inter-
cede for his safety; and that, if they could not ob-
tain it, they should accept of no quarter for them-
selves. Cato no longer opposed their intentions;
but said, that he himself must not be included in their
treaty; that he knew not of any right Cæsar had to
dispose of his person; that what had hitherto hap-
pened in the war only served to convict Cæsar of
designs which were often imputed to him, and
which he always denied. He will now, at least,
own, he said, that his opponents had reason for all
the suspicions they suggested against him.

While matters were in this state, a party of
Scipio's horse, which had escaped from the field
of battle, appeared at the gates of the town,
and were with difficulty, by Cato's entreaties,

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hindered from putting every Roman, who offered to submit to Cæsar, as well as the inhabitants of the place, to the sword. Being diverted from this act of violence, and furnished with some money for their immediate subsistence, they continued their retreat. Most of the Senators, who were present, took shipping, and escaped. Lucius Cæsar undertook to carry to his kinsman a petition from such of the Roman citizens as remained, and said to Cato, at parting, that he would gladly fall at the victor's feet to make *his* peace. To which Cato answered, "If I were
 " disposed to make my peace with Cæsar, I should
 " repair to him in person; but I have done him
 " no wrong, I am not an object of his pardon,
 " and shall not request what it were insolence in him
 " to offer me as a favor." He, however, on this occasion, observed to his own son, that it would not become him to leave his father. "At a fit
 " time," he said, "you will put yourself on the
 " victor's mercy, but do not take part in public
 " affairs; the times do not afford a station in which it
 " would be proper for you to act." "And why," said the young man, "will you not take the benefit of the victor's clemency for yourself, as well
 " as for me?" "I was born to freedom," he said, "and cannot, in my old age, be reconciled to servitude. For you these times were
 " destined; and it may become you to submit
 " to your fate." Having passed the day in aiding his friends to procure the means of their escape, he went to the bath, and supped as usual,

without any marks of dejection or affectation of ease; and being retired to his chamber, after some time which he employed in reading, he killed himself. His attendants, upon hearing a noise which alarmed them, burst open the door, and would have dressed the wound, but he tore it up with his hand, and expired in making this effort^{**}. Every one, through the day, had been anxious to know what was the design which Cato covered under the appearance of so much concern for others, and of so little care for himself. On the first report of his death, multitudes crowded to the doors of his quarters, and gave the most unfeigned demonstrations of dejection and sorrow. The colony of Utica, though originally hostile to his cause, and still in the interest of Cæsar, ordered a public funeral, and erected his statue in the place of interment.

Cato died in the vigor of life, under fifty; he was naturally warm and affectionate in his temper; comprehensive, impartial, and strongly possessed with the love of mankind. But in his conduct, probably became independent of passion of any sort, and chose what was just on its own account. He professed to believe, with the sect whose tenets he embraced, that it might not, in particular circumstances, be expedient for a man to preserve or lay down his life; but that, while he kept it, the only good or evil competent to him consisted in the part which he took, as a friend or an enemy to mankind. He had long

^{**} Dio Cass. Appian. Plutarch. Hirtius de Bello Africano.

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foreseen the dangers to which the republic was exposed, and determined to live while he could counteract the designs that were formed against it ⁴¹. The leader of the successful party thought proper to apologize for himself; by decrying the virtues of Cato; but the bulk of mankind, in his own and the subsequent ages, were equally pleased to extol them; and he is a rare example of merit, which received its praise even amidst the adulation that was paid to his enemies ⁴²; and was thought, by the impartial, equally above the reach of commendation or censure ⁴³.


⁴¹ Sed vere laudari ille vir non potest, nisi hæc ornata sint; quod ille ea, quæ nunc sunt, et futura viderit, et ne fierent contenderit, et, facta ne videret, vitam reliquerit. Cicero. ad Att. lib. xii. ep. 4.

⁴² See the writings of Virgil and Horace.

⁴³ Cujus gloriæ neque profuit quisquam laudando, nec vituperando quisquam nocuit, quum utrumque summis præditi fecerint ingeniis. Frag. Livii ex Hieronym. Prolog. lib. xi. in Oseam.

END OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.





Ferguson, Adam,

The history of the progress and termination of the Roman republic

Bd.: 4

Basil (1791)

H.ant. 123-4

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